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Abstract 
 
The March 26
th
 price spike in Genesis Energy‟s Huntly power station prices has 
focussed attention on the regulatory powers of the newly established Electricity 
Authority. The Authority‟s weapon of choice, the Undesirable Trading Situation 
regime, allows them to intervene in the market and was applied in this case to 
reset prices retrospectively. The decision caused a storm of controversy in the 
media and numerous submissions, both for and against, from market players. 
The Authority has a mandate to regulate competition in the electricity markets and 
because of the overlapping jurisdiction, has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Commerce Commission. How the two bodies interpret 
and apply their co-existing statutory obligations will be of great interest to 
businesses operating not just in the energy sector, but across the whole economy. 
For those in the electricity industry any indication as to how the Electricity 
Authority intends to regulate wholesale electricity markets will be crucial for 
implementing future market strategies and investments. 
The question for this paper will therefore be to assess the decision in light of these 
overlapping jurisdictions, the policy documents used to guide each decision maker, 
and the previous decisions which may have influenced or misled market players. 
Given the focus on efficiency in New Zealand‟s competition law, particular 
attention will be paid to the economic history of theories of contestability, the 
total surplus standard, price squeezes and wealth transfers, and the interplay 
between static and dynamic efficiency.  
The conclusion will be that the March 26
th
 decision, although made under a very 
different legislative scheme to the Commerce Act, bears remarkable similarities to 
the general competition law. The decision applies a very similar remedy to the 
standard ECPR counterfactual analysis seen in s 36 prosecutions. The main 
difference between the two regimes is that the UTS provision is not applied 
punitively, reflecting a determination on the Authority‟s part to maintain 
flexibility and restore orderly trading. 
 
 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the University of Waikato, 
Faculty of Law for the Masters Research scholarship which makes it possible for 
me to pursue my Ph.D. My thanks are also extended to Associate Professor Claire 
Breen without whose advice and support I would not have received the 
scholarship. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Professor Barry Barton, for his 
valuable comments, suggestions and guidance. Thank you for your kind support, 
assistance and patience with me. Also a special thanks to my de facto second 
supervisor, Senior Lecturer Anna Kingsbury, for her help and discussions of 
related matters pertaining to my thesis. To Doug Tennent thank you for the kind 
words and support. Also thanks to Bart van Campen and Stephen Batstone for 
taking time to meet with me provide their invaluable practical insight to the 
mysterious inner workings of the NZEM. 
Special thanks to His Honour, Sir William “David” Baragwanath, KNZM, QC, 
for his interest in my work at an early stage. It was a great motivation to achieve. 
It is a pleasure to acknowledge and to thank my friends, Kim Jordan, Roble Ali, 
Jasper Pierce, Ingo Unterweger, Tawhana Ball, Bella Barda-Bareket, Marie 
Brown and the other Grad Meeting students who in their own ways have given me 
strength and encouragement throughout my Masters. 
I am most thankful to my parents Robert and Margaret Farnworth their 
unconditional support, sacrifice, and love. 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11. 
 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
 
      Abstract 
      Acknowledgements 
Table of Contents 
Introduction – The Purpose of Competition Law 
Historical Development of Competition Law – From Perfect 
Competition to Workable Competition 
Dynamic Efficiency and the Schumpeterians 
How Useful are Economic Models – Cournot to Chaos Theory 
Perfect Competition and the Development of Static Efficiency 
The Marginal Cost Controversy 
The Sherman Act and American Antitrust Theory 
Schumpeter and Baumol on Contestability and Dynamic 
Efficiency 
The Influence of Robert Bork 
Richard Posner and Law and Economics 
Baumol and the Wave of Creative Destruction 
The Dynamic Efficiency Debate in New Zealand 
State Control of Prices and Competition Pre-1984 
The 1984 Labour Government, Bollard and Contestability 
The Shift from Prime Necessity to Light Handed Regulation 
The Commerce Act 1986 
Section 36 and the Use of Market Power 
Price Control Under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 
The Commerce Commission, the Electricity Authority and the 
Total Surplus Standard 
Regulating Electricity after Wolak and the ETAG Report 
The Undesirable Trading Situation Regime 
The March 26
th
 Price Hike 
The High Court Judgment 
Conclusion 
Bibliography 
i 
ii 
ii 
1 
4 
 
13 
18 
22 
25 
33 
37 
 
39 
45 
49 
51 
54 
57 
67 
71 
75 
86 
90 
 
95 
108 
111 
123 
131 
134 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Spiking Prices: How Economics, History and Law have 
shaped the New Zealand Electricity Authority’s UTS 
Regime 
By Steven Farnworth 
 
Antitrust is a subcategory of ideology.
1
 
Robert Bork 
 
 
Introduction – The Purpose of Competition Law 
On March 26, 2011, prices in the New Zealand wholesale electricity market, 
forecast to reach a mere $160/MWh, spiked to a record $23,047/ MWh.
2
 It 
seemed that Genesis Energy had taken advantage of a temporary monopoly of 
electricity supply to Hamilton and regions to the north to engineer a $50 million 
transfer of wealth from rivals and customers alike. The Electricity Authority (“the 
Authority”) received 35 claims under the Undesirable Trading Situation 
regulations (“UTS”) of the Electricity Industry Participation Code (“the Code”). 
In its Draft Decision the Authority concluded that an Undesirable Trading 
Situation in the form of a „market squeeze‟ had occurred and that the proper 
remedy was to reset offer prices to $3000/MWh. This decision was reached even 
though the New Zealand Electricity Market‟s defining characteristic has been that 
it has no price cap, and was intended from its inception to be lightly regulated.
3
 
The decision raises important issues which go beyond the regulation of electricity 
markets. It prompts us to reconsider the economic concepts which underpin 
competition law. We must reflect on the proper role of the law and ask what its 
                                                 
1
 Robert Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself  (Basic Books Inc, New York, 
1978) at 3. 
2
 Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd v The Electricity Authority [2012] NZHC 238 at [1]. 
3
 See “Final Decision”, below n 453, at [119]. 
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overall objective is, to pursue economic efficiency, to seek the equitable 
distribution of wealth or to find some compromise between the two ends. 
This thesis will explore the economic history of concepts such as contestability, 
workable competition and dynamic efficiency. It will reveal how New Zealand 
policy makers selected Chicago School ideas in the 1980s and used them to form 
the Commerce Act 1986. Those ideas were themselves shaped by debates such as 
the „marginal cost controversy‟, and the total surplus versus consumer surplus 
standard with its search for a proper balancing between static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency objectives. A guiding theme will therefore be whether our 
regulatory authorities will apply more of a total surplus or a consumer surplus 
standard when regulating potentially anti-competitive behaviour. 
The thesis will examine the development of s 36 and Part 4 of the Commerce Act 
to see how control of monopoly behaviour has changed from the days of state 
control of prices and the prime necessity doctrine, and how that doctrine was 
excluded by the Commerce Act. The shift to light handed regulation and 
subsequent re-regulation of the economy will be assessed in light of a few of the 
landmark judgments of the last two decades. We will then look at policy 
documents which lead to the establishment of the Electricity Authority (“the 
Authority”), how the Authority‟s employed its UTS powers in the March 26th 
Price Hike, and how that decision was subsequently approved in the High Court. 
Finally, we will consider the significance of the decision for competition law 
issues in electricity regulation given the interrelationship between the Commerce 
Commission and the Electricity Authority and their overlapping mandate to 
promote competitive outcomes in New Zealand markets. Would the two agencies 
come to a different result given the same set of circumstances? 
The purposes of competition law are inseparable from their historical 
development. As Robert Bork said:  
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm 
answer to one question: What is the point of the law – what are its goals? 
Everything else follows from the answer we give.
4
 
The question of how to balance the interests of workers, investors, consumers and 
producers lies at the heart of both economics and the law. The debate over static 
                                                 
4
 Bork, above n 1, at 50. 
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versus dynamic efficiency, the total surplus versus consumer welfare standard and 
the marginal cost controversy, all have at their core the basic question of how 
society‟s resources are to be shared between producers and consumers. These 
academic conundrums are revisited time and time again, and it is the most 
convincing solutions of the day which inform the next generation of competition 
lawyers and policy makers. Is the objective of competition law to guarantee the 
cheapest possible goods for the short term of consumers, or is it to provide 
incentives for the innovative to find solutions leading to long term growth? It is 
often said that these two objectives must be balanced, just how difficult that can 
be is the reason why the debate has continued for so long. 
The Commerce Act 1986 defines competition as “workable or effective 
competition”.5 Workable competition is a term of art. Discerning its true meaning 
requires a deep understanding, not just of the Commerce Act, but of how a whole 
historiography of economic concepts have shaped the free market system itself.  
Beginning with Adam Smith, we can see how ideal of perfect competition 
gradually gave way to workable competition based initially on Schumpeterian 
ideals of contestability and dynamic efficiency. The story begins with state 
centred control of economies, and, in the US, the Jeffersonian ideal of protecting 
the democratic economic rights of numerous, self-sufficient, small business men. 
The goal was to allow self-interest to motivate individuals to provide consumer 
and public goods at the best possible prices.  This objective has shifted to the 
promotion of an oligopolistic system, where a few large firms are encouraged to 
accumulate wealth to fund research and development for long term growth. It is 
this oligopolistic market system, where market power is constrained mainly by the 
potential for contestability, which really exemplifies workable competition. 
As the objective of competition policy has shifted from perfect to workable 
competition, a somewhat lax attitude towards anticompetitive behaviour evolved. 
In the last decade however, we have seen a shift from neo-liberal reliance upon 
light handed regulation of the free market embodied by the Commerce Act 1986, 
to a more interventionist competition law policy. James Every-Palmer has called 
                                                 
5
 Commerce Act 1986, s 3(1). 
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this the “re-regulation” of the economy.6 The recent „Datatails‟ decision for one, 
may indicate that the Commerce Commission is willing to use its powers under 
the s 36 of the Commerce Act to penalise breaches of s 36 of the Commerce Act 
with a determination we have not seen ever before.
 7
 
The Authority‟s objective is under the EIA, meanwhile, is “to promote 
competition in, reliable supply by, and the efficient operation of, the electricity 
industry for the long-term benefit of consumers.”8 This raises more questions. 
Does this mean that the Electricity Authority will define competition as workable 
competition in the same way as the Commerce Commission? And if so, would it 
make the same decision as the Commerce Commission might, given the same set 
of circumstances? Will the Authority be influenced by this quiet shift towards re-
regulation or will it maintain the neo-liberal ideals of its intellectual forefathers? 
The goal of this thesis is to explore these questions in light of the events of March 
26
th
, 2011.  
  
Historical Development of Competition Law – From Perfect 
Competition to Workable Competition 
Since Adam Smith first posited the concept of the invisible guiding hand of the 
market, the central question has been how to balance the needs of society with the 
needs of the individual. Liberal economic theory requires that government should 
not interfere with the workings of the market. By allowing individuals the 
freedom to make their own self-interested decisions in pursuit of profit, and in 
competition with each other, a mutually beneficial equilibrium will naturally and 
inevitably be reached. The invisible hand thus built on the older laissez faire 
idealists who demanded that the state should “let (them) act”.9  The theory is 
elegant and the overwhelming success of Western capitalism provides emphatic 
empirical proof that it works. History also teaches, however, that market failure, 
corruption and anti-competitive behaviour caused by those same frustrating utility 
                                                 
6 See Dr James Every-Palmer, “The State and Monopolies: New Zealand‟s Experience” (2010) 12 
Otago LR 227. 
7
 Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (2011) 13 TCLR 270; [2011] 
NZCCLR 19. 
8
 Electricity Industry Act 2010, s 15. 
9
 HarperCollins Collins Dictionary (11
th
 ed, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 2011) at 924. 
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maximising individuals may result from too much freedom. The recent Global 
Financial Crisis, for example, has renewed calls for a fundamental and far-
reaching reassessment of free market ideology. 
Along with the rise of Western capitalism we have seen the rise of the limited 
liability corporation. Ronald Coase predicted that individuals would organise 
themselves into firms when to do so would make carrying out market transactions 
less expensive.
10
 Where such organisations come to dominate the market, 
regulation of the market may become necessary to protect democracy itself. There 
is then the countervailing notion that Smith‟s invisible hand may sometimes need 
to be guided, or, to continue the metaphor, an arm wrestle between state and 
citizen may become necessary. 
Smith‟s insight was that individuals guided by the price signals of the market and 
their own self-interest would do far more to promote the public weal than any 
central planner.
11
 The Lockean pursuit of life, liberty and property would provide 
a far more flexible and reliable guarantee of wealth than could be achieved under 
any feudal or mercantilist state. The  revolutionary suggestion was that the 
remnants of the Ancien Régime’s archaic and repressive state centered structures 
must be excluded from the business realm.
12
 It is no coincidence that this seminal 
work was published in the year of the American Declaration of Independence, the 
liberal revolution was a universal phenomenon encompassing all aspects of 
eighteenth century society. 
Smith was fully cognizant of the dangers of monopoly and collusion. He is 
frequently quoted as having said that:  “People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”13  
Smith was equally clear that competitive pressure had beneficial effects for 
consumer welfare:
14
 
                                                 
10
 Ronald Coase The Firm, the Market and the Law (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1988) at 7. 
11
 Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910). 
12
 Robert Heilbroner The Essential Adam Smith (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986) at 151-
152. 
13
 Smith, at 117. 
14
 At 54. 
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The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got. 
The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary is the 
lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion, indeed, but for a 
considerable time together. The one is upon every occasion the highest 
which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which it is supposed, they will 
consent to give; the other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly 
afford to take, and at the same time continue their business. 
The goal of competition policy must therefore be to minimise the opportunities for 
collusive and domineering behaviour by the rich and powerful, while maximising 
the beneficial effects of fair competition. The challenge then, as now, was to 
balance this search for fairness to consumers and competitors alike, without 
strangling the incentives which encourage the investor and entrepreneur to engage 
in risky but rewarding business activities.  
Adam Smith also said that:
15
 
The appropriation of herds and flocks, which introduced an inequality of 
fortune, was that which first gave rise to regular government. Till there be 
property there can be no government, the very end of which is to secure 
wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor. 
It is the monopolisation of common wealth by the few from the many which first 
created inequalities in wealth. If the purpose of government is to protect that 
appropriation then, according to this reading of Smith, necessarily the state must 
make the political decision to stand with the rich against the poor. For Smith then 
success in the marketplace was not simply about the freedom to fairly compete 
and prevail through superior ideas and products. The raison d‟etre of government 
itself was to promote and protect those divisions of wealth. 
Robert Frank proposes that Smith may be supplanted by Charles Darwin as the 
founder of modern economic thought.
16
 Frank‟s idea is that individuals may make 
rational choices in their own interest which in fact harm wider society:
 17
 
... unbridled market forces often fail to channel the behavior of self-
interested individuals for the common good. On the contrary, as the 
pioneering naturalist Charles Darwin saw clearly, individual incentives often 
lead to wasteful arms races. 
 The example Frank gives is of the peacock who advertises his sexual health 
through the maintenance of the largest most brilliant tail possible.
18
 Carrying such 
                                                 
15
 Adam Smith Lectures on Jurisprudence  (1766) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978) at 404. 
16
 Robert Frank The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition and the Common Good (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton; New Jersey, 2011). 
17
 At xi. 
18
 At 7. 
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a weighty status symbol around makes every male peacock more vulnerable to 
predators, however, so what is good for the individual is bad for the species.  The 
rational choice would be for every peacock to reduce its tail size by half, but the 
nature of the individual arms race is such that the rational individual choice is an 
irrational communal choice.  
Frank contends that libertarians in the United States have co-opted Adam Smith as 
the basis for the claim that the invisible hand always benefits society,
19
 and the 
powerful meme that government is always wasteful and foolish.
20
 But as we have 
seen Smith was well aware of the dangers of collusion. Smith wrote that the profit 
seeking business owner: 
… intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which has no part of his intention. Nor 
is it always the worse for society that it was not part of it. 
Charles Darwin saw the underlying problem clearly. Natural selection favours 
traits that grant an advantage to the individual, and sometimes those traits will be 
beneficial to the species and sometimes they will not. The interests of the species 
and the individual may diverge. In the same way, large, powerful and gaudy firms 
act for their own self-interest, not necessarily in the interests of society at large, 
this must always be kept in mind when considering the invisible hand doctrine. 
Monopolies can arise either from the actions of single firms with substantial or 
complete control of a market, or from the actions of multiple firms independently, 
tacitly or explicitly colluding.
21
 Yet, are monopolies in fact less efficient at 
promoting public goods than perfectly competitive markets? The answer to that 
question may not be as straightforward as expected:
22
 
A substantial controversy has long been waged by economists as to whether 
monopoly promotes or deters innovation. Will a monopolist, in effect, rest 
on its laurels and not have any incentive to innovate because of the lack of 
market pressure, or will monopolists be spurred on by the prospect of 
capturing all of the gains from innovation that a monopoly can obtain, 
whereas a firm in a perfectly competitive market would lose some of the 
benefits of innovation as its innovation is copied by competitors? 
                                                 
19
 At 7. 
20
 At 4. 
21
 Matt Sumpter New Zealand Competition Law and Policy (CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 
2010) at 34. 
22
 Viscusi, W and others Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (3
rd
 ed, MIT Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 2000) at 5. 
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If it could be conclusively proven that monopolies were an evil, then the solution 
would be clear, ban all monopolies. If the goal of the economy is to provide the 
lowest possible prices, then the solution is also clear, legislate maximum prices 
for all goods. If the history of capitalism has provided one lesson, however, is that 
autocratic central control of the economy is a recipe for disaster. The insight, 
heavily influenced by Smith, is that a measure of laissez faire is the best means of 
providing for the public good. How far that freedom should be extended is what 
continues to be explored. 
Underlying the debate is the search for the proper goal of competition law, 
fairness or efficiency? Economists of the Chicago School, such as Robert Bork, 
argued that the only proper goal of competition law should be economic 
efficiency, though what is meant by that differs from person to person. 
Competition regulation has likewise been used to pursue socially equitable 
distribution of societies resources. Ordoliberalism, as an example, is a European 
school of thought which seeks to preserve a strong role for the state in preserving 
democratic liberal values through protecting the individual‟s democratic right to 
economic self-sufficiency. As Amato said:
 23
 
Antitrust law was, as we know, invented neither by the technicians of 
commercial law (though they became its first specialists) nor by economists 
themselves (though they supplied its most solid cultural background). It was 
instead desired by politicians and (in Europe) by scholars attentive to the 
pillars of the democratic systems, who saw it as an answer (if not indeed „the‟ 
answer) to a crucial problem for democracy: the emergence from the 
company or firm, as an expression of the fundamental freedom of 
individuals, of the opposite phenomenon of private power; a power devoid 
of legitimation and dangerously capable of infringing not just the economic 
freedom of other private individuals, but also the balance of public decisions 
exposed to its domineering strength. 
Concerns about the power of the private firm and the potential threat to 
democracy were not confined to Europe, and in fact were very much on the mind 
of Thomas Jefferson, one of the most influential authors of the United States 
Constitution. As Areeda put it:
24
 
The symbols are those of Jeffersonian democracy, in which small, local, 
responsible, and individually owned enterprises are contrasted with large, 
politically irresponsible, absentee-owned, and possibly corrupt giants 
                                                 
23
 G Amato Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) at 2. 
24
 Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow and Aaron Edlin Antitrust Analysis: Problems Text and Cases 
(Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004) at 21. 
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capable of crushing smaller business and of subverting democratic 
government. 
Before continuing, it would be useful to define some of the basic terms. First of 
all, what is static efficiency? Static efficiency is the focus on maximum output at 
the minimum price possible at the present moment. Static efficiency has two 
components, allocative efficiency which focuses on the efficient allocation of 
resources throughout society, and productive efficiency which concentrates on the 
processes and procedures inside an individual business.
25
  
As both allocative and productive efficiency are assessed at a particular point in 
time, the implication can be that further improvement becomes unnecessary once 
consumers are able to enjoy the greatest output of the lowest priced goods for 
their present needs. Firms might produce a given product for the least cost and at 
the required amount ad infinitum, with the only improvements coming from 
further reductions in cost and refinements of the proper output for maximum 
profit. Static efficiency is conducive to price regulation because if a particular 
price at a particular point in time can be easily calculated, then it can also be 
enforced.   
A focus on static efficiency would emphasise the importance of perfect 
competition. A perfectly competitive market is one where numerous competitors, 
with perfect knowledge of the market, compete to supply homogenous goods and 
services. Because of their great number, and because there is no collusion 
amongst them, neither producer nor consumer is able to influence the pricing or 
output decisions of its rivals.
26
 Any decision to increase prices would lead to the 
instantaneous loss of market share to the next cheapest competitor. Any attempt to 
reduce output to raise prices would have the same result.
27
 Prices would therefore 
be driven down to the marginal cost or what Smith called “the lowest which the 
sellers can afford to take, and at the same time continue in business.”28  
The central assumption is that a perfectly competitive market will reach a point of 
equilibrium where goods are produced at the marginal cost and at the exact 
quantity required to meet demand. A perfectly competitive market will, by 
                                                 
25
 Sumpter, above n 21, at 32-33. 
26
 Areeda, above n 24, at 5; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (4
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 7-9. 
27
 Sumpter, at 34. 
28
 Smith, above n 11, at 54. 
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definition, be Pareto Optimal in that no improvements could be made to market 
arrangements without detriment to some participant.
29
 A market which is in the 
proper equilibrium will exactly balance producer surplus with consumer surplus, 
in other words, the value to each from market arrangements will be as fair and 
equal as is possible given the constraints of technology and resources. 
By that rationale, a market which was not perfectly competitive in that it was 
dominated by one or a few monopolists would be one where it was possible to 
raise costs or reduce output without fear of losing market share.
30
 The monopolist 
would be free to transfer wealth from consumers without giving any 
corresponding increase in value, a result generally considered to be inefficient. 
Typically, economic texts demonstrate this effect by means of the supply and 
demand curve, which describes prices above the marginal cost taken by the 
monopolist as a “dead weight loss”.31 A monopolist is able to shift the balance of 
producer surplus in its favour, without a corresponding increase in the total 
surplus available to society. 
As the focus in statically efficient and perfectly competitive markets is on the 
reduction of costs and prices at a given point in time, they are not conducive to the 
recovery of fixed long run costs.
32
 Dynamic efficiency, by taking a longer term 
view, provides for the recovery of sunk or fixed costs over time.
33
 A dynamically 
efficient competition policy would allow mergers and market strategies aimed at 
longer term growth, strategies which might be prohibited under a shorter term 
statically efficient view. It is therefore more flexible for the needs of new entrants 
or companies needing to cash in on past investments in order to fund the „next big 
thing‟. 
Dynamic efficiency therefore allows competitors to obtain higher profits, and 
unlike the perfect competition paradigm, accepts that this can occur without 
instantaneous loss of market share. The wealth accumulated is not counted as a 
„dead weight loss‟ so long as it results in a beneficial innovation. It is the 
                                                 
29
 Viscusi, above n 22, at 75-78. 
30
 See Sumpter, above n 21, at 33-39. 
31
 Viscusi, at 78-80; Sumpter at 36-39. 
32
 Sumpter at 33. 
33
 Sumpter at 33. 
11 
 
exception to the rule that wealth transfers are inefficient, because the result is an 
increase in value over the long term. 
It often seems to be overlooked in this debate that marginal cost includes a normal 
level of profit. The criticism of monopolistic prices in relation to marginal cost is 
twofold. First, that the monopolist obtains supranormal profits
34
 which result in a 
transfer of wealth from the consumer to the producer, and secondly, that profits 
above the marginal cost constitute a deadweight loss to society, which is 
inefficient. The problem with monopoly profits according to Chicago School 
theorists, is not so much that such wealth transfers are inequitable, but rather that 
the rent-seeking behaviour of the monopolist results in a misallocation of 
resources.
35
 Others, as we will see, would question the equity of wealth transfers 
as well. 
Another principal objection to monopoly is derived from Harvey Leibenstein‟s 
conception of X-inefficiency. X-inefficiencies are the “internal inefficiencies and 
rising costs resulting from high salaries, excessive perks, over-manning and the 
lack of the need to minimise the cost of production.” 36 The concept charts the 
differences between expected market behaviour under perfect competition and the 
real empirical evidence of internal firm behaviour.
37
 Liebenstein‟s initial premise 
was that that gains which could be made from increases in allocative efficiency 
due to abolishing monopolies would be minuscule, at around one thirteenth of one 
per cent of the GDP of the United States for example.
38
  
X-Efficiencies are the improvements to be obtained from properly motivating 
managers and workers to make the best of available technology and capital, 
absent other efficiencies.
39
 Improvements made through clever management of 
otherwise virtually identical means of production, lead to rather large differences 
in performance between individual firms. Improved management practices 
provided more immediate benefits than those available due to technological 
                                                 
34
 Supranormal profits are any profits over and above those contained in the marginal cost. 
35
 Jones and Sufrin, above n 26, at 9-11. 
36
 At 10-11. 
37
 Harvey Leibenstein “Allocative Efficiency vs. „X-Efficiency‟” (June, 1966) 56(3) Amer. Econ. 
Rev. 392. 
38
 At 393. 
39
 At 398. 
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innovations, suggesting that x-efficiencies could outweigh dynamic.
40
 Liebenstein 
concluded that:
41
 
… [F]or a variety of reasons people and organizations normally work neither 
as hard nor as effectively as they could. In situations where competitive 
pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, of 
search, and the control of other peoples‟ activities for the utility of feeling 
less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. 
The implication is that even with best available technology, the best allocation of 
resources and the most productively efficient internal procedures and policies, the 
motivation and work ethic of managers and staff is the most important factor in 
determining overall efficiency. Competitive pressure should operate to induce the 
sorts of attitudinal changes necessary to improve x-efficiencies, but not always. 
Where firms in an oligopolistic market are all operating under the same x-
inefficiencies, the result might be that there are, in fact, no incentives to reduce the 
inefficient transfer of wealth from society to the management elite of those firms. 
That is, if it were accepted across an industry that golden parachutes, high salaries 
and other expensive perks for managers were the norm, then it would take a 
significant competitive jolt to upset the corporate culture. The firms themselves 
would be trapped by those closely guarded privileges into extracting supranormal 
profits to pay for them, which on basic principles is both unjust and a 
misallocation of resources. 
This aspect of x-efficiency, it is submitted, is the Achilles heel of dynamic 
efficiency. Wealth accumulation should only be tolerated where it is efficient, that 
is, where it is invested in long term growth and innovation. X-inefficiencies are in 
effect examples of rent-seeking behaviour. Dynamic efficiency does not imply 
that firms should invest at the greatest rate possible, but rather that there is a 
particular rate of investment that is socially optimal. More innovation is not 
always better, because resources must be used in order to discover and adopt 
innovations. There must therefore be a point where wealth accumulation is surplus 
to the requirements of dynamic efficiency. The danger is that such surplus profits 
will be used to pad executive perks rather than being used to come up with the 
next big innovation. 
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Robert Frank‟s insight can be applied to Liebenstein‟s X-Inefficiency. Each firm 
maintains wasteful perks, which it uses to hire the most talented possible 
individuals, who then jealously guard and extend those perks. The resulting waste 
is bad for the species, but if left to the free market, no collection of individuals 
would rationally pass up those benefits. The role of the state remains, that it must 
balance the interest of the individuals against the interest of society as part of a 
sensible competition policy. Government must govern. 
 
Dynamic Efficiency and the Schumpeterians 
The search for dynamic efficiency benefits has its origins in the Schumpeterian 
school of thought, which argues that monopoly may be beneficial and that there 
are factors other than price competition which need to be considered. Of greatest 
importance are the incentives to come up with the new technology, product or 
process from which true wealth gains are derived. This line of thinking has 
developed in opposition (or as a complement) to static efficiency, and was the 
fruit of thinkers associated with the Chicago School, such as Richard Posner, 
Robert Bork, Joseeph Schumpeter of course, and, more recently, William Baumol.  
As we will see, Schumpeterians often argue that Smith‟s invisible guiding hand is 
the only regulation the market needs, and that too stringent an application of 
perfect competition ideals will simply wreck the economy. It is the logical 
endpoint of the ideal of dynamic efficiency. 
In short, the Schumpeterians argued that supranormal prices are not inefficient, 
and constitute no deadweight loss to society because they provide the incentive 
for “technical progress”.42 They challenged the assumption that monopoly was 
necessarily evil, arguing that to automatically reject monopolistic behaviours via 
per se prohibitions risks discarding the efficiency benefits those practices may 
achieve. It is throwing out the baby to get rid of the bathwater. Hence, notions of 
contestability and the „dollar is a dollar‟ total surplus standard were developed to 
justify tolerance of a certain level of monopoly power in the interests of wealth 
generation.  
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The goal of dynamic efficiency is for the producer to invest time and resources to 
acquire a monopoly created by a new invention, whose benefits will spillover to 
the consumer. Despite patent protections, competitors will eventually copy and 
adapt to their rivals „technical progress‟, until the successful innovation becomes 
the new norm. The constant search for temporary monopoly profits thus motivates 
competing producers to make their own investments in research and development 
in an attempt to make the next breakthrough. Workable competition, based on the 
Schumpeterian ideals of Bork, Posner, Baumol and Scherer, assumes that 
oligopoly is the best means of obtaining innovation, as it mixes competitive 
rivalry and knowledge of competitor‟s activities with the economies of scale 
necessary to accumulate the investment funds necessary for the investment to take 
place. 
Much of the Chicago School and neoliberal theory of contestability and workable 
competition was developed in opposition to the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(“S-C-P”) paradigm. The S-C-P paradigm holds that the structure of the market 
dictates the conduct and subsequent performance of firms.
43
 Competition is 
assumed to be lessened in concentrated markets and which leads to decreased 
consumer welfare. This equation is sometimes referred to as the “concentration-
competition-consumer welfare” presumption. 44  Monopolistic behaviour could 
therefore best be regulated by breaking up those large firms whose dominance 
constituted significant barriers to entry.  
The reaction from the Chicago School was largely an effort then to prove that the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic structure could in fact be beneficial, particularly in 
terms of technical progress and therefore perfectly competitive markets were not 
essential. Despite that reaction, the S-C-P paradigm has continued to be influential. 
As Herbert Hovenkamp said:
45
 
The S-C-P paradigm left certain marks that seem all but indelible – for 
example, the greatly increased attention to market definition, barriers to 
entry, and proof of market power that even the most convinced members of 
the Chicago School acknowledge to be important. Antitrust without 
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structural analysis has become impossible, thanks largely to the S-C-P 
writers. To be sure, they may have gone too far in emphasizing structure 
over conduct, but that is a question of balance, not of basic legitimacy. Not 
even S-C-P‟s most vehement critics would roll the clock back completely. 
The problem for the regulator in the context of these competing ideals is to 
determine what market structure best stimulates such oligopolistic market rivalry. 
In another words, how many competitors can the market bear, and what market 
share should each be entitled to. A properly designed market, much like a 
precisely engineered time-piece, requires minimal intervention. The cost of 
regulation is likewise minimised because no single participant is able to bring 
monopoly power to bear without provoking a reaction from competitors or 
customers. The system works because it contains its own checks and balances. 
The regulator must also give thought to the distributional justice question posed 
by the inevitable X-inefficiencies which accompany too concentrated a market. 
How much of the profit is being optimally invested in research and development, 
and how much is being lost to society through the featherbedding of the elite 
ranks of the dominant business entity? 
The tension between the static and dynamic efficiency standards is really about 
the question of profit. A statically efficient society would produce the cheapest 
goods, but with little room for improvement. If society reaches a static, 
unchanging, „perfect‟ equilibrium then there can, logically, be no improvement. A 
dynamically efficient society allows for rapid technological advancement, but 
potentially at the cost of large wealth transfers.  
It is this latter model which provides justification for what has come to be called 
the total surplus standard. The total surplus standard rationalizes the transfer of 
wealth from consumers to producers, so long the efficiency gains result in an 
increase to the total wealth. The standard therefore relies upon a principle 
attributed to Harberger, that „a dollar is a dollar‟ and it matters not in whose hands 
the dollar lies.
46
 The policy is said to be neutral towards wealth transfers between 
consumers and producers. As long as the pie is increased it does not matter if the 
slices of the pie become increasingly unequal. It is an utterly utilitarian form of 
Pareto optimality.  
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Pareto optimality is closely related to the utilitarian doctrine of the greatest good 
for the greatest number.
47
 It asks which arrangement would provide the greatest 
share of wealth to the greatest number of people. But would a state which 
provides more equal shares of wealth be Pareto superior to one which was more 
unequal, but with a greater pool of wealth? Pareto optimality presumes that the 
best state is one in which no person could be made better off, without making one 
person worse off, and that no state exists which is superior.
48
  
A state of incredible wealth co-existing with appalling poverty could not logically 
be superior to one of more equitable distribution, however, even where the total 
amount of wealth available to the former society exceeded the latter. Even if it 
could be argued that a particular economic system should be preferred to another 
because the alternative was between wealth for some and poverty for all, for 
example capitalism versus Stalinist socialism, the moral justice of perpetuating 
extreme economic distinctions where there is a choice is questionable. Not only 
that, but the choice of economic policy options is seldom so stark.  
John Rawls therefore proposed that it would not be ethical to accept an 
arrangement in which the rich got richer, unless the lot of the poor was improved 
as well.
49
 This „difference principle‟ clarified the distribution problem posed by an 
uncritical acceptance of Pareto optimality. Only an arrangement which made 
everyone richer would be superior. Yet this virtuous approach is fundamentally 
opposed to the total surplus standard, which, by being blind to the direction and 
distribution of wealth transfers, holds that it is the total surplus available to society 
which is important. This is why the total surplus standard fits so comfortably with 
Schumpeterian model and why dynamic efficiency arguments may pose a threat 
to the equitable objectives competition law originally envisaged. 
The accusation is that Adam Smith‟s original insight, the Invisible Hand Theorem, 
(now referred to as the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics) has 
been so uncritically accepted by contemporary economists and world leaders that 
it has led to a justification of  the vast inequalities in modern society:
50
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Smith‟s great insight gradually ossified into a hard and unbending doctrine…. [and] 
Even today, many economists equate the Invisible Hand Theorem with the normative 
proposition that we should leave individuals free to pursue their own selfish ends 
without restraint. 
A counterbalancing thesis is that societies that do distribute wealth more evenly, 
out-perform liberal free market capitalism in terms of basic measures of health 
and well-being by any measure. Acemoglu suggested that there are significant 
links between oligarchic societies and barriers to investment, which suggest that 
the more democratic a society is the more likely it is to eventually surpass 
politically concentrated societies.
51
 What Acemoglu does not conclude is the 
reverse, that democratic societies which allow the formation of oligarchic elites 
become less democratic, but that point has been made elsewhere.
52
 
Wilkinson and Pickett‟s useful work in The Spirit Level demonstrates how 
disparities in income within societies are corrosive to social unity.
 53
 Empirical 
evidence shows how little difference increases in GDP play in promoting health, 
wellbeing and happiness, yet how damaging inequalities within societies can be. 
The research shows that the most unequal societies, the US, UK, Australia, and 
surprisingly New Zealand, all perform very poorly against other OECD countries 
in terms of health and social problems. Countries such as Norway, Sweden and 
Japan which are characterised by income equality (as well as healthy per capita 
GDP) score much more highly.
54
 
Wilkinson and Pickett do not provide a blueprint for how a society is to obtain 
improvements to net wealth and the social goods which seem to coincide with 
income equality. But their work does provide a foundation for criticizing the 
fundamental assumption underlying arguments in favour of dynamic efficiency 
and the total surplus standard. The implication is rather that oligarchic firms 
should be free to take high profits as just recompense or as a stimulus to 
investment in innovative technologies only so long as it does not result in the 
excessive concentration of wealth and power. Given the poor performance of New 
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Zealand and the US in health and wellbeing, perhaps better models of economic 
growth should be sought from Japan and the Scandinavian nations. 
How Useful are Economic Models – Cournot to Chaos Theory 
This idea that the competitive process would resolve itself by precisely balancing 
supply and demand to reach a statically efficient end state can be traced to 
Cournot‟s 1838 work: Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth.55 While 
Smith saw competition as an ongoing race between business rivals to produce the 
most at the least cost, Cournot‟s model was based on a static perfect competition 
model.
 56
 Cournot realised that when a market contained a sufficiently large 
number of competitors, then no single producer would be able to influence market 
price, which was the crucial feature of perfect competition.  
Under a Cournot equilibrium, the price of a given commodity will trend towards 
the marginal cost as the number of competitors increases.
57
 The emphasis is on 
making the correct output decision, with no rival wanting to produce more or less 
than needed. This model is frequently contrasted with Bertrand equilibrium, 
which differs from Cournot by proposing that firms compete, not on quantity, but 
on price. The assumption is that a firm will be happy to take any price above the 
marginal cost, so long as it is below that of its rival, and that consumers will be 
attracted to the product with the lowest price.
58
 The subsequent „race to the 
bottom‟ pushes prices down to marginal cost.  
These models may be theoretical, but they are practically applied by the 
Commerce Commission when assessing merger applications. Cournot modelling 
was used to evaluate Contact Energy‟s purchase of Natural Gas Corporation‟s 
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electricity generation plant in 2003,
59
 while a Bertrand Model was behind the 
decision to approve the Cendant-Budget hire car company merger in 2002.
60
  
Their usefulness in evaluation of real world anti-competitive practices is limited 
however, as experience has taught how willing economic competitors can be to 
use violence, rumour, industrial espionage and disinformation to increase market 
share.
61
 The tool kit of the competition regulator should ideally then include the 
full range of investigative techniques available to police fraud and robbery squads.  
Whether the mathematics of economics can ever accurately model real world 
behaviour is also highly questionable. Chaos theory teaches us of the 
unpredictability of complex systems based on small differences in initial 
conditions, commonly known as the „butterfly effect‟.62 The suspicion therefore is 
that to use any sort of mathematical model to predict market results amounts to no 
more than a best guess, and if so, there will always be an ongoing role for the 
regulator. Only human agents have the intuitive capacity to flexibly deal with 
chaotic situations. Economics seems to guide decision making in complex 
situations in only a general heuristic sense. The charge is that economics provides 
only rules of thumb, based on unprovable assumptions of human behaviour, and 
of questionable predictive value. 
In the context of the recent Global Financial Crisis, the demands for a complete 
revision of neoclassical economics have redoubled. In a recent Time Magazine 
article, David Rothkopf pointed out that we are now seeing the outcome of an 
international contest between different economic models developing in China, 
India and Brazil, and Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, all of which call 
for a more interventionist state regulatory policy.
63
 Robert Johnson asked that 
economists accept the limitations of mathematic models and accept the necessity 
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for a multi-disciplinary approach to economic studies by taking advantage of 
lessons learned from all the Humanities.
64
 
Amongst the most acerbic of recent critics of neoclassical economics is Steve 
Keen. His work in Debunking Economics points out the fundamental flaw in 
economic education and theory is that of using static equilibrium models to 
predict dynamic time varying phenomenon.
65
 If predicting future growth or 
declines amounts to no more than extrapolating lines of best fit, what predictive 
power do the models hold? Keen quotes Andre Mas-Colell, described as the 
“doyen of neoclassical instruction” to ask why economics fails to adequately 
address dynamic models:
66
 
The reason, informally speaking, is that economists are good (or so we hope) 
at recognizing a state of equilibrium but poor at predicting how an economy 
in disequilibrium will evolve. 
Certainly there are intuitive dynamic principles: if demand is larger than 
supply, then the price will increase, if price is larger than marginal cost then 
production will expand, if industry profits are positive and there are no 
barriers to entry, then new firms will enter and so on. The difficulty is in 
translating these informal principles into precise dynamic laws. 
Mas-Colell goes on to describe the use of even simple differential equations as not 
being an actual accurate model of the market economy but rather a “tentative trial-
and-error process taking place in fictional time”. 67  So even Mas-Colell 
acknowledges that mathematical models can provide insights but that there is no 
crystal ball available to foresee how markets change over time. 
Keen describes this reason as “nonsense”, economists only model in equilibrium 
because they cannot manage it in dynamic analysis. Using static models to predict 
a chaotic system is no more valid than assuming that chaos will result in static 
equilibrium. As Keynes said:  
… this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we 
are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in 
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tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past 
the ocean is flat again.
68
 
There are dynamic models available, but they are inspired by fluid fractal chaos 
theory, not the dead hand of supply and demand curves.
69
  
Keen takes dead aim at Pareto Optimality: 
Instead, what has to be abandoned is the economic obsession with achieving 
some socially optimal outcome. As noted… economists have conflated the 
concept of equilibrium with the vision of an „economic utopia‟ in which no 
one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. But a 
free market economy could never remain in an optimal position, because 
economic equilibria are unstable. The real question is whether we can 
control such an unstable system – whether we can constrain its instability 
within acceptable bounds. 
But by that rationale, surely allowing a laissez-faire style approach to competition 
regulation would make the most sense. If economic models are of limited value, 
then giving freedom to market participants without fear of external intervention 
based on static and inaccurate mathematical models would be both the fairest and 
most efficient solution. Perhaps the problem has no solution, what is clear is that 
the proper balance between static and dynamic efficiency concerns continues to 
trouble economists to this day.  
How convinced anyone is by Keen‟s criticisms depends entirely upon the 
individual‟s commitment to economic theory. No doubt those who have spent 
many years studying the complex mathematics required for understanding and 
applying economics will feel more commitment than those who have not. Like all 
sciences, economic theory is best seen as having explanatory value and that value 
can only improve if the underlying theory is constantly and methodically 
questioned and improved. The frustration critics feel with when crashes like the 
Global Financial Crisis occur is understandable, but economic models are a 
necessary tool which cannot be discarded peremptorily without recourse to a 
viable alternative.  
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Perfect Competition and the Development of Static Efficiency 
We can see then that the perfect competition model was originally developed as a 
tool, a standard the market could be compared to. In 1881 Frank Edgeworth‟s 
Mathematical Psychics provided the complete ingredients for perfect 
competition.
70
 His vision was of numerous competitors producing a homogenous 
product with perfect knowledge of the market who, because of the number of 
competitors, are  unable to influence the price or output of their rivals and would 
simply lose market share if they could not achieve the stable market price.
71
 This 
concept of perfect competition would not be brought into mainstream economics, 
however, until Frank Knight published his Risk Uncertainty and Profit in 1921.
72
 
Knight‟s method was to explain economic energy flows by analogy to Newtonian 
physics. His concept was almost Aristotelian in supposing that, just as physical 
systems tend towards rest, so too would economic forces:
73
 
Water seeks its level, air moves towards a uniform potential…. water 
continues to flow, the wind to blow, etc., only because the suns heat… 
constantly restores the inequalities which these movements themselves 
constantly destroy 
So also in economic phenomena…. The circulation of goods continues 
because the life activities of man (the production of wealth) keep new 
supplies forthcoming. 
Knight‟s goal in Risk was to demonstrate how perfect competition provided the 
friction by which economic forces would trend towards the equilibrium state of 
the „normal‟ price:74  
The primary attribute of competition, universally recognized and evident at a 
glance, is the „tendency‟ to eliminate profit or loss, and bring the value of 
economic goods to equality with their cost…. But in actual society cost and 
value only „tend‟ to equality; it is only by an occasional accident that they 
are precisely equal in fact; they are usually separated by a margin of „profit‟, 
positive or negative. Hence the problem of profit is one way of looking at the 
problem of the contrast between perfect competition and actual competition. 
It is clear that Knight never imagined that a perfect equilibrium was actually 
possible, there would always be a difference between perfect and actual 
competition, the measure of which was profit. Knight was heavily influenced in 
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this view by John Bates Clark, an American economist and father of John Maurice 
Clark, coiner of the term „workable competition‟.75 The contrast between perfect 
and actual competition in Knight‟s mind, may therefore have been a precursor to 
what we would see as workable competition.  
J. B. Clark observed that a static state would only be achieved if five sources of 
change could be eliminated. These were:
 76
 
 increases in population; 
 capital growth; 
 improvements in production methods; 
 the Darwinian elimination of the inefficient; and 
 the changes in demand caused by the multiplying wants of consumers.  
We can conclude that, as it would be either impossible or detrimental to do away 
with these sources of change, Clark had realised how impractical such a perfect 
static state would be. The third and fifth of these elements of change, taken 
together, are reminiscent of dynamic efficiency. The reference to the survival of 
the fittest or most efficient producer is a clear precursor to creative destruction. It 
seems then that the roots of these apparently modern ideas lie much deeper within 
our intellectual tradition than one would at first suspect.  
We can see how Clark borrowed the word „dynamic‟ from the language of 
physics and applied it to economics:
77
 
Profits are, then, the result exclusively of dynamic change…. The type of 
dynamic change is invention; an invention makes it possible to produce 
something more cheaply. It first gives a profit to entrepreneurs and then… 
adds something to wages and interest…. Let another invention be made…. It 
also creates a profit; and this profit, like the first, is an elusive sum which 
entrepreneurs grasp but cannot hold. It slips through their fingers and 
bestows itself on all members of society. 
So the term „dynamic‟ was being used in economics, perhaps for the first time as 
early as 1900, to describe the innovative process. We also see the notion that 
dynamic progress would produce benefits which would spillover from the 
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inventor to society.
78
 All that is absent from the definition is the 
acknowledgement that invention might come up with an entirely new product, 
rather than just productively efficient cost savings, but perhaps this point was too 
obvious to need to be stated. 
To summarise, the perfect competition model requires that:
79
 
 Firms compete to supply indistinguishable products or services; 
 Sellers and buyers each have access to the same perfect information; 
 No single buyer or seller can by their actions alter the price offered or 
taken; 
 There are no transaction costs, for example agents or lawyers fees which 
might vary from sale to sale; 
 Zero externalities; costs may not be shifted but must be borne by each 
market player; and 
 Exit and entry from the market is effortless. 
In a state of perfectly competitive equilibrium, no one is able to influence the 
price of goods in the markets by their actions, all participants are „price takers‟.80 
In economic terms, participants in a perfect equilibrium face a horizontal demand 
curve, as their price and output decisions neither increase nor decrease demand. 
As a result, in a perfectly competitive market any attempt by a firm to raise prices 
above marginal cost would result in the immediate loss of all its customers.  If 
buyers had perfect information about alternative sources of the identical product at 
a lower price, and there were no sunk or transaction costs tying them to a 
particular supplier, they would instantly respond by taking their business 
elsewhere.  
It is immediately obvious that perfect competition cannot exist, except as a model, 
a fact which was recognised very shortly after the ideal was fully described. The 
stringent and simplistic assumptions perfect competition relies on simply do not 
exist in the real world. There are almost no markets where firms compete to 
supply homogenous goods and service. Goods are often interchangeable so 
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competition may be provided by rivals in overlapping markets, for example, the 
market for home heating includes coal, gas and wood as well as electricity. 
Product differentiation is a crucial element of competition, with every rival 
seeking to set itself apart from the rest. 
Buyers and sellers are subject to a commercial „fog of war‟ and seldom know 
exactly what their competitor‟s intentions are. There can therefore be no such 
thing as perfect information. And as Smith recognised so long ago, any attempt to 
ascertain a rival‟s intentions could well result in just the sort of collusion that 
competition policy strives to prevent.
81
 
Even so, while a market may contain numerous competitors there are extremely 
few markets which are not in reality dominated by a few large players whose 
actions set prices and whose influence shapes the fundamental rules of play. 
When we think of softdrinks we think of Coca Cola, personal computing is 
dominated by Microsoft and Apple. Any moves by these major players are bound 
to create shockwaves in the price and output decisions of competitors. 
The irrecoverable sunk costs of plant, infrastructure, brand development and so on 
constitute significant barriers to entry and exit. Various transaction costs, such as 
the legal costs which attend the vetting and completion of contracts, prevent 
competitors and customers alike from easily leaving the fray. Externalities abound, 
the whole purpose of the corporate form was to limit liability and evade 
responsibility for them. The costs associated with entry, remaining in and then 
exiting from the market are greater the more substantial the resources involved 
with the particular industry are. 
The Marginal Cost Controversy  
According to Mark Blaug, perfect competition was assumed to be the ideal until 
the mid-1940s when Schumpeter and Hayek pointed out that such a perfectly 
competitive end state was “not only impossible but inferior”.82 But, as we have 
seen, J.B Clark was alluding to the impossibility of achieving a static state as early 
as 1900. We see the first direct shots being fired at the perfect competition ideal in 
the interwar period in what came to be known as the „Marginal Cost Controversy‟. 
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This controversy has become so fundamental to the dynamic efficiency story that 
its details must be delved into at some length. 
Before and during the Second World War, a group of economists, Hotelling, 
Lerner, Meade, Fleming and Keynes, advocated the use of marginal cost pricing 
for services provided by state enterprises.
83
 The marginal cost of a good is the cost 
of producing additional units of that good. Setting the price at marginal cost 
would be efficient because as Samuelson put it:
84
 
Only when prices of goods are equal to Marginal Costs is the economy 
squeezing from its scarce resources and limited technical knowledge the 
maximum of outputs…. Because Marginal Cost  has this optimality property, 
it can with some care be used to detect inefficiency in any institutional set up.  
The problem is that while marginal cost includes a profit margin sufficient to 
cover average costs, if increases in output lead to a fall in the marginal cost, a 
price equal to marginal cost will not provide sufficient income to cover total 
costs.
85
 In other words, pegging prices to costs over the short run can create 
problems in the longer term. It does not create sufficient profit to cope with long 
term capital investment, for example, where it became necessary to upgrade or 
replace expensive infrastructure. 
To overcome this difficulty, it was proposed that the government should subsidize 
industries equal to the amount income fell short of total costs, the money to be 
raised through taxation.
86
 The suggestion was not entirely new, having links to 
Pigou‟s The Economics of Welfare87 and its derivative, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.88  
Pigou suggested that it might be possible to have competent government 
departments intervening benevolently in the economy, but that interfering in the 
free market process by setting maximum prices would alter the pattern of 
investment thereby reducing the national dividend.
89
  Changes in distribution of 
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wealth through taxation, however, would enable different, more intense needs to 
be satisfied:
90
 
Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of 
the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the 
national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, increase economic 
welfare. 
That this might happen at the expense of “new machines and factories” (dynamic 
efficiency) was, if not inconsequential, at least less important than increasing the 
economic welfare of all citizens.
91
 It meant that the numerous poor would get 
more of what they needed and the rich few less of what they desired. So the ideal 
policy would be to enable the market to make free decisions about where and how 
to invest but then to compensate the losers for the costs of those decisions. 
Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks proposed in separate articles in the 1930s that if 
an efficiency improvement could be made and it allowed winners to compensate 
losers so that they voluntarily submitted to the arrangement, then the improvement 
should be made. Both based their articles on Pigou‟s plan. Kaldor said:92 
…in all such cases it is possible to make everybody better off than before, or 
at any rate to make some people better off without making anybody worse 
off. There is no need for the economist to prove - as indeed he never could 
prove - that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure nobody in the 
community is going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite 
sufficient for him to show that even if all those who suffer as a result are 
fully compensated for their loss, the rest of the community will still be better 
off than before. 
Likewise, Hicks begins with Pigou‟s proposition that every person seeks to  
maximise satisfaction of his or her preferences, subject to the obstacles that total 
wealth is finite and the fact that so much of that wealth is owned by other 
people.
93
 Taking a Paretian point of view, Hicks said that “an optimum 
organization of the economic system is one in which every individual is as well of 
as he can be made, subject to the condition that no reorganisation permitted shall 
make any individual worse off.”94 The problem is that any such reorganisation 
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would inevitably result in a change in prices which would benefit some and harm 
others:
95
 
Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from applying our criteria to the case 
of private enterprise, because we can always suppose that special measures 
are taken through the public revenue to compensate those people who are 
damaged. A „permitted reorganisation‟ must thus be taken from now on to 
mean a reorganisation which will allow of compensation being paid, and 
which will yet show a net advantage. The position is not optimum so long as 
such reorganisation is possible. 
So in terms of competition policy, Kaldor-Hicks payments could be used to allow 
mergers resulting in monopolies and excessive profit taking, so long as the poor 
people most affected by excessive transfers of wealth were compensated. By 
applying Pigovian intervention to obtain Pareto optimality, Kaldor-Hicks 
payments sought to ameliorate the harsh consequences of strict application of 
liberal free market arrangements, an approach which would be rejected by the 
neo-liberals such as Ronald Coase. 
According to Coase, and based on work he began in the 1930s:
96
 
The proposal is a recipe for waste on a grand scale. The policy would also 
mean a redistribution of income in favour of consumers of goods priced in 
conditions of decreasing cost. Furthermore, the policy involves additional 
taxation, and this will tend to raise prices…. The net gain from such a policy 
is not evident to me. 
The policy would require extensive state intervention, particularly as the onus 
would be on the state to involve itself in administering production to minimise the 
compensation paid, an involvement which would inevitably lead to the 
“substitution of state for private enterprise and of centralized for decentralized 
operations.”97 Furthermore, such economic tinkering is an example of what Coase 
called „blackboard economics‟ with the economist playing the role of the 
omniscient and omnipotent central planner. Yet the market itself is far too 
complex for any one mind to comprehend, there is in fact no central state planner 
capable of playing such a role.
98
 
So the suggestion that state enterprises should provide goods and services at 
marginal cost, or that imperfections caused by monopolistic arrangements could 
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be allowed if compensated for by Kaldor-Hicks payments, was dismissed. As we 
will see, however, the suggestion that, particularly for natural monopoly goods 
and services and particularly those provided by state owned enterprises should set 
prices at a fair rate of return persists. The neoliberal response to the marginal cost 
controversy stems from a paradigm shift. It was the abolition of the idea that 
perfect competition is something attainable and should in fact be the goal of 
competition regulators, and the acceptance that perfect competition is neither 
possible nor desirable. In order for that to happen, the perfect competition ideal 
would have to be deconstructed. 
The first serious challenge to the perfect competition ideal was probably provided 
by John Maurice Clark‟s “Towards a Concept of Workable Competition” 
published in 1940. The article is particularly notable in coining that key term: 
Workable Competition.  
Clark boldly asserted that:
99
 
… perfect competition does not and cannot exist and has presumably never 
existed, for reasons quite apart from any inescapable tendency toward 
collusion, such as Adam Smith noted in his familiar remark on the gettings-
together of members of a trade. What we have left is an unreal or ideal 
standard which may serve as a starting point of analysis and a norm with 
which to compare actually competitive conditions.  
Clark also took the opportunity to fire a shot in the marginal cost controversy:
100
 
A price which at all times covers only short-run marginal cost would lead to 
large operating deficits whenever demand is short of capacity, and would 
bankrupt most industries, no matter how shock-proof their capital structures. 
And since the horizontal individual demand curve of pure competition leads 
to a price that covers only marginal cost, it is not one of the conditions of 
workable competition. Instead, the requirement is an individual demand 
curve with sufficient slope to bring price, on the average, far enough above 
marginal cost so that average cost may be covered, over the run of good 
times and bad. Along with this should go, presumably, enough price 
flexibility to afford a stimulus to demand in dull times, and the reverse in 
boom times. 
Clark established that too much competition is „ruinous‟ because it results in a 
constant process of price „chiselling‟ where competitors are continuously seeking 
to outdo each other on price, but which can only lead to their destruction when 
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demand falls. What is needed instead is some midpoint between “pure oligopoly 
and the ruinously low prices likely to result from unlimited market chaos…”101 
By the 1970s opposition to the perfect competition ideal and marginal cost pricing 
was well established. Robert Bork colourfully described the result of applying 
pure competition law principles to the American economy as follows:
 102
 
The economist builds a pure model in order to clarify thought; such models are 
indispensable starting points for policy analysis, but they are not prescriptions for 
policy. They leave out too much. A determined attempt to remake the American 
economy into a replica of the textbook model of competition would have roughly the 
same effect on national wealth as several dozen strategically placed nuclear 
explosions. 
The debate which began in the 1930s over the marginal cost controversy had, by 
the 1980s, morphed into an acceptance of dynamic efficiency and workable 
competition. Rather than expecting central state regulators to intervene and set 
prices based on the marginal cost and a consumer welfare focussed rate of return, 
the ideal would be to allow the market to operate according to Darwinian survival 
of the fittest. Excessive profits were simply a measure of success and the benefit 
to the consumer, and as long as the proceeds were re-invested in efficient 
improvements then the total surplus would grow to provide for all future demands. 
As Hildebrand said:
103
 
Dynamic efficiency is analysed in terms of how total surplus, consumer plus 
producer surplus, evolves over time with the introduction of a product or 
process innovation. A new product satisfied a demand that was not catered 
for before, If the product was supplied at its short run marginal production 
cost then none of the suppliers would recover their original research and 
development (R & D) investment, the anticipation of this by suppliers would 
mean that there would be no incentive to make the investment and develop 
the new product. 
The dynamic efficiency arguments which grew out of the marginal cost 
controversy have obvious application to electricity industry and are frequently to 
be found in policy discussion to this day.  
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Steven Stoft wrote the basic general text on electricity regulation. He said:
104
 
If the expected market price is so low that a supplier cannot enter the market 
and cover all costs, no supplier will enter. More specifically, if a new 
generation unit cannot cover all costs, no new units will be built. The result 
will be a gradually diminishing supply of generation (due to retirements of 
old plants) in the face of gradually increasing demand. This tightening of the 
market will cause the price to rise, and eventually price will be high enough 
to cover all costs. 
Similarly, if price is so high that costs are more than covered, suppliers will 
build new generating units. This will increase supply and cause the price to 
fall. The result of this long run dynamic is that profit in any competitive 
market returns to the normal level of profit (zero) in the long run competitive 
equilibrium.  
Marginal cost pricing would therefore act as a significant deterrent to new entry 
and would result in the long term deterioration of supply. The issue came to the 
forefront in New Zealand when a series of dry winters raised the spectre of 
blackouts due to lack of investment in non-hydro generation. The problem as 
Grant Read saw it was:
105
 
… that market prices do not go high enough, often enough, to justify 
investment in plant capacity to provide „acceptable‟ load coverage in 
situations of tight supply, due to dry years, peak loads, or whatever. To be 
exact, it has been suggested that potential investors do not have sufficient 
assurance that spot market prices will go high enough, often enough, to 
justify investment in plant capacity that will only be required to run in such 
situations of tight supply.  
Much like with health care, New Zealanders expect to get cheap electricity as of 
right and are resistant to the idea of paying premiums now for guaranteed 
electricity supply later. Instead the public demand is for low electricity prices with 
any shortfall to be met by a political solution at a later date. The New Zealand 
public are like the grasshopper in Aesop‟s fable, we expect the times of plenty to 
last for all time, without having to pay the price for it. 
The NZEM wholesale electricity market has no price cap, in part because the 
price signal must be allowed to operate undistorted by regulation, but also because 
prices must be allowed to reach a sufficiently high level to justify investment in 
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infrastructure to cover future demand. Regardless of public preferences, insisting 
upon pricing at Short Run Marginal Cost (“SRMC”) would mean having:106 
… to calculate SRMC prices, which, in this country, implies a requirement 
for mutually inter-dependent “opportunity costing” of all energy limited 
fuels, including not only water but coal and gas stockpiles and/or contracts. 
Such a regime would be intrusive, controversial, and ultimately costly. And, 
if it succeeded, it could be expected to increase price volatility, and hence 
risk, thus increasing required rates of return and ultimately consumer prices 
For Bart van Campen, Stephen Poletti, David Young and Golbin Zakeri the basic 
problem with marginal cost or „rate of return‟ regulation is that it is costly to 
administer and, while it guarantees a return on investment, there is no incentive on 
industry to minimise costs.
107
 A properly structured competitive market requires 
little intervention and is much more efficient at providing incentives to invest 
wisely and reduce costs. 
Like Read, van Campen and others recognise the crucial problem posed by SRMC 
pricing. As SRMC excludes capital costs there is no way to retrieve the Long Run 
Marginal Costs which include operational expenditures as well as capital 
expenditures. And as the NZEM needs investment sufficient to satisfy a 1.8% per 
annum growth in demand, SRMC pricing will not foot the bill. 
The marginal cost controversy was thus resolved, both generally and as applied to 
the New Zealand Electricity  Market, in favour of profit motivated dynamic 
efficiency. Rather than ascertaining and enforcing an acceptable marginal cost, 
which included a reasonable rate of return, the market itself would be left free to 
markup costs so far as the market would bear. Price control in natural monopolies 
is an important exception to this principle, but in general, government regulation 
or state centred redistribution of wealth was to be roundly rejected. The 
Jeffersonian objective of European style competition law, to guarantee and protect 
democratic values of economic self-sufficiency, would be lost in favour of 
autocratic but efficient corporate command of the market. Dynamic efficiency, by 
taking the long term view that investment in the market requires a higher rate of 
return than would be available in Short Run Marginal Cost pricing, required that 
regulators tolerate monopolies and supranormal monopoly profits. 
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The Sherman Act and American Antitrust Theory 
The United States, that most capitalist of nations, entered its first serious 
interventionist phase with the Sherman Act of 1890.
108
 The rampant behaviour of 
the „Robber Barons‟ who had come to dominate the major industries, oil, coal, 
steel and rail, had provoked a popular backlash. As Representative Heard said of 
the “dressed-beef combine”:109 
[T]his giant robber combination, while perhaps the most damaging of all of 
its class to the interests of our people, is only one of many which by their 
methods extort millions form the citizens of this Republic without adding 
one cent of value to our productions or one iota of increase to our prosperity. 
In fact, the very object of these giant schemes of combined capital is not to 
increase the volume of supply, and thus lessen the cost of any useful 
commodity, but rather to repress, reduce, and control the volume of every 
article that they touch, so that the cost to consumers is increased while the 
expenditure for production is lessened and thereby profit secured. 
A favourite strategy of these serial oligopolists was to combine businesses at 
successive levels of the productive chain into vertically integrated Trusts. 
Antitrust became the umbrella term describing the prohibition of numerous 
anticompetitive trade practices.  
Investigation into the activities of these robber combinations resulted in the 
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.
 110
 The Sherman Act‟s goal was 
clearly stated:
111
 
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign 
nations is hereby declared to be illegal. 
Senator John Sherman himself said that the main intention of the Act was to do 
away with cartels:
112
 
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. It 
can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish 
interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition 
and advance prices at will where competition does not exist. Its governing 
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motive is to increase the profits of the parties composing it. The law of 
selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest 
of the consumer…. Such a combination is far more dangerous than any 
heretofore invented, and, when it embraces the great body of all the 
corporations engaged in a particular industry in all the States of the Union, it 
tends to advance the price to the consumer of any article produced, it is a 
substantial monopoly injurious to the public, and, by the rule of both the 
common and the civil law, is null and void and just subject of restraint by the 
courts, of forfeiture of corporate rights and privileges, and in some cases 
should be denounced as a crime, and the individuals engaged in it should be 
punished as criminals. 
The premier example of the application of the Act was provided by the Standard 
Oil case.
113
 Rockefeller‟s Standard Oil company controlled drilling, refineries and 
sales of oil making it one of the largest businesses in the world, until its breakup 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1911. In doing so, Chief Justice White 
declared:
114
 
The evils which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the final 
denial of the power to make them may be thus summarily stated: 1. The power 
which monopoly gave to the one who enjoyed it to fix the price and thereby 
injure the public; 2. The power which it engendered of enabling a limitation on 
production; and 3. The danger of deterioration in quality of the monopolized 
article which it was deemed was the inevitable result of the monopolistic 
control over its production and sale. 
The story is well presented in Daniel Yergin‟s The Prize.115 Part of the debate 
over competition has always been about whether monopolies in fact are 
detrimental to the common weal. While Standard Oil‟s massive profits provoked 
public outcry (over $500 million distributed as dividends between 1882 and 1906) 
its business model was based on efficiency, reduction of waste and maintaining 
high quality standards. For example, where competitors poured gasoline into 
nearby rivers as a waste product, Standard used it to power its machines. Even the 
choice of the name Standard reflected Rockefeller‟s determination to provide oil 
of an even consistency, due to the tendency of oil lamps to explode when fed 
more volatile or dirtier fuels causing up to 5000 deaths per year. 
According to Yergin‟s account, Rockefeller was highly motivated to prevent the 
waste caused by uncontrolled competition for a finite resource. The picture which 
emerges is of an unrestrained stampede for swiftly depleted resources, a classic 
„tragedy of the commons‟ dilemma. Multiple competitors for a single widely 
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dispersed and unregulated resource lead to inefficient production and massive 
waste. The boom and bust speculation rampant in this wildcat economy caused 
extreme price volatility which threatened the steady supply of oil to market.  
By vertically integrating and aggressively acquiring oil leases over as wide an 
area as possible, Rockefeller was able to take advantage of economies of scale and 
bring stability and predictability to the oil economy. Paradoxically, despite the 
breakup of Standard Oil after 1911, many of his organizational innovations came 
to be the standard within the industry.    
In Standard Oil the United States Supreme Court had endorsed the „rule of 
reason‟, that freedom of contract must be preserved and only unreasonable 
restraints of trade were to be prohibited:
116
 
… although the statute… makes it certain that its purpose was to prevent 
undue restraints of every kind or nature, nevertheless by the omission of any 
direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete, it indicates a 
consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract, when not 
unduly or improperly exercised, was the most efficient means for the 
prevention of monopoly…. In other words, that freedom to contract was the 
essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract.  
The Court therefore preserved the right of monopolies to exist, only trusts in 
restraint of trade were illegal. By inference, if unreasonable restraints of trade 
were illegal, then reasonable restraints of trade must be allowed. Freedom of 
contract was the paramount virtue. But in the instant case, the methods by which 
Standard Oil gained control of all levels of production, distribution and supply of 
oil led inevitably to the conclusion that the intention was to “drive others from the 
field and to exclude them from their right to trade, and thus accomplish the 
mastery which was the end in view.”117  The proper remedy therefore was to 
dissolve the combination altogether. 
For the founding neoliberal theorists such as Frederick Hayek it was the state 
centralised economy that was the true threat to freedom. In his seminal work, The 
Road to Serfdom, Hayek said that central planning was the greatest danger to 
democracy: 
Our point… is not that dictatorship must inevitably extirpate freedom but rather that 
planning leads to dictatorship…. The clash between planning and democracy arises 
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simply from the fact that the latter is an obstacle to the suppression of freedom which 
the direction of economic activity requires.
118
 
Hayek‟s work spoke to economic planners of the 1970s and 1980s faced with 
rising inflation, falling returns from investment of public funds, the political 
intransigence of unions and an uncontrollable economic decline. The prescription 
for the Chicago School‟s program for economic reform came to be called the 
„Washington Consensus.‟ The full list, as set out by John Williamson in 1990 
is:
119
 
 Fiscal discipline to reduce deficits to 2% of GDP; 
 Redirecting public expenditure towards neglected but valuable fields; 
 Tax reduction; 
 Deregulation to improve competition while protecting environmental 
protection, public safety and prudent financial management; 
 Encouraging foreign direct investment; 
 Financial liberalization; 
 A single exchange rate; 
 Reduction or abolition of tariffs; 
 Privatization of state assets; and 
 Protection of property rights. 
Rather than having a large interventionist state centred economy, the new 
economy would distribute economic power throughout the „ownership society‟. 
The mercantilist approach which saw economies as national fortresses in 
competition with hostile neighbours for capital would be rejected in favour of a 
system characterised by the free flow of capital. By use of David Ricardo‟s 
theories of comparative advantage each country would focus on producing what it 
did best. Local industries would not be protected from international competition at 
the expense of the consumer, but would have to thrive on their own merits. The 
new consensus was much more than an economic programme, it was a 
fundamental revision of the relationship between State and society based on a 
total rejection of anything smacking of state centred control of the economy.  
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Schumpeter and Baumol on Contestability and Dynamic 
Efficiency 
Schumpeter and Hayek were amongst the first of the Chicago School writers to 
have influenced the new right. Schumpeter has come to be associated with the 
term „creative destruction‟, the process by which old inefficient monopolies are 
constantly undermined and destroyed by innovative newcomers. Creative 
destruction is the basic initial premise of contestability theory.
120
  
Schumpeter was unashamedly supportive of the role „big business‟ played in 
creating the high standard of living Americans enjoyed in the post-war years.
121
 
Like Smith, Schumpeter assumed that this happy state of affairs was the result of 
an ongoing “evolutionary process.”122 It followed that: 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate 
the same process of industrial mutation… that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism. 
Schumpeter was dismissive of critics of big business who objected to huge profit 
taking and subsequent transfer of wealth. Rather he proposed that it is necessary 
only to look at the big picture and ask how these large industrial units are created 
or destroyed.
123
  
The core statement of the Schumpeterian analysis comes from the man himself:
124
 
Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the 
background of that process [of innovation] and within the situation created by it. It 
must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be 
understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull. 
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But economists who, ex visu of a point in time, look for example at the behavior of 
an oligopolistic industry – an industry which consists of a few big firms – and 
observe the well-known moves and countermoves within it that seem to aim at 
nothing but high prices and restrictions of output or making precisely that 
hypothesis…. the problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism 
administers existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and 
destroys them. 
Contestability theory‟s fundamental idea is that, by lowering the barriers to entry, 
a Darwinian process of competition and improvement might be activated. It is the 
ever-present threat of competition which disciplines the monopolist. If large 
profits are in the offing then newcomers with new ideas will be attracted, forcing 
incumbents to adapt with lower prices or better products and services. The role for 
the regulator, if there is one, is to ensure that incumbents cannot use political 
influence, corruption or force to block that competitive pressure. 
Perfect competition, with its focus on reducing costs and refining output through 
allocative and productive efficiency, is not really the issue:
125
 
… it is not that kind of competition which counts but the competition from the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization… competition which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the 
outputs of the existing firms but at their very foundations and their very lives. This 
kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in 
comparison with forcing a door… 
Schumpeter‟s insight and his contribution to dynamic efficiency, was that it is 
necessary to take a longer term view about the fruits of investment in innovation. 
It is more fruitful to accept the existence of oligopolistic markets, because only 
oligopolies can accumulate the capital necessary to fund such investment in the 
long term. 
 As mentioned earlier, many of the Chicago School theories were developed in 
opposition to the S-C-P paradigm‟s ideal of deconcentrated market structures. The 
assumption was that perfectly competitive markets (if they even existed) could be 
statically but not dynamically efficient, while monopoly markets would be far less 
efficient. Frederic Scherer built on Schumpeter‟s hypothesis that “industrial and 
innovative effort … increases with the concentration of market power” to develop 
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the inverted-U model which predicts that oligopolistic markets provide a better 
environment for innovation than do either perfectly competitor or monopolistic 
ones.
126
  
Scherer derived the inverted-U model from three conclusions. First, the 
relationship between technological opportunity and market concentration is 
complex; any apparent patterns may be coincidental. Secondly, the relationship 
between concentration and employment of scientists and engineers is positive but 
modest. And thirdly, increases in “technological vigor” mainly occur at low to 
mid levels of concentration and are dampened in monopolies.
127
 The final point is 
the source of the inverted-U model of the relationship between concentration and 
innovation. If both monopolistic and perfectly competitive markets dampen 
innovation, then oligopolistic arrangements afford the best environment for 
dynamic efficiency. Scherer  provided the empirical proof for Schumpeter‟s 
insight and thus workable competition has come to be equated with oligopolistic 
markets. 
The influence of Robert Bork 
Robert Bork‟s The Antitrust Paradox is widely regarded as one of the most 
influential books of the Twentieth Century, so far as the neoliberal approach to 
competition regulation is concerned. A scathing critic of the courts‟ interference 
with efficient business practices, Bork directly confronted the interventionist 
objectives behind the Sherman Antitrust Act 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act 
1914.
128
 
Bork‟s paradox was that, in attempting to level the playing field between big and 
small business in the interests of fairness, antitrust policy was achieving too little 
at too great a cost. Bork believed antitrust had lost its proper focus on maximising 
efficiency and total wealth. The courts had misinterpreted the „rule of reason‟ 
since the breakup of Standard Oil in 1911. By promoting Justice Brandeis‟ “goal 
of small business welfare” and incipiency, the idea that damaging practices could 
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be caught and arrested in their early stages, antitrust had evolved into a system for 
protecting the inefficient from the pressures of competition.
129
  
“In modern times the Supreme Court, without compulsion of statute, has inhibited 
or destroyed a broad spectrum of useful business structures and practices”130 Not 
only that but in justifying the rationale of his 1890 Act, Sherman had 
misrepresented its common law basis by selecting cases which prohibited 
predatory pricing, cartels and monopolistic horizontal mergers, while ignoring 
those cases which would have allowed them.
131
 
Bork says the „rule of reason‟ was developed to deal with two categories of 
offences. Per se practices, a form of strict liability where it would only be 
necessary to show that the practice had occurred to incur liability, and practices 
which should be prohibited because they were motivated by anti-competitive 
intent or would have a bad effect on the competitive process.
132
 We can see that 
same intent behind the Commerce Act 1986, but the difficulty, as in Bork‟s time, 
is defining the line between competitive practices which do damage to 
competitors but should be allowed because they are efficient and anticompetitive 
practices which harm competition itself and should be prohibited. 
Bork boldly asserted that: 
Basic microeconomic theory is of course a science, though like many other 
sciences it is by no means complete in all its branches. Were it not a science, 
rational anti-trust policy would be impossible.
133
  
Taking a „scientific‟ approach then, Bork said the problem of monopoly is not 
only that it results in higher prices and reduced output, but that it misallocates 
resources. This misallocation means that “unneeded resources must either lie idle, 
an obvious social waste, or migrate to other [less valuable] industries”. 134 
Allocative efficiency is therefore about making sure that resources, including raw 
materials, labour and so forth, create the most wealth possible by being distributed 
in the most sensible way.  
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Static allocative efficiency was differentiated from productive efficiency as “any 
activity by a business firm which creates wealth.”135 Productive efficiency could 
therefore include the kind of forward thinking innovation we normally associate 
with dynamic efficiency. The efficiency of the firm can be measured by its 
relative success in attracting consumers.
136
 By that rationale the most successful 
firm would be the one which attracted all consumers which by definition would be 
a monopoly. 
Bork said that: “Consumer welfare is greatest when society‟s economic resources 
are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as 
technological constraints permit.”137 This efficiency objective must be the sole 
purpose of the law and other concerns, such as the equitable distribution of 
resources, could not be left to the courts:
 138
 
… [C]ompetition must be understood as the maximization of consumer 
welfare, or, if you prefer, economic efficiency, That requires economic 
reasoning because courts must balance, when they conflict, possible losses 
of efficiency in the allocation of resources with possible gains in the 
productive use of those resources. In a word, the goal is maximum economic 
efficiency to make us as wealthy as possible. The distribution of that wealth 
or the accomplishment of noneconomic goals are the proper subjects of other 
laws and not within the competence of judges deciding antitrust cases. 
Then in 1993 The Antitrust Paradox was revised with a new epilogue in which 
Bork reiterated:
139
 
consumer welfare [means] economic efficiency… to make us as wealthy as 
possible….. [t]he distribution of that wealth or the accomplishment of 
noneconomic goals are the proper subjects of other laws. 
Bork was asserting that not only was maximum total consumer welfare the 
primary goal but that if there were competing considerations, they should be 
discarded. Giving voice to concerns for, say promotion of social justice or 
preventing the concentration of political power in the hands of the commercial 
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elite, would in fact be a source of judicial error.
140
 In support of this, Bork cites 
Judge Learned Hand as an example of what judges should not do:
141
 
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid 
monopoly; but… there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial 
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic 
results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself… showed that 
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before 
them. (Emphasis added.) 
Bork‟s use of the term „consumer welfare‟ is somewhat misleading. Usually when 
we think of consumer welfare, we think of the competition for wealth transfers 
between producers and consumers. The assumption is that in single firm 
monopoly markets, too much wealth is transferred which results in a dead-weight 
loss to society. When Bork contrasted consumer welfare with producer welfare he 
was in fact advocating that the total wealth of society should outweigh the 
interests of the individual. Maximisation of consumer welfare therefore meant an 
adoption of the total surplus standard. It has been said that: “The confusion arising 
from this use of the term „consumer welfare‟ has been called the „Chicago trap‟ 
and should be borne in mind when reading Chicago school sources.” 142  
For Bork producer welfare meant the Jeffersonian ideal of protection of small 
business men, but when small businesses were less efficient than large 
monopolies, they should not be protected. The proper intention of the Sherman 
Act was to outlaw only those predatory practices which might lead to inefficient 
monopoly, rather than those which produce greater efficiency and therefore 
greater consumer welfare. Thus monopolies which were obtained by efficiency 
would be protected regardless of the cost to democracy or resulting concentration 
of economic power.
143
 It followed that predatory commercial tactics which 
actually benefited the consumer, such as setting super low prices, should only be 
prohibited where the purpose was anticompetitive.  
This judicial obsession with the inherent undesirability of big business would lead 
to economic disaster. Pursuing a competition policy which idealised perfect 
competition would result in the: 
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atomization of society…. [and] would call not only for general abject 
poverty but for the death by starvation of millions of people. We may 
assume the antitrust laws were not designed to place the United States in 
worse economic condition than Bangladesh.
144
 
The true Congressional intention, according to Bork, had been to allow monopoly 
if it were obtained by efficiency. The courts were therefore mistaken in that:
145
 
Congress‟ decision to permit monopoly achieved by efficiency is completely 
inconsistent with the view that courts should use the Sherman Act to 
ameliorate the noneconomic „helplessness of the individual‟  before „great 
aggregations of capital‟ or that they may take into account the alleged 
desirability of preserving for its own sake an economy of small business 
units. 
Bork concluded that there was no possibility that antitrust policy could achieve 
the equality its proponents claimed to seek.
146
 Instead the costs would include:
 
 
1. The “destruction of wealth through the inhibition of efficiency”; 
2. The “accumulation of power in government”; 
3. The “replacement of free markets with government regulated markets”; 
and 
4. The “shift of lawmaking from elected representatives to courts and 
bureaucracies”. 147 
Antitrust was its own worst enemy, and was in fact the enemy of economic and 
democratic freedom, hence the antitrust paradox. 
Jack High is critical of the ambiguity in Bork‟s definitions of the static and 
dynamic efficiency concepts.
148
 While Bork should be given credit for refocusing 
antitrust on efficiency, and largely disposing of opposition to efficient practices 
such as vertical integration, High says that Bork‟s analysis is flawed in that it 
retains static efficiency concepts in a dynamic efficiency analysis.
149
 This 
combination of static efficiency concepts of perfect competition with dynamic 
productive efficiency is the true paradox of Bork‟s antitrust theory.150  
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In attempting to apply the two models Bork is conflating incompatible theoretical 
concepts, the first of which requires strict prohibition of restrictive trade practices, 
and the second which would dictate dropping all restrictions. High‟s point is that 
static and dynamic efficiency are mutually exclusive, accepting one requires that 
the other be abandoned. Antitrust cannot truly balance such fundamentally 
opposing concepts and the attempt to do so can only lead to inconsistent results.  
A second useful critique of The Antitrust Paradox was provided by Barak Orbach.
 
Orbach agrees with High that Bork‟s basic conception of static versus dynamic 
efficiency is flawed:
151
 
Borkean consumer welfare has never been anything but some weak form of 
allocative efficiency. It was and still is a misuse of the term. Intentionally or 
not, Bork obfuscated basic concepts in economics when he popularized 
consumer welfare as the prescription of antitrust laws. 
Orbach submitted that a search for the meaning of Bork‟s „consumer welfare‟, 
“the only articulated goal of antitrust law in the United States”, will be largely 
fruitless.
152
 A search in caselaw or academic literature will provide no single 
meaning of the term. It is this confusion which adds to the antitrust paradox, that 
the misapplication of antitrust laws, particularly equating competition with the 
protection of small businesses, harms both consumers and producers. 
Bork mistakenly equated competition, efficiency, wealth maximization and 
consumer welfare. Orbach‟s point is that these microeconomic concepts are 
related, but they are not synonyms. We can see the ramifications are profound and 
have rebounded throughout the total surplus standard debate. It is not sufficient to 
conclude that because a practice is efficient that it will promote competition, or 
that because wealth is maximised that consumer welfare will be enhanced, yet 
these are the conclusions which are constantly made in support of workable 
competition.
153
  
The ultimate goal of Borkean antitrust is to properly balance productive efficiency 
and allocative efficiency while making as much wealth as possible.
154
 The fair 
distribution of wealth should be left to other laws, such as tax or social welfare 
policy. New Zealand‟s workable competition model likewise aims to balance 
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static efficiency goals, such as minimizing costs and prices with the long-run 
dynamic efficiencies of increased innovation leading to new products and 
processes. This means that our competition policy, from 1986, has been borne 
unmistakable Borkean characteristics. Therefore any valid criticisms of Bork‟s 
work may also be applied to our workable competition model. 
The ongoing question remains, what is the proper role of competition regulation? 
What is workable competition? If the focus is on static efficiency to minimise 
prices and maximise output then extensive intervention to prevent „bigness‟ and 
preserve the S-C-P perfectly competitive model is warranted. If the focus is on 
dynamic efficiency then the market should be free to operate, organisations which 
are efficient in producing what consumers want at least cost will, and should be 
free to, acquire monopolies and charge monopoly pricing as just reward. But will 
balancing the two concepts really result in confusion and arbitrary judicial 
lawmaking? In any event, competition policy choices will directly affect the 
distribution of wealth and are therefore inherently political. That fact must be 
recognised, to do otherwise is the worst form of hypocrisy.  
 
Richard Posner and Law and Economics 
The next most influential antitrust writer to emerge from the Chicago School 
closely associated with Robert Bork is Richard Posner. Currently a senior lecturer 
at the University of Chicago Law School and Judge in the United States Court of 
Appeal in the Seventh Circuit, Posner has played a key role in the rise to 
ascendancy of Law and Economics.
155
 
The picture that emerges from the literature over the last century is that 
competition law became more permissive as the judiciary allowed neoliberal 
economists to take the lead in the interpretation of competition legislation. A 
striking example of this shift can be taken from the first and second editions of 
Richard Posner‟s book – Antitrust Law.156 These two editions span 25 years of 
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Posner‟s intellectual development and coincide with the period in which the 
Chicago School became so influential.  
Again like Bork, Posner‟s initial premise was that the Sherman Act was motivated 
by the public perception that the American economy was being taken over by 
cartels and monopolies.
157
 Competition law up to that late nineteenth century had 
been more concerned with ensuring Parliamentary supremacy, stopping 
unionization and limiting competition in the sale of particular goods.
158
 The 
writers of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, aimed to promote the Jeffersonian 
ideal of protecting small businessmen and the poor from monopoly pricing rather 
than on promoting any allocative efficiency effects. The result was that 
competition law had become too protective of the inefficient. Only when the role 
of antitrust law shifted to promotion of economic efficiency did:
159
 
… it became recognised that the lawful monopolist should be free to 
compete like everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an 
umbrella over inefficient competitors. „A monopolist, no less than any other 
competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete aggressively on 
the merits‟…  
Posner‟s suggestion was that this disjuncture between the common law and the 
anti-elitist concerns of contemporary legislators led to a failure to set clear 
standards. The resulting confusion and damage to the economy was only resolved 
when the judiciary abandoned its search for answers in the common law and 
turning to economics for solutions, hence the rise of the Law and Economics style 
of legal analysis. 
If we compare Posner‟s conclusions from the 1976 edition of Antitrust Law with 
the same point made again in 2001, we can observe a paradigm shift in action:
160
 
The discontinuity between the common law of trade regulation and the 
Sherman Act is important to remember whenever one sees a lawyer or judge 
attempting to buttress his antitrust theories by reference to some common law 
doctrine that he contends was incorporated into the antitrust laws by the 
Sherman Act. Such an argument is almost always unhistorical. The Sherman 
Act did not enact the common law of restraint of trade. A better guide to 
interpreting the Sherman Act is the economic analysis of monopoly. 
[emphasis added].  
And in 2001:
161
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Populists would like the interpretation of the antitrust laws to be guided 
neither by the common-law background nor by economics, but instead by the 
prominent vein of populist thought that runs through the legislative history of 
all the major federal antitrust statutes…. For guidance the courts perforce 
turned elsewhere. After a century and more of judicial enforcement of the 
antitrust statutes, there is a consensus that guidance must be sought in 
economics. [emphasis added]. 
The point here is not how the Sherman Act should be interpreted, but rather that it 
is evidence of Posner‟s increasing confidence in the role of economics in antitrust. 
After 25 years he could unequivocally state that, „guidance must be sought in 
economics‟ and, by implication, that economists must have the final say.  
Perhaps Posner‟s most significant contribution was to emphasise the importance 
of the total surplus standard with its focus on overall growth and neutrality 
towards wealth transfers:
 162
 
Populists complain that monopolization transfers wealth from consumers to 
the stockholders of monopolistic firms, a redistribution that goes from the 
less to the more wealthy. The transfer, unlike the restriction in output that 
monopoly pricing entails, has no direct effect on efficiency, … [but] a 
transfer of income from wealthy to a poor person increases the utility of the 
poor person more than it reduces the utility of the wealthy person. The 
argument is plausible in extreme cases: a dollar surely confers more utility 
on an indigent person than on a billionaire. but applied to monopolies and 
cartels, it is undermined … by the increasingly broad ownership of common 
stock … 
Posner‟s point, that investors are also consumers and gain or lose just as much as 
others in any wealth transfer, sits well with the Borkean definition of consumer 
welfare and its exclusion of all objectives unrelated to pure economic efficiency. 
But the argument that  wealth is fairly transferred via „broad ownership of 
common stock‟ may not apply to New Zealand‟s shallow share market. A careful 
analysis of the composition of stockholders of our largest companies, compared to 
the size of wealth transfers from consumers, would be required.  
The argument may be directly applicable to our state owned enterprises, however, 
as the owners are all taxpaying citizens. Wealth transfers to state owned 
enterprises are more like taxes, in that dividends are not paid in proportion to 
shareholding, but the accumulated capital goes to pay for public goods. This 
indirectly undermines Bork‟s point that social distribution of wealth is the proper 
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subject of other laws. If the wealth transfer is essentially a tax, then the distinction 
disappears. 
If a given society contains a disproportionate number of indigent and low income 
citizens and the major industries are owned by the middle and upper classes then 
Posner‟s wealth transfer neutrality could amount to double dipping by the rich. A 
rich household may be far more expensive to run and maintain than a poor one, 
but not so much that it outweighs the disproportionate ratio between earnings and 
outgoings of the rich relative to the poor. It is an undeniable fact that poor people 
pay a far higher proportion of their yearly earnings on basic necessities than do 
the rich. Secondly, if costs of consumer goods do increase due to the extraction of 
monopoly profits then that is more than compensated for by the payment of higher 
shareholder dividends.  
 
Rudolf Peritz described Posner‟s claims to scientific objectivity as “ill founded” 
and a rather hypocritical mask for a political agenda.
 163
 Not only that, but the 
single-minded insistence upon efficiency risks doing away with subsidiary, but 
crucial, benefits of competition:
164
 
… competition is important both in and of itself, as a fair, meritocratic 
process, and in light of a whole ensemble of expected benefits including not 
only efficiency but also low prices to consumers, product innovation, and a 
preference for independent entrepreneurs.  
Even Posner‟s basic definitions of allocative and productive efficiency are unclear 
and differ from mainstream economics. Peritz argues that, for mainstream 
economists, allocative efficiency is about utility, or the subjective personal 
satisfaction each individual seeks.
165
 As this is unquantifiable the Chicago 
Schoolers opted for wealth maximization, as money may be easily counted.  The 
same criticism might be made of Bork‟s efficiency definition, which measures 
efficiency by success in the market place.
166
 Changes in wealth distribution 
necessarily change the preferences of consumers, however, which makes market 
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success as much about the political choices of the market regulators as it is about 
the consumer‟s own self-selected satisfaction.167 
Peritz claims that, in preferring easily quantifiable total wealth maximisation 
Posner has abandoned Pareto optimality as a measure of efficiency. Benthamite 
cost-benefit analysis justifies the total surplus standard and makes the neutrality of 
wealth transfers far more palatable.
 168
 Secondly, Peritz objects to the misuse of 
the Law of Demand. This most fundamental of all economic concepts holds that 
the price consumers are willing to pay for a good subsides as supply increases. 
Posner applies this to all things except his treatment of money. Posner refuses to 
accept that an extra dollar means less to the wealthy than it does to the poor (with 
the exception of the extreme case of the indigent versus the billionaire). Taking 
this „dollar is a dollar‟ position absolves regulators from responsibility for social 
inequity. As consumer welfare is easily measured as a factor of GDP, we can 
therefore say that the economy is doing well if it is growing, regardless of who is 
truly benefiting, which again is a political choice.
169
   
Baumol and the Wave of Creative Destruction 
Following on from Posner and Bork, William Baumol reinvigorated Schumpeter‟s 
creative destruction hypothesis and formulated much of modern contestability 
theory.
170
 A candidate for the Nobel Prize in economics and co-creator of the 
Baumol-Willig rule, Baumol testified as an expert witness for Telecom in New 
Zealand‟s leading competition case.171  
Baumol agreed with Scherer that true innovation would come from a market 
composed, not of numerous competitors as in the perfect competition model, but 
from an „oligopoly‟. A workably competitive market would entail a few large 
firms, not competing on price but engaged in a technological arms race fueled by 
routinized research and development programmes.
172
 Perhaps because this model 
closely resembles New Zealand, with the limitations posed on it by the small size 
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of our economy, Baumol came to be very influential here, an influence clearly 
seen in Alan Bollard‟s writing.173  
Like Schumpeter, Baumol identified innovation as the key factor for success. 
Firms which fail to invest in the “innovation race” will lag behind and “even a 
firm that is in the vanguard may find that super-competitive profits are very 
transitory because they attract ambitious entrants.”174 Oligopoly was necessary for 
rivalry in innovation as single firm markets, by definition, contain no competition. 
The perfect competition model, with its large number of small firms tending to a 
marginal cost equilibrium, fails to provide sufficient capital for investment in new 
products.
175
  
Only in an oligopoly are firms in a position to observe and react to the actions of 
the limited number of competitors, which then sparks a „spillover‟ of benefits. 
This spillover is due to the sharing of ideas amongst competitors and the cross-
fertilisation from the licensing or sale of patented inventions. Baumol calculates 
the “spillover ratio – the share of the benefits of innovation that goes to persons 
other than the investors…” as the true measure of the innovative fertility of a 
market.
176
  
The spillover problem is created where competitors lose those benefits through 
being unable to copy or learn from each other‟s advances. What Baumol appears 
to be advocating is collusion between oligopolistic competitors, the sharing of 
ideas and technologies as a means of more creatively exploiting niches in the 
market. The line between collusion and cartel is blurred if not extinguished and as 
Jones and Sufrin point out:
177
 
The downside of the information sharing between oligopolies, whether it is 
deliberate or accidental, is that it increases the potential for collusion. While 
some oligopolistic markets are characterised by fierce competition others are 
not. This presents a formidable problem for regulators.  
But for a Schumpeterian like Baumol, prevention of all collusion between rivals 
would result in a world where a few trillionaires completely monopolised the 
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profits of technologies they had developed, while the rest of us languished in a 
state of seventeenth century style poverty.
178
 Citing George Bernard Shaw‟s 
dictum that poverty is the greatest crime,
179
 Baumol makes a case for a free 
market in innovation, while only obliquely addressing the distributive justice 
questions raised by the capitalist process itself. 
Like Coase, Baumol describes the use of a Kaldor-Hicks or Pigouvian style 
solution, that efficient yet sub-Pareto optimal arrangements could be compensated 
for by lump sum redistributions (tax), as a “fairy tale”.180 Baumol asserts that 
lump sum redistribution is frequently impossible and is unnecessary as the 
spillovers alone would cater to a Pareto optimal result. Consistent with the 
marginal cost controversy, Baumol‟s premise is that if the state appropriates the 
profits of innovation from investors, the incentives to innovate would disappear. 
Stopping investors enjoying the fruits of their competitively correct decisions 
would, in the long-run, prevent anyone benefiting from investment at all. Kaldor-
Hicks style compensation would only deter other socially desirable 
investments:
181
 
The bottom line, simply, is this: there is no way in reality to escape the 
tradeoff between the incentives required to elicit the “optimal” level of 
investment in innovation and the desire for the resulting rise in real 
production to benefit everyone, and not just the innovators. 
Perhaps not but to do so ignores other moral justifications for taxation based on 
citizenship and communal obligation. The rich benefit from stable egalitarian 
societies just as much, if not more so, than do the rest of us.  
The Dynamic Efficiency Debate in New Zealand 
Musings on the relative merits of and proper balance between static and dynamic 
efficiency are not limited to the American and British academics. The debate is a 
continuing one and it has found its way to our shores. Matt Sumpter, Michael 
Katz, Lewis Evans and Geoff Bertram amongst others demonstrate its enduring 
influence on contemporary economic policy.  
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The ideals of dynamic efficiency, contestability and the total surplus standard 
have been so influential that they have become the economic orthodoxy. 
Economists‟ claims as to the wisdom of any particular course of action are 
seemingly unimpeachable, especially as the models used require advanced 
degrees in mathematics and economics to decipher. The problems posed by 
market failure and the increasing wealth gap, however, continue to stimulate 
questioning of the orthodox, particularly amongst the left and especially in the 
years since the Global Recession. 
Sumpter explores the tension between static and dynamic efficiency and 
concludes that where the two conflict, dynamic efficiency should prevail.
 182
 The 
overall logic is that while static efficiency focuses on improving performance in 
existing products and markets, dynamic efficiency results in the creation of 
entirely new products and markets. Therefore the gains from dynamic efficiency 
must exceed those of static efficiency. 
As an example of the economic orthodoxy, take these statements from a speech 
made by Michael Katz of the University of Berkely, California:
183
 
Total surplus is the leading concepts [sic] of economic efficiency used in 
practice. Total surplus is defined as the gross benefit to consumers minus the 
total cost to producers, so the aim is to maximise consumer welfare, while 
minimising producer cost. 
Katz was concerned that a consumer surplus based standard would lead to a 
situation of monopsony, where all power lies with the consumer, which would 
result in lower consumption. Presumably this would be because producers would 
have less incentive to come up with better products and services which might 
stimulate greater consumption. Prices which maximise consumer welfare would 
reduce the incentives to invest. Likewise a focus on lowering barriers to entry 
would favour new entrants at the cost of incumbent investors burdened with large 
sunk costs.  
Katz takes the Borkean position that antitrust is poorly suited to dealing with 
distributional issues and that it is better to use tax policy to deal with social policy 
questions. If the state were to involve itself in questions of wealth transfers it 
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would only create opportunities for rent seeking behaviour. Katz quotes Posner: 
“A major conclusion is that public regulation is probably as large a source of 
social costs as private monopoly”. 184  One is reminded of Reagan‟s 
pronouncement: “Government is not the solution to our problems, government is 
the problem.”185 
Despite these qualms Katz also said in an article in 2006 that Schumpeterian 
ideals could not be used as an excuse for backing off from all regulation of anti-
competitive behaviour.
186
 Katz defines Schumpeterian competition as competition 
over innovation, equivalent to dynamic efficiency. The difficulty Katz sees for 
antitrust officials in the US, although they have long recognised the importance of 
innovation competition, is how that should be implemented in actual policy. Does 
taking a pro-dynamic efficiency position necessitate a full scale retreat from 
antitrust enforcement as the Schumpeterians appear to advocate?
 187
 Profits from 
short term anticompetitive behaviour may in fact be justifiable in the long term. 
Indeed, as Katz put it:
188
 
…if firms are in fact competing by making risky investments in R & D, then the 
existence of high margins and apparent profits does not establish that the incumbent 
is earning excess returns as a consequence of market power. The apparent profits 
may simply be returns on past investments. The fact that, in the Schumpeterian view 
of the world, any profits and associated welfare losses due to unilateral practices or a 
merger are transitory reinforces the Schumpeterian theme that antitrust enforcers 
should focus on long-run innovation concerns rather than short-run price and output 
decisions. 
The conclusion is that regulation of such markets on the basis of short term 
indicators, such as prices or output, is counter-productive unless it also takes 
incentives and opportunities for innovation into account. In fact, externally 
imposed price caps may well impede incentives for innovation. Likewise 
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preventing mergers may thwart the accumulation of technologies and valuable 
economies of scale.
189
 
Katz‟s conclusion to the question „are the Schumpeterians right?‟ is yes and no.190 
Increasing concentration in a market does not necessarily harm innovation or 
consumer welfare, but it would be going too far to say that dynamic efficiency 
warrants a total and systematic retreat from market regulation. Katz recalls 
Scherer‟s point that perfect competition may be as harmful to innovation as 
monopoly. While it is a given that incentives are needed to promote business 
strategies and structures which promote progress, this should not result in carte 
blanche to practice monopoly behaviour as advocated by laissez-faire 
Schumpeterian idealists. A balance must be found. As Katz succinctly put it:
191
 
At some point, the benefits of an incremental increase in innovation 
incentives will be outweighed by the harms from the loss of static 
competition. Moreover, although exclusionary practices might yield profits 
that could finance R&D or strengthen R&D incentives by increasing the 
prize earned by a successful innovator, such practices may also reduce 
competitive pressures on incumbents. Importantly, such practices may also 
make it less profitable and more difficult for entrants to innovate so as to 
perpetuate the Schumpeterian cycle of „creative destruction‟. 
Giving too much power to antitrust enforcement officials runs the risk of allowing 
the state to pick the winners, a task it has demonstrably failed in the past. On the 
other hand, the consumer has a right to be protected from the „great aggregations 
of capital‟ which has been the concern since the days of the Sherman Act. It is this 
search for balance, for some form of workable competition, which so consumes 
competition policy to this day. The case for sensible antitrust enforcement remains 
intact, even amongst the orthodox. 
State Control of Prices and Competition Pre-1984 
Prior to 1984 and the election of the neoliberal-inspired Lange Labour 
government, New Zealand utilities had been closely regulated. Electricity in 
particular was a state monopoly and so the onus was upon the state to set fair 
prices and conditions.  
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State centered control of prices was the norm across the economy. For example, 
the Control of Prices Act 1947 fixed prices for consumer goods as of 1 September 
1939, the outbreak of World War II.
192
 Any change in price could require recourse 
to the courts to decide whether the good had changed in its nature or quality.  
The main competition legislation was the Trade Practices Act 1958 (“TPA”) 
which intended to prevent “trade practices deemed contrary to the public 
interest.”193  While the TPA was not the first competition law statute in New 
Zealand, it was pioneering in that it set up its own tribunal and appeal authority 
with specific procedures, principles and methods.
194
 The Act was criticised, 
however, for giving too little resources to the Trade Practices and Prices 
Commission (the “TPP Commission”) and for creating an Appeal Authority 
which could second guess those decisions.
195
  
The TPA was extremely detailed compared to the generally proscriptive phrasing 
of the Commerce Act 1986. For example, profiteering, black marketing and 
hoarding all specifically prohibited.
196
 It was deemed an offence under s 20 to 
unreasonably increase costs and prices or to prevent, reduce or limit 
competition.
197
 But deciding which practices unreasonably harmed the public 
interest, outside of those listed, might not be so straightforward a process. 
Section 20 was tested in Re the Associated Booksellers of New Zealand.
198
 The 
High Court dealt with an appeal from a decision by the TPP Commission that an 
agreement between retailers to fix prices covering ninety per cent of all imported 
books was against the public interest. In prescribing the agreement, the 
Commission had taken what was basically a quantitative approach, in which price 
was the only factor and other competitive advantages of the practice were 
disregarded.
199
  
Judge Dalgleish criticised the quantitative approach and said that to determine 
whether a practice was reasonable or unreasonable: “All facets of competition in 
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the sale of books such, for example, as services, breadth of selection and display 
of stocks are relevant for consideration.”200 Reasonableness of prices was a factor 
to be taken into account in considering the public interest, but it was not the only 
factor. The Court seemed to be particularly impressed by testimony from J.C. 
Beaglehole of Victoria University that the advantage of not having to „shop 
around‟ for the best prices far outweighed gains from competitive pricing.201 The 
TPP Commission might have a wide discretion to determine the public interest, 
but it had misdirected itself in taking a view based solely on the price effects of 
the bookseller‟s agreement.202   
In the context of the previous staunch controls of pricing, the decision is 
somewhat surprising. The focus on effects of competition, and the idea that the 
regulator should not prevent collusive retail price maintenance, if the overall 
efficiency gains was in the public interest, is surprisingly modern. Perhaps this 
signalled that competition issues were in a transitional stage in 1961. But as John 
Collinge (former chair of the Commerce Commission) pointed out, it was still not 
clear whether the balancing of beneficial and detrimental effects to determine the 
public interest should apply only to the question of the unreasonableness of the 
practice, or whether it applied to the broader question of the public interest.
203
 
Subsequent cases only deepened the confusion. For example, at what stage should 
the inquiry take place? What did unreasonable mean? Did it apply to purpose, 
means or effects?
204
 The commentary had become awash with trivial legal 
ephemera. And as these tests applied to the subsequent 1975 Act as well, the 
confusion would have lasting effects. 
By the late 1960s several statutes with competition law implications remained on 
the books. Along with the TPA, there was the Monopoly Prevention Act 1908, the 
Commercial Trusts Act 1910, the Control of Prices Act 1947 and the Trade and 
Industry Act 1956, all of which dealt with anti-competitive practices either 
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directly or indirectly.
205
 One goal of the authors of the Commerce Act 1975 would 
therefore be to repeal and consolidate these several Acts. 
 The 1975 Act created the Commerce Commission (the “Commission”) which, in 
determining the public interest, would be guided by:
206
 
(a) The promotion of interests of consumers; 
(b) The promotion of the effective and efficient development of industry and 
commerce; 
(c) The need to encourage improvements in productivity and efficiency in 
industry and commerce in New Zealand; 
(d) The economic policies of the Government as transmitted in writing from 
time to time to the Commission by the Minister and as published by him in 
the Gazette. 
Reconciliation of these conflicting objectives would be the responsibility of a 
body whose members were selected for their commercial and practical as well as 
legal expertise.
207
 Far from being guided by lasseiz-faire free market ideals, the 
prevailing philosophy was that “where the freedom of the individual businessman 
or combination of businessmen conflicts with essential public interest, then the 
public interest must prevail.” 208  But as we have seen, discerning that public 
interest and the proper degree of intervention would continue to vex. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the main significance of the 1975 Act was that it 
established the Commerce Commission without resolving the deeper underlying 
issues. 
The 1984 Labour Government, Bollard and Contestability 
To put the shift in competition policy in context, it would be useful to pause and 
take note of historical events prior to 1984. The mid-1970s were a climactic 
period for energy policies world-wide. The oil crisis of 1973-74 saw the price of 
oil quadruple, forcing a contraction of global economies, including New 
Zealand‟s, and causing recessionary effects which persisted into the 1980s. 
Political demands for energy self-sufficiency led directly to the Muldoon 
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government‟s notorious „Think Big‟ Plans. Unfortunately, when high oil prices 
collapsed and high demand for electricity failed to materialise, the rationale for 
debt laden public works energy projects disappeared. These events led to a 
popular belief amongst the right wing that government was simply unsuited to 
directing the economy. 
That belief was exacerbated by the epic scale of the public sector circa 1984. With 
government expenditure transfers making up approximately 39% of GDP,
209
 state 
owned enterprises included, not just utilities such as electricity and 
telecommunications, or flagship services such as Air New Zealand or NZ Rail, but 
also shipping, hotels, insurance, finance, computers, coal, forestry, steel, radio and 
tourism.
210
 Such dominance of the economy did not leave much room for the 
entrepreneur and, within the public sector itself the highly centralised 
bureaucracies were regarded as simply stifling.  
This was the context within which the Muldoon government fell and was replaced 
by Lange/ Douglas with their commitment to small government, privatization and 
deregulation of the economy. It has frequently been asserted that the Chicago 
School styled Washington Consensus was accepted wholesale by elements within 
New Zealand society who then came to dominate the formation of public policy 
following the 1984 election.
211
 As Richard Miller put it, what lay behind the new 
policies was:
 212
 
… a newly discovered concern with economic efficiency and a renewed faith 
in the competitive powers of market rivalry as a means to approach or to attain 
that efficiency…. [The] central role of the market mechanism is to provide 
goods and services that consumers want by allowing market prices to reflect 
costs, by encouraging entrepreneurial enthusiasm and by removing the 
deadening visible hands and feet of government regulation. Private avarice can 
be harnessed for the public good by a competitive environment. 
It has even been said that in many respects the liberalisation and deregulation of 
the New Zealand economy would out-do that of the United States or United 
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Kingdom. New Zealand provided a „test bed‟ for free market theories allowing 
them to be applied on a level not seen elsewhere.
213
  
The paradigm shift was staunchly opposed by trade unions, Maori, and many 
amongst the intelligentsia. Opposition to the new regime accelerated amongst 
Victoria University economists and at the Wellington meeting of the New Zealand 
Association of Economists in February 1985, the two sides came head to head.
214
 
The „Victoria Group‟ criticized the “Monetarist Doctrine” for rejecting aggregate 
demand management as a means of managing unemployment, and focusing on 
reducing wages and restructuring the labour market. By floating the exchange rate, 
and concentrating on lowering wages to control inflation, Treasury was accused of 
abandoning the working class to the whims of market forces, cynically 
disregarding the social cost. These American-inspired supply-side monetary 
policies ran the risk of inducing a full scale recession.
215
 As Bertram put it:
216
 
Treasury had fallen into the trap of treating the real world as though it 
matched exactly the pure theoretical neoclassical model, and had therefore 
failed to warn the incoming government of the real-world consequences of 
the policies being recommended. 
The policy arena itself was, and may still be, dominated by simply too few players. 
The market may fail to provide the most efficient outcomes if it is dominated by 
the few, and this is just as true for the market for ideas as it is for any other 
commodity. The wholesale importation of these ideas meant that the public failed 
to appreciate that what was being put to them as common sense propositions, were 
in fact highly speculative, ideologically driven thought experiments. Bertram 
characterised the period as one of an ideological regime change, an “internal coup 
d‟etat” in which Treasury and the Reserve Bank took control of government from 
the large Ministries of Works and Development, Energy and Trade and 
Industry.
217
 Henceforth, „light handed regulation‟ was embraced as a key 
component of New Zealand‟s financial resuscitation. The free market would now 
be the primary mechanism used to order society. The great danger was that the 
state had been so involved with the administration of the economy that too many 
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working people‟s livelihoods were tied up in the state owned enterprises. Simply 
replacing a commitment to state centered full employment and the guaranteed 
provision of public services at a fair price with reliance upon market forces, would 
cause mass social disruption.  
Led by Roger Douglas, Rod Deane, Ron Trotter, Roger Kerr amongst others, a 
group of businessman, Treasury and Reserve Bank luminaries and members of the 
Business Roundtable were moving as quickly as possible to privatise, deregulate 
and liberalise the New Zealand economy.
218
 The strategy was deliberately 
designed to intimidate and overwhelm opposition, as Douglas put it:
219
 
Do not try to advance one step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and 
move towards them in quantum leaps. Otherwise the interest groups will 
have time to mobilize and drag you down. 
These same sentiments echo those of an earlier political theorist: “For injuries 
ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less.”220 
The neo-liberal programme was comprehensive and wide ranging, and as we can 
see, its birth was attended by numerous mid-wives. One of the most significant, 
and recognizable names to enter the discourse, was that of Dr Alan Bollard. 
Current Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (at the time of writing), 
Bollard also served as Secretary to the Treasury (1998-2002), head of the 
Commerce Commission (1994-1998) and Director of the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research (NZIER) from 1987-1994. Bollard made his philosophy clear 
in 1987 with a seminal paper which applied William Baumol‟s contestability 
theories to competition law in New Zealand.
221
 The paper therefore provides a 
clear link between the American microeconomic theories propounded by Baumol 
and Commerce Commission‟s support for Baumol‟s conception of Dynamic 
Efficiency.
 
 
According to Bollard, and it is important to be clear about his views given his 
position at the centre of competition policy in New Zealand, contestability is 
achieved where “entry is absolutely „open‟ and exit absolutely costless.”222 The 
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aim must be to reduce the barriers to entry and exit so that should a firm gain 
monopoly control of a market, its dominance can be easily challenged by 
innovative newcomers. After that the Darwinian law of survival of the fittest will 
determine which firms remain. 
The major barriers to entry are sunk costs. These would include outlay on assets 
which cannot be easily redeemed. These are contrasted with fixed costs, which 
constitute a minimum price for entry to the market, but which are more easily 
recouped. The example Bollard gives is the difference between railway cars, a 
fixed cost which can be moved and sold separately if the business fails, and rail 
tracks, a sunk cost which cannot be easily liquidated.
223
 The electricity market 
contains both fixed and sunk costs. The rolling stock, to analogise with the rail 
example, would be the retail assets (customers) and gas powered turbines, and the 
rail tracks would be the immovable hydro dams, geothermal assets and wind 
turbines.  
In a perfectly contestable market large monopoly profits would attract „hit and run‟ 
operators, new entrants taking short term positions in the market until the 
increased supply drove prices back down. Either the new entrants, or inefficient 
incumbents, would then be forced from the market. The threat from new entrants 
should, according to the theory, keep prices at the Pareto optimal level.
224
 
Bollard maintained that contestability was the best possible policy, but, “it has not 
yet become clear just how contestability theory can be operationalized in the 
courtroom or the regulation office.”225  Bollard acknowledged the challenge to 
creating contestability in industries where entry required large financial outlays in 
terms of brand development, human resources and capital intensive infrastructure. 
He also recognised that there may be a flaw in the assumption that there even 
exists a ready-made body of potential entrants, large and powerful enough to 
affect outcomes in the market, and eager to enter at the first sign of weakness.
226
 
Despite the difficulties, on a transaction costs analysis the benefits of 
contestability outweighed the detriments. Transaction cost theory is the Coasian 
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idea which provides that, particularly where sunk costs are very high, firms and 
individuals will organize their own affairs in the best way possible. Government 
regulation cannot be as efficient.
227
 So while cautious about contestability theory, 
Bollard still recommended a free market approach where possible. 
The tenor of the article suggests that Bollard was acquiring Schumpeterian ideas 
in the mid-80s which would guide his career in the Commerce Commission. We 
can see that he believed a free market was a Darwinian self-evolving mechanism 
which would tend towards the most efficient outcome so long as regulation (for 
example by the Commerce Commission) was kept as a last resort. Yet while 
Bollard was keen to learn from the American example, there is evidence that he 
attempted to moderate and adapt the lessons for the New Zealand context.  In 
1988, he edited a series of Fulbright Seminars titled: “The Influence of American 
Economics on New Zealand Policy and Thinking.”228 The book contains a series 
of articles by Richard Miller, Douglas Greer and Lewis Evans, amongst others, 
which criticise the American influence in terms which range from cautionary to 
scathing. A brief survey of these authors‟ views provides a valuable critique of 
some of the theories this thesis has introduced so far. 
Miller tells the story of how Keynesian demand-side economic policies were used 
successfully to contain the damage of the Great Depression.
229
 The goal was to 
provide full employment through large public works projects which would 
stimulate consumption and economic growth. Cartels were encouraged and prices 
fixed in the interests of economic stability. Growing inflation following the oil 
shocks of the 1970s caused a seismic shift to supply-side monetary policy in the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations, however, and inflation would henceforth be 
controlled by restricting the supply of money, but at the cost of full employment. 
Incentives for the individual to succeed would be provided by fostering economic 
inequality, a notion heartily subscribed to in New Zealand by David Lange.
230
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Intervention in markets would be restricted to that necessary to improve efficiency, 
with fairness considerations excluded.
231
 Instead Schumpeter and Baumol‟s 
theories of contestability in an oligopolistic market would be followed. Perfect 
competition might be impossible, but at the other extreme single firm monopolies 
markets were not necessarily to be feared, so long as entry conditions were 
attractive:
232
  
…  structural fewness came to be viewed as not automatically producing monopoly 
performance, despite the static oligopoly models of micro theory. By this theoretical 
development of contestability, competitive rivalry and performance may exist in 
industrial markets with only two firms, if appropriate entry conditions exist. And 
even a single firm may be forced to exercise considerable pricing restraint if it fears 
rapid loss of sales through entry of a new rival. 
If competitive pressures could be provided merely by leaving the door open for 
potential competition, then the role of the state in deconcentrating markets could 
be drastically reduced. While wholesale and complete withdrawal by the state 
from economic regulation was popular with some elements of the business 
community, few academics agreed.
233
 Even Baumol and Willig themselves are oft 
quoted as saying, “Specifically we will deny emphatically that [contestability] 
offers carte blanche to mindless deregulation and dismantling of antitrust 
safeguards.”234 What had changed since the 1930s was society‟s view of what was 
possible.
235
 Deregulation, removing government from playing an active part in 
controlling the economy, was now much more acceptable, even if there was no 
single accepted view of how far this process should be taken. 
Douglas Greer lambasted the exaltation of contestability theory, arguing that 
“seldom has a new theory been promoted with such extravagant exhortation by its 
natural and foster parents”.236 The “ultra-free” exit and entry principles required 
by contestability had “revolutionary” implications that were neither plausible nor 
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backed up by empirical evidence, its growing influence in the United States and 
New Zealand was really based on only “ideology and ignorance”.237 
Greer pointed out that the significance of conditions for exit and entry and the 
opportunities they played in obtaining monopoly profits (or losses) had been well 
known for more than a century.
238
 But while previously most neo-classical 
economics had required „actual‟ exit and entry from a multitude of competitors as 
per perfect competition, Baumol‟s contribution was to emphasise the importance 
of potential competition. If a market is perfectly contestable, the entry barriers 
should be sufficiently low that any rival may enter and extract profits from the 
underperforming incumbent, then leave again without undue cost:
239
 
Even a very transient profit opportunity need not be neglected by a potential 
entrant, for he can go in, and, before prices change, collect his gains and then 
depart without cost, should the climate grow hostile. 
The threat of such „hit and run‟ profit taking alone should then be sufficient to 
discipline the market and prevent the evils of monopoly practices:
240
 
Given contestability one need not worry about mergers that create monopoly 
or about collusive activities. A cavalry of hit-and-run contestants is always 
read to ride to the rescue. 
That contestability theory was significant in New Zealand‟s competition 
regulation from an early stage is revealed by these 1985 comments from former 
Commerce Commission chairman, John Collinge:
241
 
The emphasis in contestability theory is away from ensuring a number of 
independent sellers in the relevant market and whether there is a history of 
competition between them. It is upon whether there is a history of 
competition between them. It is upon whether, notwithstanding that there 
may be a monopoly or oligopoly in the relevant market, potential entrants 
could reasonably enter the market. Contestability theory has the important 
practical consequence that, in the absence of independent sellers in the 
market [ie. monopoly], there need be no concern if there is reasonably 
costless entry and exit for potential competitors (emphasis added). 
For Greer, it is the impracticality of the last point, the necessity for reasonably 
costless entry and exit, which makes contestability implausible and historically 
rare. Contestability lacks robustness, internal consistency or believable 
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assumptions.
242
 It is simply too unlikely that the potential „hit-and-run‟ profit 
taking newcomer would fail to be deterred by sunk costs or that an entrenched 
incumbent could be easily displaced by a newcomer without responding by 
changing tactics. In fact, such strategic behaviour increases and becomes more 
effective as markets become more concentrated.
243
 Having a competition policy 
which tolerates monopolies can only concentrate markets thereby destroying the 
opportunities for the hit-and-run profit taking contestability relies upon.  
Furthermore, refusing to break up the corporate structures which occupy all 
vertical and horizontal niches in such markets, on the basis that some competitor 
could theoretically challenge the incumbent, seems to amount to an abdication of 
the state‟s responsibility. This aspect of contestability theory put it at the forefront 
in the war of ideas between the Chicago School‟s Schumpeterian views, and its 
populist rival, the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (“S-C-P”). The goal 
of S-C-P was to preserve many small firms, in the interests of the perfect 
competition ideal and democratic economic equality, even at the expense of 
„efficient‟ wealth accumulation for a few large firms.244 The decision to move 
away from the S-C-P paradigm was therefore a political choice to favour large 
firms, which had more to do with how it was embraced by Reagan‟s 
administration, than the objective and somewhat flimsy merits of contestability.
245
  
Evans compared public utility regulation in New Zealand and the United States, 
submitting that our state owned organisations had very different regulatory 
requirements to those of American shareholder owned corporations.
246
 In the 
United States, regulatory commissions were established to oversee existing firms, 
whereas in New Zealand state ownership was necessary to build infrastructure in 
the first place. The mandate for state intervention was built into New Zealand 
utility regulation from its very inception.
247
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In the United States it is necessary to observe and understand the behaviour and 
motivations of four types of agents. These are:
248
 
1. the managers and stockholders of the regulated firm, 
2. advocates for the buyers of all goods and services produced, 
3. advocates for the buyers of a subset of the goods and services, and 
4. the courts (to which all regulatory decisions can be appealed). 
It is assumed that managers and stockholders will be motivated to procure higher 
profits, while consumer advocates push for lower prices. Rate of return price 
setting, which sets prices at a set percentage above the marginal cost, is a popular 
tool. Buyers of a particular subset of goods and services might demand cross-
subsidization from other products, for example, paying for free local calls with 
higher toll charges in the telecommunications market. The difficulty for the courts 
is balancing these competing objectives while developing and following a 
consistent policy narrative. 
Stigler‟s “capture theory” revealed the problem posed by the revolving door 
between regulator and regulated.
249
 Industry representatives are hired from the 
ranks of regulatory commissions and vice versa, creating an „old boys‟ network 
reluctant to take the harsh action sometimes required to properly police powerful 
privately owned organisations. Regulators are co-opted and become highly 
politicised creatures forced to balance self-interest with duty.
250
 
Evans argues that in New Zealand, state owned enterprises are subjected to many 
of the same political and economic pressures, but an additional layer of political 
complexity is evident, particularly in election years.
251
 The level of government 
ownership, which entails a somewhat oxymoronic and contradictory self-
regulation, has eliminated the detailed scrutiny shareholders and financial analysts 
afford to stock exchange listed companies.
252
 Shareholders have the power to vote 
with their feet, and exit a low performing asset en masse. State ownership, at least 
pre-1984, guaranteed the continued existence of politically important industries, 
no matter how unprofitably and incompetently run. This defeats the self-
correcting powers of creative destruction, to the long term detriment of both the 
enterprise and the taxpayer.  
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This of course assumes that private shareholders and analysts are better at picking 
winners that politicians and voters. Worldcom, Enron, Lehman Brothers and the 
Titanic were not state owned enterprises. 
As New Zealand makes the transition from state-owned to publicly-owned 
corporations, the choice of regulatory model will be crucial. Evans identified the 
need for full disclosure as, in order to police an industry, the regulator must know 
as much, if not more about it than do market players.
253
 He therefore 
recommended the United States system of separate industry specific regulatory 
commissions for New Zealand, post-privatisation. 
Whether or not the foregoing authors were outraged or cautiously optimistic, free 
market reforms were a fait accompli. The task for practitioners and industry 
participants alike would now be to adapt to the new regime. 
The Shift from Prime Necessity to Light Handed Regulation 
As previously discussed, the Commerce Act 1986 (“Commerce Act”) was 
intended to replace tight, highly detailed and prescriptive statutory controls with 
so-called light handed regulation. The rationale according to Peter Allport, former 
chair of the Commerce Commission, was that:
254
 
„Light handed‟ regulation provides an attractive, less economically 
distortionary alternative to heavier forms of regulation with the associated 
industry-specific regulatory bodies and higher compliance costs. For 
example direct regulatory control imposed by an industry-specific regulator 
can generate its own inefficiencies including the costs of operating the 
regulatory body, the information supply costs imposed on the regulated firms, 
and the compliance costs arising from the distortions caused by imperfect 
regulation. The possibility of „regulatory capture‟ is often noted as another 
possible concern, that is, where the regulator is „captured‟ by the regulated 
with the monopoly firms influencing the regulator to their own advantage. 
We can see the influence of Coase‟s transaction cost theory, that a generic 
competition authority would be more objective and less prone to capture, easier to 
comply with and cheaper to run than industry specific bodies. As Evans pointed 
out above, however, the United States experience had been that it was necessary 
to have expert bodies armed with full disclosure to properly police complex 
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industries. Time would tell whether a generic body like the Commerce 
Commission would, or could, effectively monitor market abuses. 
The three elements of the light handed regime were “„generic competition law‟, 
information disclosure requirements, and the threat of further intervention such as 
price control.”255 These coupled with contestability theory should have allowed 
efficient market based solutions for complex regulatory dilemmas. If all else 
failed the threat of future regulation would be a sufficient check on abuses of 
market power. However the shortcomings of the light handed regime lead to 
complaints that it was in fact a “no-handed” regime.256  
Michael Taggart reviewed the development of public service price regulation and 
the prime necessity doctrine, which guaranteed the supply of essential public 
services at a fair price. His thesis was that the privatization of public utilities since 
the mid-1980‟s had resulted in the de facto monopolization of supplies of essential 
services.
 257
 Under the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 the principle objective 
would be to operate as “successful businesses … As profitable and efficient as 
comparable businesses that are not owned by the Crown.”258 For Taggart, the 
potential for exploitation inherent in this corporatization and privatization of 
public services demanded that the common law doctrine be revisited. This was of 
particular importance as previously the state monopoly of essential services like 
electricity supply and distribution meant that it had not been necessary to properly 
explore those common law duties.
259
 The pattern had been to grant territorial 
monopolies, to prevent inefficient competition, and then to impose statutory duties 
which replicated the common law prime necessity duties. 
Taggart complained that replacing these statutory duties with contestability and 
free market ideals had “put pressure on the article of faith of New Zealand‟s 
welfare state, that public utilities should be universally available to all at a fair and 
reasonable price…”260 Great effort had been made to separate natural monopolies, 
where prices should be regulated, from contestable markets, where the free market 
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price signals would efficiently guide consumer choices.  Yet domestic consumers 
were still:
261
 
… just as much captive of the new privatised and corporatized entitles as 
they were when these utilities were owned and run by Government 
departments or municipalities. The legal shift from „public‟ to „private‟ 
ownership has made not one whit of difference to the plight of domestic 
consumers, except that several complaint and protective mechanisms have 
been removed in the transition.  
For Taggart this was a sufficient rationale for making the case that the doctrine 
should be reapplied to protect the public from corporate greed:
262
  
Public utilities are truly businesses affected with a public interest, whether in 
public or private ownership. For as long as they are practical monopolies – 
as they are in relation to domestic consumers – public utilities must be 
subject to regulation in the public interest. 
That relevance of prime necessity style duties was considered by the High Court 
in Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd.
263
 The plaintiff complained that the parties had entered into an interim 
agreement to supply electricity until a new substantive agreement could be 
negotiated “as soon as reasonably practicable.” 264  Electricorp then gave 12 
months notice of termination the agreement, which the plaintiff argued was a 
breach of a tortious statutory duty under the State Owned Enterprises Act to act in 
a “socially responsible manner”. 265  The question was whether that duty was 
overwhelmed by the principle objective to behave efficiently and competitively as 
a „successful business‟.266 This cause of action was struck out on the grounds that 
the primary responsibility was to be commercially successful, other considerations 
only need to be balanced, not given primacy.
267
 
Of the application of common law principles to the monopoly suppliers obligation 
to supply an essential commodity, Barker J said:
268
 
… at common law, the defendant, as a monopoly supplier of an essential 
commodity, owes a duty to the plaintiff and to the public generally to 
conduct itself reasonably and not to seek to abrogate existing contractual 
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arrangements. This cause of action is based on the proposition, accepted by 
the defendant, that a monopoly supplier of an essential commodity has a 
duty to supply and to charge a fair and reasonable price with a corresponding 
duty on the recipient to pay a reasonable price. This principle has been 
accepted in many cases… 
That cause of action was also struck out, arbitration being the most practicable 
remedy in the circumstances, but the Court had approved of the prime necessity 
rule that monopoly suppliers of essential commodities must behave reasonably 
and charge fair and reasonable prices. 
Judicial review of the terms of private contracts is somewhat anathema to the free 
market principles upon which the Commerce Act 1986 was founded, and it is 
somewhat surprising to see a case like this post-1986. The fact that a court in 1993 
was still commenting favourably about these common law duties demonstrates 
their persistence. 
Attempts to judicially review pricing decisions via use of the prime necessity 
doctrine were ultimately dismissed by the courts, however. When Mercury Energy 
Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited
269
 was appealed in Vector v 
Transpower,
270
 the Court of Appeal accepted that the prime necessity doctrine 
remained part of the law of New Zealand, but that the passing of the Commerce 
Act and the State Owned Enterprises Act precluded its application. It was 
becoming clear that the prime necessity doctrine was not going to gain much 
traction against the harsh application of free market principles. The Court of 
Appeal approved of the High Court‟s judgment where it said:271 
…there can be little doubt that in enacting the relevant statue, Parliament did 
not intend that doctrine to survive…. Since the mid-1980s New Zealand has 
opted for a light handed regulatory regime as encapsulated in the Commerce 
Act 1986 and the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. Direct intervention is 
clearly intended as a last resort ...  
The legislative intent behind the Commerce Act was to prohibit restrictive trade 
practices only where they abridged proscribed purposes as in s 36 or where it was 
necessary to control natural monopolies through Part 4 price regulation.
.272
 The 
Court accepted that while it had the expertise to set prices, as a practicality this 
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was a complex process, which must be continuously repeated and would involve 
the ongoing attention of the courts, “Had Parliament intended the Court to fulfil 
such a role, in our view it would have said so unmistakably clearly.”273  
Thomas J dissented in part, however, saying that while the prime necessity 
doctrine was in general excluded, because of the separation of Ministerial control 
from operation of what were basically commercial enterprises, it could still play a 
role in regulating state owned enterprises.
274
 Thomas J highly approved of 
Taggart‟s “oviferous” work. Prime necessity might be a “crude instrument” but 
the doctrine could still be used to prevent the monopoly abuse of refusing to 
supply or offering services on terms, such as “extortionate” prices, which 
effectively precluded supply. Though still complex, this was “a much narrower 
question than the question of what is a fair and reasonable price” and one which 
presumably the courts could manage.
275
 The door to prime necessity was left 
slightly ajar. 
James Every-Palmer said that the shift from heavy handed state owned 
monopolies to light handed regulation, has been followed by a re-regulation which 
has tended to be “political, reactive and ad hoc”.276 The changes have been driven 
by political philosophies rather than empirical analysis, have been purely reactive 
to excesses of the previous regimes, and were formulated on a case-by-case basis 
rather than as a coherent programme. Barry Barton has contested this conclusion 
seeing rather that the increasing control of natural monopolies and coordinated 
approach to investment in infrastructure has shown a consistent logic, even if it 
has not been explicitly planned.
277
  
The Commerce Act 1986 
New Zealand competition law, post-prime necessity and the extensive controls of 
earlier legislation, because of obligations under the New Zealand and Australia 
Closer Economic Relations Agreement, drew its inspiration from Australia. 
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Australian legislation in turn was rooted in United States and European 
Community law, and logically would follow Bork and Posner and the other 
Chicago School economist lawyers whose influence was so clearly felt in the 
United States.
 278
 
Developing a system of state control of private affairs is not an easy matter, as we 
have seen. The first question is to decide what the objective of the policy is, only 
then can all other issues about the extent of intervention be resolved.  Originally 
the purpose enacted was “to promote competition in markets within New Zealand” 
which lead Richardson J to remark:
279
 
In terms of the long title the Commerce Act is an act to promote competition 
in markets in New Zealand. It is based on a premise that society‟s resources 
are best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between two firms 
ensures maximum efficiency in the use of resources 
The search for the proper balance between consumer and producers interests 
continued, however, and while it was accepted that efficiency gains were desirable, 
to be of public benefit these gains had to find their way to the consumer in terms 
of lower prices, improved quality and so on.
280
 The purpose statement was 
replaced by the Commerce Amendment Act (2001) and, true to dynamic 
efficiency, the new section 1A states that the Act‟s purpose is to “promote 
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers in New Zealand.”  
Under the 1990 amendment to s 3A efficiency considerations must be cast in 
terms of their “benefit to the public” and in 1992 the Interdepartmental Review of 
the Commerce Act recommended that this test should be amended to:
281
 
1. Replace the words “benefit to the public” with benefit to New Zealand; 
2. That allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency would be the primary 
considerations; 
3. That “decision makers should take no account of the identity of those who 
were the beneficiaries of efficiency gains; and 
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4. A s 26 statement would be released explicitly stating that it was 
government policy to remain neutral over wealth transfers. 
This was a clear adoption of the total surplus standard. Benefit to the public was 
the goal, with the inferences that consumer welfare was less important than the 
total wealth of the nation. Pursuing efficiency measures to create maximum total 
wealth, while disregarding whose hands that wealth is in, is the very definition of 
the total surplus standard. The relevance of social welfare and equity in 
distribution remained an issue, but not for the courts to dwell on.
282
 
While these amendments were never made, the Commerce Commission 
incorporated many of its recommendations in Guidelines to the Analysis of Public 
Benefits and Detriments in the Context of the Commerce Act (Oct 1994). The 
guidelines “adopted a total welfare approach and ignored distributional effects”, 
and have since been followed.
283
 It is interesting, however, that in its submission 
to the Commerce Select Committee on the s 1A purpose statement the Commerce 
Commission declared:
284
 
We… considered whether the words „long-term‟ may lead the courts and the 
Commission to over emphasise dynamic efficiency at the expense of more 
immediate benefits. We accept the words „long-term‟ on the basis that 
welfare is defined as the welfare of consumers within New Zealand  
This seemed to suggest that the focus would be on consumers, not on the total 
surplus. The Hon Paul Swain, then Minister of Commerce, remarked that while 
“Consumers are given special mention as they are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
competition… the welfare of all New Zealanders will continue to be 
important”.285 This suggests that the Minister considered the purpose statement 
should in fact be interpreted consistently with the total surplus standard approach 
and that the welfare of producers would also be a significant factor. 
The High Court likewise rejected the suggestion that s 1A would require 
acceptance of a consumer surplus approach:
286
 
We are satisfied that the introduction of s 1A should not disturb the 
Commission‟s established practice of treating as neutral any wealth transfers 
between New Zealand consumers and producers…. The inclusion of ad hoc 
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welfare transfers, which are not losses to society, would distort the efficiency 
assessment by assuming additional economic harm to the public of New 
Zealand. In any event consumers might well be the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Long term benefit would therefore be equated with dynamic efficiency and the 
total surplus standard. The conclusion must be that workable competition is 
equivalent to dynamic efficiency, with a total surplus slant. 
As the legal framework of the Commerce Act was taken from the Australian 
Trade Practices Act,
287
 Australian decisions such as Re Queensland Co-operative 
Milling Assn Ltd (QCMA)
288
 would be influential. QCMA reveals the 
Schumpeterian ideals which informed so much competition law at the time:
289
 
This does not mean that we view competition as a series of passive, 
mechanical response to „impersonal market force‟. There is of course a 
creative role for firms in devising the new product, new technology, the 
more effective service or improved cost efficiency. [Schumpeter] And there 
are opportunities and rewards as well as punishments. Competition is a 
dynamic process; but that process is generated by the market pressure from 
alternative sources of supply and the desire to keep ahead. 
While the absence of price competition was not considered to be a concern, the S-
C-P focus on market structure was still significant. The Tribunal identified five 
elements to market structure analysis. These are:
290
 
(1) the number and size of independent sellers, especially the degree of market 
concentration; 
(2) the height of barriers to entry, that is, the ease with which new firms may enter 
and secure a viable market; 
(3) the extent to which the products of the industry are characterised by extreme 
product differentiation and sales promotion; 
(4) the character of „vertical relationships‟ with customers and with suppliers and 
the extent of vertical integration; and 
(5) the nature of any formal stable and fundamental arrangements between firms 
which restrict their ability to function as independent entities. 
Reducing barriers to entry was, true to form, seen as the key to a competitive 
market, on the grounds that it is contestability which guarantees workable 
competition:
291
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… it is the ease with which firms may enter which establishes the 
possibilities of market concentration over time; and it is the threat of entry of 
a new firm or a new plant into a market which operates as the ultimate 
regulator of competitive conduct. 
New Zealand legislators would synthesize these lessons and apply them to the 
formulation of s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. 
Section 36 and the Use of Market Power 
Section 36, like the purpose statement, has been the subject of significant debate 
and revision. As originally written, it was intended to prohibit the use of a 
dominant position in the market for the purposes of restricting entry to a market, 
preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct, or 
eliminating any person from a market.
292
 Person is defined to include local 
authorities and is “any association of persons whether incorporated or not”,293 a 
definition broad enough to include limited liability companies. 
As for overall role of the court in defining competition policy, McGechan J 
commented:
294
 
It is the permission of competition which the Court is directed to foster. Parliament, 
as a matter of policy, has decided benefits will flow from that course. Whether such 
is a correct economic or social analysis is not a matter for the Court. Within that 
objective, the particular objectives of ss 27 and 36 are clear… Section 36, following 
in the footsteps of a tradition at least as old as the Sherman Act (USC 15 ss 1-7) 
recognises that even in competitive markets dominant positions do arise which in the 
end can generate anti-competitive activity. Accordingly it is intended to prohibit the 
use of such dominant position within a market for serious anti-competitive purposes. 
Such provisions are directed at the protection of the concept of competition as such. 
They are not directed at the protection of individual competitors except in so far as 
the latter may promote the former.  
It is clear from the previous discussion that the principle picked up is Bork‟s, 
monopoly obtained by efficiency is to be rewarded not prohibited. It is not the 
holding of a dominant position in the market which was prohibited, but merely 
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using that power for one of the three prohibited purposes, restricting, preventing 
or eliminating competitors from a market.
295
   
One of the starting points for any s 36 analysis is the Australian case of 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd .
296
 Broken Hill Pty 
Ltd (“BHP”) had a near total monopoly of the production and supply of steel in 
Australia, and it used this position to refuse to supply Y-bar (used for fencing) to 
Queensland Wire, except at an exceptionally high price. In other words, this was a 
classic „refusal to deal‟ case, in which one monopolist was able use its power to 
restrict output and increase price for a product, with the intention of eliminating 
its rival from the market. BHP were able to use the inelastic demand features of 
the Y-bar market to impose standard Ramsey pricing, or all the price that the 
market could bear, on a captive consumer.  
The line between what behaviour was competitive, and what was exclusionary 
was explored by the Court. Dawson J said:
297
 
The difficulty in determining what conduct constitutes taking advantage of market 
power and what does not, stems inevitably from the need to distinguish between 
monopolistic practices, which are prohibited and vigorous competition, which is not. 
Both here and in the United States the search continues for a satisfactory basis upon 
which to make the distinction. For the most part, all that emerges are synonyms, 
which are not particularly helpful. Words such as „normal methods of industrial 
development‟, „honestly industrial‟, „anti-competitive‟, „predatory‟ or „exclusionary 
conduct‟ merely beg the question. 
As Mason CJ and Wilson J put it: 
… the object of s. 46 [Australia‟s equivalent to s 36] is to protect the interests of 
consumers, the operation of the section being predicated on the assumption that 
competition is a means to that end. Competition by its very nature is deliberate and 
ruthless. Competitors jockey for sales, the more effective competitors injuring the 
less effective by taking sales away. Competitors almost always try to „injure‟ each 
other this way…. The question is simply whether a firm with a substantial degree of 
market power has used that power for a purpose proscribed in the section, thereby 
undermining competition, and the addition of a hostile intent inquiry would be 
superfluous and confusing. 
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Again as in Bork‟s work, competition is equated with efficiency which equals 
consumer welfare. Correctly, the Court held that by refusing to deal with 
Queensland Wire for the supply of Y-bar, BHP were in effect preventing 
competition in the parallel star picket post market, and that brought them afoul of 
the prohibited purposes in s 46.
298
 
In order to establish liability under ss 27 and 36 of the Commerce Act 1986, the 
market in question must be defined.
299
 Again the QCMA case is taken as the 
starting point, the “market is the area of close competition between firms or, 
putting it a little differently, the field of rivalry between them”.300 If the market is 
defined too narrowly or too broadly, then anticompetitive behaviour may not be 
apparent. Too narrow an approach may be too permissive in failing to recognise 
the impact of non-competitive behaviour on competitors, too broad a view may 
unfairly penalise useful practices.  
Once the market has been defined then the question becomes, what behaviour 
should be prohibited? Rather than detailing specific trade practices, as was the 
common practice in earlier legislation,
301
 section 36 allows monopolistic practices 
in the interests of efficiency, but penalises those which have an anticompetitive 
purpose. The proper application of the law can be taken from Australian case of 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission
302
 McHugh J identified the issues relevant to application of s 46:
303
 
Section 46 of the Act poses four issues for determination. First, the court 
must identify the relevant market in which the conduct occurred. Second, the 
court must determine whether the alleged offender has taken advantage of 
that market power. Finally, the alleged offender must have engaged in the 
conduct for one of the proscribed purposes. This is the way in which s 46 is 
structured, and that is the way courts should apply it. 
The apparent clarity and simplicity of section 36 is deceptive, however. Surely 
there can be few other legislative statements which have provoked more judicial 
and academic debate than have been provoked by asking whether market power 
has in fact been used for a proscribed purpose, or whether it was just rivalrous 
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behaviour necessary in the ruthless cut and thrust of commercial life. The case of 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd
304
 provided the 
solution in the notorious yet still accepted “counterfactual test”. The 
counterfactual test asks, if the firm whose conduct was in question was operating 
in a competitive market, and was not in a dominant position, would it have acted 
the same way? If so, then there was no abuse of market power for the purpose of s 
36. 
The counterfactual test was directly applied in New Zealand‟s most important 
competition case of the 1990s, Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd.
305
 Telecom, as a former state owned enterprise, had enjoyed 
a monopoly of the telecommunications market, until the 1
st
 April, 1989, when the 
market was opened to competition. Thereafter it was required to allow its main 
competitor, Clear Communications, access to the Public Service 
Telecommunications Network (“PSTN”). The question then would be what 
should the company in the dominant position charge for access to an essential 
facility? With no regulating body to arbitrate, and no guidance from government, 
the solution would depend upon how well market forces could be constrained by 
the general prohibitions contained in s 36. 
As the Privy Council asserted:
306
 
Monopolies act to the detriment of the consumer by permitting the 
monopolist to charge higher prices than would be the case if there were a 
fully competitive market. This problem can be tackled in one or other or 
both of two ways viz by a regulatory body artificially restricting the price 
chargeable by introducing efficient competition…. The Commerce Act, inter 
alia, directed itself to both these processes: s 36 is designed to produce the 
competition which will, it is hoped, in due course compete out monopoly 
rents: Part IV of the Act enables immediate price restriction to be imposed 
by regulation.  
The case is perhaps most famous for its institution of the Baumol-Willig or 
Efficient Component-Pricing Rule (“ECPR”). Professors Baumol and Willig 
instructed Telecom that they could charge their competitor a price equivalent to 
the opportunity cost of the service, without breaching s 36.
307
 In other words, the 
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price would include the profit Telecom would lose by not supplying those 
customers. Their reasoning, familiar to us from the marginal cost controversy, was 
that marginal cost would not be the “correct yardstick” as that would not include 
the longer term costs of running the network.
308
 Rather the correct charge would 
be what a firm might charge in a perfectly contestable market, where ease of entry 
meant that monopoly pricing might attract new entrants. This was the 
counterfactual then; competitive behaviour would be defined according to what a 
firm acting in a competitive market and not in a dominant position would do. 
The High Court found that under the ECPR Telecom did not breach s 36, but that 
decision was reversed on appeal.
309
 In the Court of Appeal, Gault J accepted that a 
firm in a dominant position was entitled to compete, he accepted that it would not 
amount to use of a dominant position to demand prices equivalent to those 
obtainable in a contestable market, but where he disagreed was that those prices 
could include the opportunity costs without breaching s 36.
310
 The fact that the 
ECPR would allow the inclusion of monopoly profits invalidated the model 
altogether, particularly as it contained the risk that prices would be so high as to 
exclude Clear from entering the market at all. That Telecom had an 
anticompetitive purpose could be inferred from “the inevitability of the 
consequences of refusing to deal except on terms that lead to competitive 
disadvantage.”311 A fairer model would be to charge the “true cost” which would 
include only the incremental costs plus a reasonable rate of return. Cooke P added 
that in his judgment, a rule which required a competitor to indemnify its rival for 
the loss of custom was clearly anticompetitive.
312
 
The High Court judgment would be restored on appeal to the Privy Council, 
however. The Privy Council held that while it can be inferred from the effects of 
its actions that a firm in a dominant position has an anticompetitive purpose, it 
cannot be assumed that because that purpose exists that the dominant position was 
used.
313
 The Privy Council applied Posner‟s dictum: “A monopolist is entitled, 
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like everyone else to compete with its competitors: if it is not permitted to do so it 
„would be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors.”314 
The ECPR rule was an entirely valid model for the way a “hypothetical firm 
would conduct itself.”315 The key statement and application of the counterfactual 
is that:
316
 
In their Lordships‟ view it cannot be said that a person in a dominant market 
positions „uses‟ that position for the purposes of s 36 unless he acts in a way 
which a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same 
circumstances would have acted. 
Gault‟s „true costs‟ model, with its reliance upon ephemeral benchmarks like a 
„reasonable rate of return‟, would only create uncertainty, as “different minds can 
easily reach different views on what is reasonable or justifiable.”317 Monopoly 
markets should be dealt with in two ways, either by introducing efficient 
competition, or by empowering a regulatory body to restrict prices. Section 36 
could not be used as a “quasi-regulatory system” for controlling prices, when Part 
4 had already been designed for that purpose.
 318
 Calculating a reasonable 
monopoly profit under Gault‟s model would be too complicated for both the 
courts and the firm itself. Such investigations are “the function of regulatory 
bodies who can make decisive value judgments. They are the daily diet of a 
regulatory body.” 319  Furthermore, the choice of whether to invoke the Part 4 
machinery was for the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Minister, 
to decide, “But what policy the government adopts is no concern of the 
Courts.”320 
The Privy Council was satisfied that the ECPR still provided scope for 
competitive pressure through efficiency and better service, but the reduced ability 
for rivals to compete on price seems to have been less of a concern. The possible 
existence of monopoly rents did not invalidate the model.
321
 The point of s 36 is to 
promote competition, not to control prices. So long as Clear and Telecom were 
charging customers on the same basis, then there was a level playing field, no 
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matter how high those prices might be. So long as Clear efficiently competed for 
customers up to the “point alpha”, the point the customer connected to the PSTN, 
there would still be a downward pressure on the opportunity cost which would 
compete out monopoly prices and benefit consumers. Forcing Telecom to charge 
less than ECPR for access to the PSTN would amount to subsidizing Clear which 
would reduce competition in the contested area. 
On the question of monopoly rents, the Privy Council accepted the High Court‟s 
finding of fact that these could not be proved. Adoption of the ECPR might allow 
Telecom to recover monopoly rents, but deciding whether they existed or not 
would require investigations of such complexity that they were beyond the 
competence of the court. The point is crucial to the price squeezing issue:
322
 
The High Court … next considered whether the amount of the monopoly 
rents included in Telecom‟s opportunity cost might lead to the price payable 
by Clear for access to the PSTN being so high that it could not possibly enter 
the contested area as a competitor at all. So far as Their Lordships can detect, 
the High Court made no finding of fact on this issue specifically, presumably 
because, having found that the existence of any monopoly rents had not been 
proved, the point did not arise. 
What should have been the heart of the matter was dismissed. The sort of in-depth 
analysis which might have revealed that Telecom‟s behaviour constituted a price 
squeeze was assumed to be beyond the proper remit of the Court. Allowing the 
ECPR to function would probably compete out such monopoly rents if they 
existed, and if it did not, then the decision to control prices should be left to 
government to decide.  
Telecom v Clear was therefore a crucial step in the development of competition 
law in New Zealand. It established that the Baumol-Willig rule was the 
appropriate s 36 counterfactual test for a dominant vertically integrated firm‟s 
conduct in the market. It considered the relationship between s 36 and Part 4 price 
control and decided that s 36 could not take the place of Part 4 price regulation. 
Controlling prices should be left as a matter for government policy and executed 
by the appropriate regulatory agency.  
The decision also holds a special place in the history of the marginal cost 
controversy and the total surplus versus consumer welfare debate. To recap, the 
marginal cost controversy was the debate sparked in the 1940s by the suggestion 
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that essential services should be supplied at the marginal cost. Coase‟s response 
has become one of the foundations of dynamic efficiency to this day. Marginal 
cost cannot be the benchmark by which prices are measured because marginal 
cost pricing fails to provide sufficient capital for long term development. Chicago 
School theories hold that monopoly profits are necessary for long term growth, 
they stimulate new entry, new technology and the investment required to deal 
with growing demand. Regulation should be kept to the absolute minimum and 
price controls are only necessary in natural monopoly markets, such as electricity 
transmission networks, where competition is not feasible. This is workable 
competition as it was conceived by the Chicago School and realised in the 
Commerce Act. 
Telecom v Clear observably fits within this dialectic. By rejecting Gault‟s 
alternative to ECPR, the „true cost‟ model, the Privy Council had all but 
eliminated the option of using the courts s 36 powers to control prices. By 
including opportunity costs, the ECPR would allow for monopoly profits which 
could then contribute to dynamic efficiency and long term development. 
Unfortunately, for the rule to operate, the courts would still have to regularly 
review those access charges to ensure they reflected the downward trend on that 
opportunity cost created by Clears competition.
323
 That would seem to undercut 
the argument that the courts would not have a role, but that point was something 
of an aside. The main thrust was to allow the market to set prices, and to reduce 
the role of the courts as far as was practicably possible. 
According to Rex Ahdar the result has been that, while the legislation promised 
much, it failed to deliver.
324
 Ahdar argues that this ineffectuality stems from “a 
specious fairness or parity premise ... that powerful firms are entitled to compete 
as much as small, ordinary firms.”325 Ahdar argues that the dominant firm by the 
reason of its overwhelming economic force cannot and should not be treated in 
the same way as the small business.
326
 By adopting Posner J‟s well known 
objection to holding an „umbrella‟ over the inefficient, the Privy Council 
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rationalised monopolistic behaviour to the point where s 36 could almost never be 
breached.
 327
 
The prospect that innovative and efficient behaviour by the monopolist will be 
„chilled‟ is a real danger and not to be lightly dismissed. By 2006, however, the 
time Ahdar was writing, there had only been four successful s 36 actions since its 
enactment in 1986. This was so even after the high threshold set by the dominant 
position standard was softened to prohibiting taking advantage of a “substantial 
degree of power in a market.”328 But then in 2009 in Commerce Commission v 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd,
329
 Telecom was successfully 
prosecuted for breach of s 36 and fined $12 million, a record penalty under the 
legislation.  
The case arose competitors were required to pay Telecom for the right to connect 
to potential internet customers through the local access network datatail links 
which, outside of the major CBDs, were in Telecom‟s sole possession.330 The 
Commerce Commission‟s allegation was that Telecom had been setting its price 
for access to these datatails deliberately high with the intention of excluding its 
competitors from the retail market, a classic price squeeze.
331
 This was a breach of 
the “duty on a vertically integrated incumbent to supply an essential wholesale 
input to a competitor in a downstream market as found in Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Limited v Broken Hill Pty Co Limited.”332 The case is therefore 
somewhat analogous to the Telecom v Clear, and the Court accepted that there 
was no real distinction between the two cases in terms of pricing issues, so why 
then was the result so different?
333
 Was Telecom‟s behaviour really so much more 
egregious, or was it simply because of the changes to s 36? 
The Court considered s 36, and as Telecom‟s conduct traversed both regimes, 
what changes had been made by the 2001 amendment which shifted focus from 
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use of a dominant position to taking advantage of a substantial degree of power.
334
 
Whether there was any difference between the two versions was not considered to 
be an issue, rather the question was whether Telecom‟s pricing policy had 
breached the counterfactual test.
335
 The easy assumption that the two tests could 
be read in the same way is surprising, but at least it demonstrates confidence that 
ECPR is a definite test for anticompetitive behaviour in pricing involving a 
“dominant vertically integrated provider of network infrastructure and 
services”.336 
Telecom was found to be consistently charging rivals above the efficient price, 
and well above the price it charged its own retail customers.
337
 It seemed that 
Telecom‟s strategy was to charge at such an extortionate level, that the rival 
service provider would not be able to compete on retail price at all. Despite 
Telecom‟s submissions, the Court held that the Telecom v Clear was clearly 
applicable.
338
 Telecom‟s behaviour had amounted to a price squeeze which occurs 
when:
339
 
… a dominant vertically integrated supplier sets prices in the upstream 
wholesale market in a manner that prevents equally or more efficient 
competitors from profitably operating in the downstream retail market. 
As purpose can be inferred from effects, Telecom‟s imposition of such high prices 
amounted to refusal to supply, which was sufficient evidence of anticompetitive 
purpose to breach s 36.
340
  
The case is predicated on the assumption that the holder of an essential facility 
owes a duty to supply to its competitors, and at a price consistent with the ECPR, 
which is extremely similar to the prime necessity doctrine. The high sunk costs 
relative to potential business involved in building alternative local access 
networks outside the CBDs implied that Telecom had a duty to provide access.
341
 
The difference is that, rather than a reasonable price standard, the maximum price 
is set by the ECPR. Pricing above ECPR would impede efficient entry, which 
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would reduce contestability, but the inclusion of opportunity costs could mean 
that prices themselves were quite high. 
In Telecom v Clear the Court had shown a reluctance to investigate complex price 
issues more appropriate to the functions of a regulatory agency. Where there is a 
natural monopoly, the appropriate price control mechanism has long been held to 
be under Part 4. The Court took a far more relaxed approach to the difficulties of 
investigating breaches. Even if the Commerce Commission was unable to prove 
the complete extent of Telecom‟s violations of the ECPR, that would not prove 
fatal to their case. So long as the breaches were more than “de minimis” their 
actual number and extent would only go to “the gravity of the breach, not to its 
existence.” 342  Anecdotal evidence of financial losses, and that one 
telecommunications company was forced from the field, was held to be consistent 
with the economic theory.
343
 Part 4 was not considered at all, which makes the 
case tantamount to acceptance of the proposition that s 36 can be used as a price 
control, if only because pricing above ECPR will be penalised.  
The Commission requested a penalty fine of $20-25 million under s 80 of the 
Commerce Act.
344
 Section 80 gives the court discretion to impose up to $500,000 
for an individual, or the greater of $10,000,000, or 3 times the value of the gain 
for a body corporate, or if that cannot be ascertained, 10% of the turnover of the 
body corporate.
345
 The factors to be considered when imposing a penalty are:
346
 
(a) The nature and extent of the contraventions. 
(b) The duration of the contravening conduct. 
(c) The deliberateness of the conduct. 
(d) Knowledge of senior management. 
(e) The commercial gain derived. 
(f) Loss or damage to others. 
Rodney Hansen J said, that because of the “bewildering complexity” of Telecom‟s 
submissions: “Without expert assistance, I am not competent to resolve the 
plethora of issues which must be determined in order to quantify gains from non-
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compliant sales.”347 The Commission‟s position was that even if the gains were 
“inherently unquantifiable…their assumed effects support a severe penalty.”348 
The Court agreed and reasoned that as the primary objective of the pecuniary 
penalty is deterrence, it must be sufficiently high to amount to more than a licence 
fee for the prohibited behaviour.
 349
  Telecom‟s group annual turnover was 
assessed at $2.792 billion, so the maximum penalty was potentially $279.2 million. 
Telecom might consider themselves fortunate to have escaped with a mere $12 
million slap on the wrist.  
What are the implications of the Datatails judgment? First, it is the largest penalty 
ever imposed under s 36 of the Commerce Act and as such reflects a new 
determination to treat anti-competitive behaviour severely.  Secondly, it opens a 
new category of anti-competitive behaviour, market cornering or price squeezing, 
up to scrutiny. Thirdly, far from distinguishing Telecom v Clear, it confirms that a 
dominant vertically integrated firm‟s refusal to supply access to an essential input 
at ECPR can be used to infer anticompetitive purpose in breach of s 36. Fourthly, 
it implies that s 36 may be used to involve the courts in a „quasi-regulatory‟ role, 
which blurs the line between s 36 and Part 4. Finally, as the case is precedent for 
the proposition that market cornering can breach s 36, it may well have relevance 
for analysis of the Electricity Authority‟s UTS decision of March 26, 2011. 
 
Price Control under Part 4 of the Commerce Act 
While s 36 was intended to prohibit abuse of market power, routine price control 
of the free market was intended to be a thing of the past. Part 4 of the Commerce 
Act provides the proper mechanism for the imposition of price control, and as we 
have seen, attempts to use s 36 as a „quasi- regulatory system‟ were supposed to 
have been rejected.
350
  
Like s 36, Part 4 has been extensively scrutinized and amended. The Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001 introduced Part 4A which gave the Commerce Commission 
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authority to impose „targeted control‟ of electricity lines distribution prices.351 
Under Part 4A the Commerce Commission set thresholds for price and quality 
performance, and would only intervene if those were breached. Perceptions that 
the process was unpredictable and arbitrary lead to the 2006 review of price 
control which resulted in the Commerce Amendment Act 2008 and the 
replacement of Parts 4 and 4A with a new part 4.
352
 
The Cabinet Economic Development Committee suggested that the preferred 
option would include a clearer purpose statement, a “more conventional 
qualitative test for when regulation may be imposed and a wider range of 
regulatory options.
353
 They referred to economic efficiency versus “consumer 
protection/distributional considerations” and pointed out that the debate “does not 
fit well with the key regulatory objectives of clarity, certainty, transparency and 
predictability.” 354  The option of an efficiency-only purpose statement was 
considered and rejected in favour of a purpose statement which balanced 
protection of producers, investors and consumers.  
The Court of Appeal, referring to the pre-amendment Part 4, said that it is: 355 
… aimed not at the promotion of competition, which is not possible in monopolistic 
(or monopsonistic) markets, but at mimicking the economic externalities of effective 
competition for the benefit of either acquirers (s 52(b)(i)) or suppliers (s 52(b)(ii) of 
goods or services. 
The goal is to provide, via external monitoring and administration, the same kinds 
of competitive pressures which would be provided by a workably competitive 
market but where such a market does not and cannot exist. 
In deciding whether to regulate markets under the new Part 4, the Commission 
must have regard to the purpose of the Commerce Act, to “promote the long term 
benefit of consumers in New Zealand.”356 It must consider first, the incentives to 
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innovate and to improve efficiency, secondly, that the benefits of those 
improvements are shared with consumers and, thirdly, that suppliers of regulated 
goods and services are “limited in their ability to extract excessive profits.”357 
These three components are represented by the following three tests:
358
 
1. The Competition Test; 
2. The Other Constraint Test; and 
3. The Net Benefit Test. 
The Competition Test has two limbs. There must be: 
 little or no competition; and 
 little or no likelihood of a substantial increase in competition. 
The first limb would be satisfied if the market was dominated by a monopolist 
who is free to act independently of constraints posed by actual or potential rivals. 
There should also be little or no possibility of customers substituting alternate 
goods or services or using their countervailing power to lower prices or lift output. 
Part 4 applies, but is not explicitly limited, to natural monopolies such as 
electricity lines businesses. In markets where there is the possibility of 
competition, however, contestability will be allowed to operate, and Part 4 will 
have no application. 
For the purposes of the second limb, whether or not there is the likelihood of a 
„substantial increase in competition‟ will be judged over a significant period of 
time. The procedure is that, on the recommendation of the Minister, the Governor 
General makes an Order in Council which must contain an expiry date of no more 
than 20 years.
359
 There is no explicit ban on using Part 4 to prevent short term 
market cornering, but the Commerce Commission has stated that “the appraisal 
should not be limited to immediate or short term changes”.360 Part 4 regulation, in 
its current form, would be an unlikely remedy to correct price spikes as a 
consequence of one off market cornering events in normally contestable markets. 
The Commission must then apply the Other Constraints test. This test considers 
how much market power a participant is capable of exercising, “taking into 
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account the effectiveness of existing regulations or arrangements, (including 
ownership arrangements)”.361 In the electricity market, the alternate regulatory 
restraint would be provided by the Electricity Authority and the market restraint 
would be provided by the various competing entities, particularly the big five 
generation retailer companies, Genesis, Mighty River Power, Contact, Trustpower 
and Meridian.  
The final test is the Net Public Benefit test (“NPB”), which may only be applied if 
the first two tests have been satisfied. The NPB requires the Commission to make 
a qualitative analysis of all “efficiency and distributional considerations.”362 The 
Commission must first quantify allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency 
effects, then consider “distributional and welfare consequences on suppliers and 
customers” and finally, “assess the direct and indirect costs and risks of any type 
or regulation considered, including administrative and transaction costs, and spill-
over effects.”363 The reference to spill-over effects is interesting in that it reflects 
Baumol‟s continuing influence. The ideal regulation then should minimise 
administrative costs while encouraging innovation in the interests of promoting 
the total surplus. The focus is on whether the benefits of regulation materially 
exceed the costs. The default setting, after all, is not to regulate. There must be a 
clear case that the wealth transfers are so great, that the balance is so clearly in the 
producer‟s favour, that the Commerce Commission has no choice but to intervene. 
Applying this test requires demanding in-depth analysis on the part of the 
regulator. Quantifying the three main forms of efficiency, as well as the ongoing 
welfare consequences, costs and unintended consequences of regulation in any 
detail, would absorb significant resources, which may, in themselves, actually act 
as a deterrent on the regulator. Given this high threshold, that the benefits of 
regulation materially exceed cost, and considering the extensive and expensive 
scrutiny required, it is likely that price regulation will seldom occur. Indeed as 
Ben Hamlin put it:
 364
 
A Pt 4 inquiry can be triggered by the Commission itself or by the Minister 
requesting that the Commission hold an inquiry (s 52 H). In practice the 
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Commission is unlikely to conduct one on its own motion because the cost is 
enormous. Indeed a price-control inquiry is so expensive that the 
Commission generally needs an additional specific appropriation of funds 
from Parliament to do the job.  
It should also be noted, however, that Part 4 provides a range of regulatory 
responses including information disclosure, negotiation or arbitration, default or 
customised price-quality regulation and individual price-quality regulation.
365
 
Under the Net Public Benefit test, the more expensive the analysis and intensive 
the regulation required, the less likely it is that it will be undertaken. The cheapest 
options requiring the least intervention will be preferred, expensive price control 
need not be the first choice. As the Commission has said: “Any regulation should 
be the least intrusive necessary to meet the objectives of the purpose 
statement.”366 The wider range of regulatory responses allows the Commission to 
take a more reasoned and flexible approach to intervention; it is less of a zero sum 
game. 
 
The Commerce Commission, the Electricity Authority and 
Applying the Total Surplus Standard 
A guiding theme of this thesis is whether our regulatory authorities will apply a 
total surplus or a consumer surplus standard when regulating potentially anti-
competitive behaviour. As we have seen in the 2008 review which led to the new 
Part 4, the efficiency only purpose statement was rejected. The Commerce 
Commission‟s approach after the 2001 amendment, on the other hand, had been to 
take a neutral position on wealth transfers:
367
 
For the purpose of determining both detriments and benefits, the 
longstanding practice has been to ignore wealth transfers from New Zealand 
consumers to producers that result from higher prices. The underlying 
principle is that the welfare effect of changes in the distribution of income, 
where one group within the public of New Zealand gains while another 
simultaneously loses, is neutral. … we are satisfied that introduction of s 1A 
should not disturb the Commission‟s established practice of treating as 
neutral any wealth transfers between New Zealand consumers and producers. 
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The determination to treat wealth transfers neutrally was consistent with the total 
surplus standard. The Commission would not intervene in distributional questions 
which might favour producers or consumers, but focus on encouraging efficiency 
gains which might increase the total welfare. 
How then did this approach sit with practice overseas? Geoff Bertram argued that 
the whole-hearted adoption of wealth transfer neutrality and its total surplus 
standard premise made New Zealand almost unique amongst OECD countries.
368
 
In countries like the United States and the United Kingdom the application of the 
consumer welfare approach “gives primacy to the welfare of consumers and 
therefore counts the elimination of monopoly-rent transfers as a public benefit.”369 
Here Bertram failed to give weight to the strength of total surplus arguments 
which have found their way into the consumer welfare debate in the US, and may 
in fact have fallen into the Chicago trap which equates total benefit with consumer 
welfare.
370
 
In Canada the courts have gone a long way towards rejecting wealth transfer 
neutrality and Bertram argued that New Zealand should follow their lead. In 
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Superior Propane Inc,
371
 the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal was faced with determining whether a merger which 
would result in the creation of a monopoly in gas distribution should be allowed in 
the interests of efficiency. This „efficiency defence‟ would allow monopolies if 
there was a clear public benefit. The question was whether the total surplus or the 
„balancing weights standard‟ would provide the proper balance between public 
benefit and efficiency.
372
  
The merger would have resulted in gains to the Canadian economy of $29.2 
million and losses of only $6 million. Under the total surplus standard the overall 
economic gain was the sole consideration and, by applying that standard, the 
Tribunal allowed the merge. Under the total surplus standard:
373
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… the wealth likely to be transferred from consumers to producers as a result 
of the merger is not considered to be an anti-competitive effect, because such 
a transfer is neutral: that is, it neither increases, nor decreases total societal 
wealth. Proponents of the total surplus standard argue that there is no 
economic reason for favouring a dollar in the hands of consumers… over a 
dollar in the hands of the producers or its shareholders, who are, after all, 
also consumers. 
The Court preferred that a flexible balanced weights approach be followed, giving 
consideration to the full range of anti-competitive effects, including the wealth 
transfers which would result from increased prices.
374
 
The purpose of the Canadian Competition Act is to:
 375
 
… maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the 
efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand 
opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while at the same 
time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to 
ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide 
consumers with competitive prices and product choices. 
The Commerce Act 1986 makes no such provision for the protection of local or 
small business from the effects of globalization, which somewhat undermines 
Bertram‟s suggestion that Superior Propane is applicable in New Zealand. Even 
so he does raise a valid point, why does New Zealand, whose economy is orders 
of magnitude smaller than Canada‟s, not make such provision? 
The matter was sent back to the Tribunal to be re-determined according to the 
balanced weights approach. It is interesting to note the subsequent events. In its 
redetermination, the Tribunal again approved the merger, and did so by applying a 
„socially adverse effects approach‟. 376  Of the entire $40.5 million of wealth 
transferred, only $2.6 million was extracted from low income households and 
only that amount was offset against the efficiency gains.  
This time the Court approved of the Tribunal‟s reasoning, affirming that it is not 
monopolies per se which are prohibited but rather the effects of monopoly which 
are to be considered.
377
 The ultimate result is that Superior Propane [2003] must 
be interpreted as a backward step away from the balanced weights approach of the 
original appeal and a long step towards the total surplus standard. Again this 
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suggests that the total surplus standard, or versions of it, are influential world-
wide and Bertram‟s thesis that New Zealand is out of  step with international 
practice is further weakened. 
In New Zealand, the 2008 case of Powerco Ltd v Commerce Commission directly 
confronted the relevance of wealth transfers in Part 4 price regulation.
378
 In 
Powerco the Commerce Commission had included wealth transfers from 
consumers to Powerco as a factor in its decision to regulate Powerco‟s gas 
distribution prices. The decision applied to Part 4 prior to its 2008 amendment, 
but the discussion of wealth transfer issues is still revealing. Under ss 52(b)(i) and 
56(1) of Part 4 as they were then, price control could be imposed where the goods 
are being “supplied or acquired in a market in which competition is limited or is 
likely to be lessened” where the acquirer is purchasing from a person who “faces 
limited or lessened competition for the supply of those goods or services.”  
According to the Commission, Powerco‟s basic argument seemed to be that a 
“cost-benefit analysis that subjects the interests of acquirers [of gas] to the 
interests of the economy… as a whole” must be applied.379 In other words, the 
welfare of consumers must be subjugated to the greater good, a classic 
restatement of the total surplus standard. Powerco denied that this was the case, 
but rather that as the “net efficiencies” obtained by acquirers were the sole 
concern of the court, the question of wealth transfers should be ignored.
380
  
The Court responded:
381
 
We find no substance to this point. ... It amounts to the proposition that what 
is good for the economy as whole is good for any sub-set of it, and therefore 
good for a particular sub-set, in this case acquirers. 
The Court accepted that it is correct to exclude wealth transfers when controlling 
restrictive trade practices such as mergers and acquisitions, but that such 
reasoning had no place in Part 4 regulation. The Court indeed seemed to be 
rejecting the utilitarian Net Public Benefit test altogether:
382
 
We cannot accept that s 52 envisages only an NPB [net public benefit] test, 
even if that test is couched in terms of acquirers. NPBs, by their nature, do 
not discriminate between discrete groups in the economy. They are truly 
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utilitarian, with each economic actor counting for no more or less than any 
other. But s 52 expressly provides for acquirers. ... The reference to acquirers 
must have a practical effect on the consideration to be undertaken. 
The fact that other parts of the Act properly exclude valuation of wealth transfers 
does not determine the correct interpretation of Part 4. We are satisfied that to adopt 
the appellants approach would so shrink the application of Part 4 as to render control 
virtually a practical, if not a theoretical, impossibility. 
In both Powerco and Superior Propane the courts appeared to have rejected the 
total surplus standard in order to retain control of natural monopolies. In New 
Zealand the focus was on protecting the rights of acquirers (consumers), in 
Canada the legislation explicitly provided for protection of „small and medium-
sized enterprises‟. In both cases it appeared that the Total Surplus Standard was 
finding less favour with the courts demonstrating a willingness to take a more 
interventionist stance. 
Superior Propane, however, was re-determined according to the „socially adverse 
effects‟ approach which severely diluted the „balanced weights‟ approach. Rather 
than being concerned with ensuring that wealth transfers from consumers to 
producers be outweighed by the total efficiency benefits, only the wealth transfers 
from low income families would be included. This is not a pure total surplus 
standard approach, but it is very close to it. 
As for the Powerco case, the Ministry of Economic Development‟s review of 
Parts 4 and 4A and sections 70-73 of Part 5 of the Commerce Act had resulted in 
significant amendments which suggest that the balanced weights approach may be 
closer to the legislative intent.
383
 It is possible therefore that a very different 
judgment might have been delivered on those facts after the amendment occurred. 
The wider range of regulatory measures available under the new Part 4 might have 
resulted in a different remedy, for example to arbitrate or negotiate different terms. 
The cost/benefit threshold is still very high however, and may have precluded 
regulation altogether. 
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Gault on Commercial Law discussed the amendment, in light of the Powerco 
decision, and concluded that:
384
 
While the new provision focuses on promoting the long term benefit of 
consumers, the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning in relation to the interpretation 
of the interests of acquirers suggests that the cost benefit analysis required 
before control can be imposed will value wealth transfers to consumers as a 
benefit to consumers. 
It is submitted, however, that the threshold requirements of the three tests are still 
extremely high, and price control will be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
Regulating Electricity After Wolak and the ETAG Report 
This section of my thesis will analyse the powers of the Electricity Authority, 
particularly with reference to the „Undesirable Trading Situation‟ regime and the 
Authority‟s response to the price spike of 26th March, 2011. 
Electricity regulation has its own distinct challenges. These stem from the peculiar 
physical characteristics of electricity as a commodity and the unique history and 
development of the electricity industry, both in New Zealand and 
internationally.
385
 Regulation of the industry has broadly followed the familiar 
trend from state monopoly to light handed regulation. Once a wholly stated owned 
monopoly, the responsibility for electricity generation was delegated to an 
oligopolistic vertically integrated market dominated by a few corporatized state 
owned enterprises.
386
 Transmission was the domain of Transpower, the system 
operator, with the final distribution in the hands of 28 Local Network Companies. 
Competition has been fostered only at the wholesale generation and retail stages. 
Regulation of the wholesale and retail sectors would be limited to that provided 
by general competition law, information disclosure and the threat of further 
regulation, but with no industry specific regulatory body.
387
 It was intended that 
the New Zealand Electricity Market (“NZEM”) would be self-regulating, but after 
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a 2003 industry referendum failed to come to a consensus on the appropriate self-
regulatory mechanisms, the Electricity Commission was established.
388
 The 
attempt to self-regulate was over. 
The Electricity Commission‟s objective was to ensure the production and delivery 
of electricity “in an efficient, fair, reliable and environmentally sustainable 
manner.” 389  Concerns were raised that these broad statutory objectives might 
prove contradictory. The decision not to renew Electricity Commission chief Roy 
Hemmingway‟s contract after the Commission rejected Transpower‟s 
controversial Whakamaru to Otahuhu transmission line also raised apprehension 
about a lack of independence.
390
 At the same time concerns continued to be raised 
about the rising cost of electricity and the seeming failure of the corporatization to 
provide benefits to electricity consumers. In one horrendous incident a low 
income sickness beneficiary died after the power to her oxygen machine was 
switched off for an alleged unpaid account.
391
 
Two influential reports were prepared about the problems of regulating electricity. 
These were the Commerce Commission‟s Investigation Report: Commerce Act 
1986 s 27, s 30 and s 36 Electricity Investigation
392
 (“Investigation Report”) and 
the Electricity Technical Advisory Group and Ministry of Economic 
Development‟s “Improving Electricity Market Performance: Volume one” 393 
(“ETAG report”). 
 
The Commerce Commission and the Wolak Report 
The Investigation Report included conclusions from the well-known “Wolak 
Report” that the four main generators had used their market power over a six and 
a half year period to extract some $4.3 billion in excess profits from the NZEM 
wholesale electricity market.
394
 When the monolithic Electricity Corporation of 
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New Zealand was broken up between 1995 and 1998, it was expected that a four 
firm market structure with low barriers to entry and light handed regulation would 
stimulate contestability and dynamic efficiencies. The Commission concluded that 
the results had been somewhat different:
 395
 
The Commission… considers that these four companies have exercised their 
market power, for substantial periods, by offering their generation output 
into the wholesale market at prices above those that they would have offered 
under competitive conditions. The periodic and recurring nature of these 
bouts of high prices, together with high entry barriers, means that potential 
entry has not been able provide a constraint on the exercise of market 
power.
396
  
In other words, the basic assumption that oligopolistic markets would be 
disciplined by potential contestability had failed. The report also found that high 
prices occurred regardless of whether there had been transmission constraints or 
not.  
Despite that conclusion, the Commission resolved that there was insufficient 
“evidence at this stage of further anti-competitive behaviour to warrant continuing 
its investigation”. 397  Even though “serious systemic issues” with the market 
structure provided opportunities and incentives for the four main generators to 
game the system, the Commerce Act had not been breached.
398
 The lawful use of 
market power to maximise profits did not breach Part 2 of the Commerce Act.
 399
 
Rather, the behaviour was a product of the design of the market and the nature of 
electricity as a commodity. Whether or not there should be a Part 4 inquiry was 
for the Government to decide after consideration of the full range of regulatory 
responses.  
Contestability in the NZEM was further reduced by the lack of a liquid hedge 
market. Hedges are typically contracts to provide a set amount of electricity at a 
set price over a certain period in time. Competitors and consumers (such as NZ 
Steel) who buy electricity in bulk from the wholesale market need to consider a 
purchasing policy which balances the overall lower prices in the NZEM with the 
risk that prices could spike. There is no cap on prices in the wholesale market and 
prices can go as high as the market will bear, with very little notice. Hedges can 
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therefore been seen as a form of insurance, and must be included in any sensible 
risk management policy.  
A properly liquid hedge market would do a great deal to even out the risks from 
price volatility in the wholesale market. It would also offer opportunities for 
contestability from new entrants who lacked generation facilities, but wished to 
compete in the retail sector, or vice versa. Attempting to obtain retail market share, 
with insufficient generation capacity to meet demand, was described by one 
participant as „insane‟.400 New entrants were forced to purchase hedges from the 
big generators on the wholesale market, and then compete with the same 
generators who sold them for the same customers.
401
 Only a vertically integrated 
company, able to cover its retail demand by selling electricity it generated itself, 
could hope to survive. Vertical integration was, in fact, the inevitable result of, 
and solution to, the lack of adequate hedging. Generation and retail base are 
geographically aligned and:
 402
 
Vertically integrated generator-retailers can limit competition because they 
operate in two markets and can cross-subsidize operations…. [T]he 
generation-retail structure means that companies are managing risk 
internally, to the detriment of transparency and price discovery – 
prerequisites for a competitive market. 
Gentailers (the vertically integrated electricity generation and retail companies 
who account for 96% of the retail market)
 403
 are thus able to manage their own 
supply and demand. New Entrants, without sufficient generation capacity to cover 
their customers demand, are exposed to the volatility of the NZEM. This does not 
make an attractive picture for investors or creditors and makes developing startup 
electricity retail companies even more prohibitive. Needless to say, stimulating 
the development of a deep and liquid hedge market has been a priority for the 
Authority and provides an important context for the UTS decision. 
The Commerce Commission‟s conclusion may have been frustrating to some, but 
it was consistent with prevailing dynamic efficiency ideal of workable 
competition and its toleration of monopoly prices. The Major Energy Users 
Group‟s expressed their frustration about continuing high prices and the 
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Commission‟s seemingly blasé attitude to the loss of manufacturing jobs. The 
Commission‟s somewhat nonchalant response was that:404 
Large profits may arise in a number of circumstances: they may be needed to 
adequately compensate investors for the large amounts of capital used by the 
company; they could result from the company possessing a superior product 
or from being more innovative or efficient than its competitors or they may 
be a signal that an expansion of supply is needed to meet increasing demand. 
Profit may also enable a company to expand and compete on a wider basis, 
or to invest in research and development to deliver better products and 
greater choice to its consumers. 
These points could have been quoted directly from Bork and Posner, caselaw like 
Scalia‟s judgment in Trinko or the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear 
Communications, or Baumol‟s The Free Market Innovation Machine.  The 
Commerce Commission‟s acceptance of dynamic efficiency and the total surplus 
standard seemed to be almost complete. 
If the Wolak Report was correct in finding that the electricity market was gamed 
and that supra-normal profits were extracted in spite of a supposedly workably 
competitive market structure, then what does this say about the efficacy of 
competition policy in New Zealand? Is the Commerce Act itself flawed? Can the 
Electricity Authority and the Commerce Commission between them effectively 
police behaviour in the markets?  
Wolak‟s findings have been criticised by Lewis Evans of Victoria University of 
Wellington and Bart van Campen of Auckland University‟s Energy Centre. For 
Evans, the counterfactual benchmark Wolak used was based on flawed 
assumptions about the short run marginal costs of hydro versus thermal generation 
and the responsiveness of demand to changes in pricing.
405
 Wolak assumes that in 
times of water shortage the marginal cost of water is the same as that of gas. In 
dry years generators were able to game the market and raise wholesale prices for 
hydro generated electricity to the same level offered by gas generators.
406
 But this 
assumes that gas prices themselves will not change as demand increases. Increases 
in gas prices would detract from profits available to generators and would reduce 
the overall profits, a factor which Evans says was underestimated in Wolak‟s 
calculations. 
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Most interesting for the purposes of this thesis is the recurrence of the marginal 
cost controversy in terms of Short Run Marginal Cost pricing (“SRMC”):407 
It is important to recognise that investment in the electricity market would be 
limited under Wolak‟s counterfactual and marginal-cost estimation. In a 
SRMC-based energy-only pricing scheme (estimated as Wolak does), 
practically no firm would have the incentive to invest…. In this setting, 
firms will invest in additional plant when the marginal cost and frequency of 
scarcity, whether generated by energy or capacity concerns, generates 
sufficient operating surplus to justify new plants…. High prices during 
scarcity periods are essential to pay for all capacity and provide an 
incentive for investment in new capacity. (emphasis added). 
Bart van Campen and others of Auckland University‟s Energy Centre pointed out 
that the vertical integration of retail and generation had a significant effect on 
reducing the overall significance of the wealth transfers. The purchase of 
wholesale electricity by the retail arm of a single vertically integrated firm 
amounts to:
408
 
… an internal transfer of funds between different arms of the same company, 
with zero net effect…. Thus the true transfer of wealth from generators to 
consumers during periods of high wholesale prices is likely to be much 
lower than Wolak‟s estimate of market rents, even ignoring the way he 
estimates hydro costs.  
This logic would apply to the UTS situation as well and may not have been 
factored into reports that the event cost $45-50 million. High prices charged by 
Genesis would be downplayed by the transfer of funds between its retail and 
generation arms and should not have been included in the total cost to the market. 
Taken together, the argument against Wolak is first, that the $4.3 billiion figure 
was overestimated, and second, that the electricity market must be profitable if the 
country‟s long term electricity needs are to be provided for. Any criticism of the 
electricity industry which is based on that argument that it is „too profitable‟ 
would necessarily involve calculation of how much profit is allowable. This is a 
short road to re-instituting routine price controls and the extensive oversight and 
costly intervention the Commerce Act aimed to avoid. The NZEM has been 
deliberately designed with an oligopolistic market structure, guided by policies 
aimed at lowering the barriers to entry, by deepening the hedge markets, for 
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example. The system will never be entirely self-regulated but, like a well-
engineered clock, it should only require only occasional adjustments. 
As it is, the profitability of the system may well have already led to real 
improvements in dynamic efficiency. While the share of energy being generated 
by independent and cogeneration stations has been steadily reducing since 2000, 
11 new generation stations have been commissioned by the main entities.
409
 There 
is evidence then that, even in a concentrated market, the incentives to invest in 
additional capacity are working. According to workable competition, a 
competitive market would exert downward pressure on prices, while providing 
incentive to invest in sufficient capacity to provide for future demand, thus 
satisfying both static and dynamic efficiency. Incumbent players are managing to 
entrench their positions on the other hand undermining contestability, but the 
additional generation capacity is being provided, which is a dynamically efficient 
outcome. One need only look westward from Hamilton to see the wind turbines 
sprouting at Meridian Energy and WEL Networks Te Uku wind farm to see the 
process in action. 
If the critics like Evans and van Campen are correct and Wolak‟s figure of $4.3 
billion has been overestimated, then what is the correct figure? Have there in fact 
been any excess profits or are all high prices reinvested in generation 
infrastructure? What level of profit is sufficient to satisfy a profit maximising 
entity? At what point does greed fail to be good? What is efficiency? These are 
questions which may not be answered by this thesis, and perhaps can never be 
answered, but they are the very essence of this debate and it is vital that they 
continue to be put. 
One final note about the Wolak report. Wolak based his findings on a six and a 
half year data set which covered over 113,800 time periods.
410
 His work was peer 
reviewed by Professor Niljs Henrick von der Fehr, of Oslo University who 
described it as “fundamentally sound [and] well founded on accepted econometric 
methods and practices.”411 
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The ETAG Report 
In 2009 the Ministry of Economic Development published its Ministerial review 
of electricity market performance, the ETAG report.
412
 It was felt that more 
needed to be done to improve electricity market governance, in particular, that the 
Electricity Commission should be reconstructed as a more independent entity with 
more tightly focussed objectives. The Electricity Authority (“the Authority”) was 
thereafter established under the Electricity Industry Act 2010, (“EIA”).   
In line with the ETAG report‟s recommendations, the purpose and objectives of 
the Authority have been slimmed down. Section 15 of the EIA now merely 
requires that “the Authority is to promote competition in, reliable supply by, and 
the efficient operation of, the electricity industry for the long-term benefit of 
consumers.” Fairness has been excluded from the Authority‟s concerns. 
Environmental sustainability is now under the ambit of local councils as provided 
for by the Resource Management Act 1991. Responsibility for energy efficiency 
has been transferred to the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority. 
The Electricity Authority‟s independence has been increased from that of a Crown 
entity to that of an independent Crown entity.
413
 As an independent Crown entity, 
the Authority now has the same status as the Commerce Commission. While 
Crown entities “must give effect to government policy when directed by the 
responsible Minister”, independent Crown entities are generally independent of 
government policy. 
414
 This upgrade in status was a clear signal of the 
government‟s expectations. The Authority was to intervene according to its own 
statutory objectives, and not according to the wishes of the Minister of the day, or 
of any lobby groups which may capture state policy, and was to have equal 
standing with the Commerce Commission.
415
  
Both the Electricity Authority and the Commerce Commission have a mandate to 
deal with competition issues, but the purpose statements differ. The Electricity 
Authority‟s s 15 mandate, to promote competition, reliability of supply and 
efficiency, can be contrasted with the Commerce Commission‟s purpose, to 
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“promote competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within 
New Zealand.”416 Because of this overlapping responsibility, the two bodies have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). 417  The Authority must 
consult with the Commission before amending the Code, or making any decision 
that is likely to affect the Commission‟s performance or exercise of its 
functions.
418
  
The danger for industry participants is that both agencies could potentially involve 
themselves in a given situation. Regulatory uncertainty is created by the 
possibility that each agency could come to opposite conclusions, one allowing and 
one prohibiting the same behaviour. While the hope is that the MOU would be 
sufficient to prevent such conflicts of law, a key task for any market participant 
will be to conduct a thorough risk analysis including an assessment of the 
likelihood of transgressing laws and regulations administered by these two bodies. 
After all, an MOU does not have the status of an Act of Parliament. The 
Electricity Authority‟s foundation documents might create the basis for a 
legitimate expectation, but the final answer must be found in the legislation itself. 
Under s 32(b) of the EIA, the Authority may not “purport to do or regulate 
anything that the Commerce Commission is authorised or required to do or 
regulate under Part 3 or 4 of the Commerce Act 1986”. 419 As we have seen, Part 
4 of the Commerce Act is supposedly the sole means by which price control can 
be imposed on monopolistic markets in New Zealand. One could perhaps make an 
argument from this that the Authority would be acting ultra vires if it used the 
UTS regime to regulate prices in natural monopoly situations which are the 
purview of the Commerce Commission. Yet as we have seen from the Datatails 
case, the Commerce Commission has treated market squeezes as a breach of s 36. 
The potential remains for both agencies to be legitimately involved in a market 
cornering incident. 
The issue is complicated by the fact that authors of the ETAG report expected that 
the Commerce Commission would retain competition oversight, while the 
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Electricity Markets Authority (which became the Electricity Authority) would 
only be responsible for developing and enforcing industry rules.
420
 In its 
foundation document, “Interpretation of the Authority‟s statutory objective”, the 
Authority confirmed that its role was to set the rules of the Market, while the 
Commerce Commission would regulate the behaviour of individual 
participants:
421
 
The Authority interprets promoting competition to mean exercising its 
functions to facilitate or encourage stronger competition. The Authority is 
not focussed on the conduct of individual participants with respect to 
competition in the electricity industry as this is the responsibility of the 
Commerce Commission. Rather the Authority is focussed on improving the 
arrangements in the electricity industry to promote competition.
422
  
The MOU likewise states that:
 423
 
In regard to monitoring competition the Authority‟s focus is on the 
competitiveness of electricity markets, rather than on the conduct of any 
particular market participant or group of market participants. 
This suggested that the Authority would focus on policy objectives aimed at 
improving competition in the market, for example promoting hedge fund 
arrangements or making alterations to the structure of the market itself. 
Prosecution of anticompetitive behaviour and price control decisions would be left 
to the Commerce Commission. The authors of the Statutory Objective and the 
MOU perhaps underestimated the scope for intervention in market conduct 
contained within the Undesirable Trading Situation regime. 
What might provide a further clue to the potential for disagreement between these 
two agencies is how consumer benefit is to be measured. In interpreting its 
Competition limb, the Authority has settled for the total surplus standard, stating 
that: “The benefits of competition refer to efficiency benefits, not wealth transfers, 
arising from price movements, but it includes any efficiency effects that may arise 
from wealth transfers.” 424  Just as in the Commerce Act, competition means 
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“workable or effective competition”, but the focus on efficiency benefits differs 
from the Commerce Act‟s current more balanced weights approach.425  
While s 15 of the Electricity Industry Act refers simply to consumers, the Act 
defines consumers to mean: “any person who is supplied, or applies to be supplied, 
with electricity other than for resupply.”426 As practically every individual and 
organisation in the country uses electricity in some form or other, the definition 
extends to virtually everyone in New Zealand with the exception of the electricity 
retailers, Transpower and the lines businesses themselves. The Authority bunches 
electricity consumers under the term “aggregate consumers” and clearly intends to 
apply the total surplus standard:
427
 
The implication of this approach, is that, in virtually all circumstances, only the 
efficiency gains of an initiative should be treated as benefiting consumers, with 
wealth transfers excluded because they net off among all electricity consumers once 
indirect wealth effects are taken into account. 
The Authority‟s intention was to allow large transfers of wealth from consumers 
to suppliers of electricity, so long as the result would improve efficiency. The 
focus must be on “expanding the „size of the economy pie‟”.428 If wealth transfers 
were taken into effect, the pie would undoubtedly shrink. And as dynamic 
efficiency promotes the accumulation of capital for investment in the next big 
thing, a Schumpeterian would have argued that almost any transfer of wealth 
which accumulates capital should be allowed. 
The Authority‟s goal is to encourage competitive pressure, via contestability 
which includes situations where there are only potential competitors:
429
 
The Authority uses the term competitive pressure because it covers a broad 
range of competitive circumstances, including circumstances where industry 
participants behave competitively because they anticipate competitor 
responses (or the entry of new competitors) if they do not do so. In these 
cases, a lack of rivalrous activity is not necessarily an indication of weak 
competition. 
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Equating potential rivalry with actual rivalry is pure Baumol. One of the major 
implications of the Commerce Commission‟s Investigation Report was that 
barriers to entry in electricity markets were so high, that the main gentailers were 
unlikely to be influenced by the fear of new entrants. Anticipating responses from 
competitors is another question altogether and there is every reason to believe that 
the competition between existing rivals is fiercely competitive. If nothing else, the 
fact that the March 26
th
 Price Hike provoked 35 complaints to the UTS 
demonstrates just how jealously industry participants will defend their 
prerogatives. 
By taking a wealth transfer neutral approach to efficiency, the Authority‟s aim 
was to make reliability of supply a priority over reduction in prices. In logic 
straight from the marginal cost controversy, the Authority said:
430
 
… this approach is an aggregate consumer interpretation of the benefits to 
consumers, which excludes wealth transfers to consumers. If direct wealth 
transfers were taken into account (but not indirect wealth transfers), then 
price reductions would be valued ahead of reliable supply, which the 
Authority does not believe was intended by the Act. Adopting an efficiency 
(i.e. aggregate consumer) approach achieves an even-handed treatment of 
resource costs versus avoided costs. 
Profits must be sufficiently high to encourage investment in infrastructure to deal 
with the long run costs of supply of electricity. Long term security of supply is 
more important than ensuring that electricity consumers enjoy the lowest prices 
possible in the short run. A focus on low prices would only mean that eventually 
demand would outstrip supply, necessitating political intervention.
431
 
The Authority‟s commitment to the total surplus standard was completed by their 
emphatic rejection of the Powerco decision. The Authority acerbically stated that 
they were “aware of the legal position established” in Powerco but that the 
judgment was relevant only to Part 4 control of natural monopoly markets prior to 
the 2008 amendment.
432
 Instead the Authority would continue to ignore wealth 
transfers even if they penalised electricity consumers in the short run. It 
determined to adopt “standard cost-benefit analysis when assessing net benefits to 
electricity consumers.”433 
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The Authority‟s position might therefore be summarised as this. Efficiency would 
be assessed according to cost-benefit analysis excluding the effects of wealth 
transfers on aggregate consumers. Monopoly profit taking would be allowed in 
the interests of providing for the long run reliability of supply. The short term 
transfer of wealth would have to be traded-off against the long term benefit of 
guaranteeing that the lights stayed on no matter what the demand. Monopoly 
profits would be just the incentive competitors needed. Excessive behaviour 
would be reined in by the anticipation of a response from rivals and potential 
rivals, even where no such rivalrous behaviour was evident. The warnings from 
the Commerce Commission‟s Investigation Report that excessive profits were 
being taken could therefore be comfortably disregarded. Price control was 
something the Commerce Commission might do under Part 4 of the Commerce 
Act (as it stood in 2008), but it had no place in a properly designed electricity 
market. 
And yet when the time came to make a decision to intervene to control prices 
following the March 26
th
 Price Spike, this fine neo-liberal rhetoric was simply 
abandoned. Why? 
If in hindsight the result seems obvious, that is only because the decision itself is 
couched in the terms of the Statutory Objective which showed that the Act and 
Code had been crafted to give the Authority flexibility to deal with unlikely 
events. The Authority made two key statements which, while referring to the logic 
of contestability and dynamic efficiency, do demonstrate the Authority would not 
be bound by a strict Schumpeterian non-interventionist ideal. The Authority 
would retain the right to intervene because, first: 
… the benefits of competition refer to efficiency benefits,  not wealth 
transfers, arising from price movements, however [we will intervene] if 
wealth transfers seriously undermine confidence in the pricing process or in 
the electricity industry more generally… 
And secondly: 
… efficient entry and exit in markets are not necessarily orderly, however if 
disorderly situations undermine confidence in the pricing process or in the 
electricity industry more generally then that can inhibit efficient entry and 
investment decisions and these dynamic efficiency effects should be taken 
into account… [when deciding to intervene]. 
In light of these provisos, the Authority retained its mandate to intervene to 
protect the confidence and the integrity of the market, despite its clearly stated 
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commitment to Schumpeterian ideals. Which still left open the question; at what 
point would the Authority find that the confidence and integrity of the market was 
threatened? To understand what might trigger the Authority‟s intervention, we 
must now turn to the details of the Undesirable Trading Situation regime. 
 
The Undesirable Trading Situation Regime 
One of the Authority‟s principal functions is to investigate and enforce 
compliance with the Electricity Industry Act, the regulations and the Code.
434
 
Complaints or appeals may be referred to the Rulings Panel. The Rulings Panel 
may set its own procedures, subject only to the Act, the regulations and the Code 
and the “requirements of natural justice”. 435  The Rulings Panel has some 
reasonably fearsome teeth under the Act. It may give a public warning to an 
industry participant, order a pecuniary penalty up to $200,000, order payment of a 
“sum” in compensation to any other person, and make orders of costs. 436  In 
determining pecuniary penalties the Rulings Panel can take into account all 
circumstances of the breach, including its impact on industry participants and the 
gain the wrongful party obtained or expected to obtain.
437
 This suggests that the 
sum awarded could be equal to the damage caused; an open-ended sum which 
could be immense. 
The Authority may itself intervene to enforce the code via application of the 
Undesirable Trading Situation regime contained in part 5 of the Electricity 
Industry Participation Code 2010.
438
 The UTS regime is broad and deliberately 
phrased to capture a wide range of circumstances. Undesirable Trading Situation 
(“UTS”) is defined as: 439 
… any contingency or event –  
(a) that threatens, or may threaten, trading on the wholesale market for 
electricity and that would, or would be likely to precluded the 
maintenance of orderly trading or proper settlement of trades; and 
                                                 
434
 Electricity Industry Act 2010, s 16. 
435
 Section 53. 
436
 Section 54. 
437
 Section 56. 
438
 Sections 25 and 45. 
439
 Electricity Industry Participation Code 2010, Part 1, cl. 1.1. 
109 
 
(b) that in the reasonable opinion of the Authority, cannot be satisfactorily 
resolved by any other mechanism available under this Code…  
Activation of the UTS is the Authority‟s prerogative, but the decision to use the 
UTS and not some other mechanism must be based on reasonable grounds. The 
door might be open to judicial review if other mechanisms were available under 
the Code and had not been applied first.  Other mechanisms could include the 
Authority‟s powers to “make and administer” or amend the Code.440 Any proposal 
to amend the Code must include publication of a draft statement of the 
amendment, and a regulatory statement which the Authority must then consult on, 
presumably with industry participants and other interested parties. The regulatory 
statement must include an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the amendment 
and the alternative means of achieving its proposed objectives. These 
requirements would prove to be relevant when the UTS decision was made, as 
some participants would complain the decision was a de facto price cap, which 
amounted to a change to the Code without adherence to these formal procedures. 
Furthermore, the Authority must consult with the Commerce Commission before 
making any amendment which will, or is likely to, affect the Commission‟s 
performance of its powers or functions.
441
 Failure to consult on an amendment 
which affected the Commission could therefore result in an argument between the 
two agencies. How that situation might be resolved is unclear, but presumably 
judicial review could occur, particularly if the complaint was raised by a third 
party affected by the amendment. Arguably a decision which amounted to an 
amendment should receive the same treatment. The point is that amendments are 
supposed to be made according to a measured process. The complaint that the 
UTS decision did not follow the same process may have merit, if only because it 
did not result in an actual amendment to the Code. If the Code had been amended 
without recourse to the correct consultation procedures, then that would certainly 
lend weight the argument that the decision or amendment was wrong and should 
be reviewed. 
Events which may trigger a UTS include:
442
 
(i) manipulative or attempted manipulative trading activity; and 
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(ii) conduct in relation trading that is misleading or deceptive, or likely 
to mislead or deceive; and 
(iii) unwarranted speculation or undesirable practice; and 
(iv) material breach of any law; and 
(v) any exceptional or unforeseen circumstance that is at variance with 
or that threatens or may threaten, generally accepted principles of 
trading or public interest. 
Even if the events did not fit neatly within clauses i-iv, clause v is a residual 
clause which is sufficiently broad to capture „any exceptional or unforeseen 
circumstance‟. Somewhat surprisingly, a UTS may occur even when there has 
been no actual breach of the Code.
443
 It is sufficient only that it be some 
“contingency or event outside the normal operation of the wholesale market for 
electricity.”444  
These provisions are kept extraordinarily broad for a reason:
445
 
UTS provisions are adopted by market providers because they cannot 
foresee all future eventualities and hence cater for these in the market rules. 
Also, some practices are particularly difficult to specify in the rules, and so 
are better covered by generic UTS-type rules. 
The economic rationale behind the Authority‟s competition and reliability 
statutory objectives, after all, is “to achieve operationally efficient and 
competitive markets.”446 To protect the integrity of the market place it is vital that 
“contract terms are transparent and prices are competitively determined.”447 A fair 
summation might be that a UTS is something that is incapable of precise 
definition, but everyone would know it when they saw it.. Deceptive or fraudulent 
behaviour, for example, harms the integrity of the market because it undermines 
the faith that the game will be fairly played. The full spectrum of manipulative 
and underhanded behaviour available to the unscrupulous cannot be defined, 
hence the need for flexibility. The overall complexity of the NZEM means that 
serious unintended consequences can still occur, even with the best of intentions. 
Specific and detailed proscriptions would be easier to avoid and perhaps harder to 
apply. 
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The Authority had broad powers to intervene in the market, but had avowed a 
determination to take a neutral approach to wealth transfers. They would not 
intervene unless the integrity of the market was threatened. What would happen 
then if the UTS regime was tested by anticompetitive behaviour? 
The March 26th Price Hike. 
On March 26
th
, 2011, the New Zealand Electricity Market experienced what has 
come to be known as the March 26
th
 Price Hike. Scheduled maintenance on 
transmission lines in the central North Island resulted in constraints of supply to 
Hamilton and the regions to the north of Hamilton. For seven hours that Saturday 
afternoon only one company had a power plant available to supply the upper 
North Island. That plant was Genesis Power Limited‟s Huntly power station. 
Prices on the spot market had been forecast to reach a mere $160/MWh but in fact 
exceeded  $20,000/MWh. Although many claimants treated their actual losses as 
confidential trade secrets, it was estimated that some $45-$50 million was 
transferred that day.
448
 
The incident has provided the first significant test of the Electricity Authority‟s 
Undesirable Trading Situation (“UTS”) regime. It has raised substantial questions 
about the proper role of this newest of regulatory authorities is to take in a 
historically lightly regulated free market. What should the Authority do when it 
appeared that an attempt had been made to use transitory market power to corner 
the market, especially when the incident was so spectacular in terms of the size of 
the wealth transferred and in such a short space of time. 
Simply put, the conclusion of the Authority was that Genesis had taken advantage 
of its position to execute a “market squeeze.” The proposed remedy was to reset 
market prices for the day at $3,500/MWh, which was still more than 20 times the 
anticipated price.  Paradoxically:
449
 
 The UTS Committee's preliminary view is that Genesis' conduct is not 
unlawful, does not constitute manipulative or attempted manipulative trading 
activity, and does not amount to conduct in relation to trading that is 
misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive. 
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Why then, if Genesis‟ behaviour did not fit within at least these first four 
subclauses of the definition of a UTS, did the Authority feel justified in 
intervening? It is confusion over the actual rationale for intervening which 
partially explains why the decision was appealed to the High Court. This 
confusion may have even lead to the market squeeze in the first place. If industry 
participants realised what could trigger a UTS, then logically they would have 
taken steps to avoid it. One is reminded of Oliver Wendell Holmes famous dictum: 
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”450 
Despite the feeling that the events of that day did not fit easily within the intended 
framework of the UTS, the Authority had a mandate and an obligation to 
intervene. The starting point for the exercise of this UTS discretion is whether the 
events would threaten trading on the wholesale market:
451
 
Allowing the interim prices to become final prices would have increased 
uncertainty in the spot market as it would signal that generators that find 
themselves in a net pivotal position could set whatever prices they wished 
regardless of whether there was a genuine scarcity of supply or not and 
regardless of whether parties exposed to those prices had an opportunity to 
curtail demand or increase their own generation. 
A UTS had occurred, and everyone knew that it had occurred, even if its precise 
definition was unclear. The generally proscriptive rules provided the mandate for 
intervention; it only remained to decide how to fit the events of the day within the 
Code, and what remedy would best fit the justice of the case. A more detailed 
narrative of the course of events that day will reveal how the decision was reached. 
 
Key Events452  
Transpower had notified industry participants of the need for maintenance on the 
Whakamuru C transmission line between Whakamaru and Otahuhu as long ago as 
                                                 
450
 Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law (1881) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 2009) at 1. 
451
 Electricity Authority “Questions and Answers relating to the Electricity Authority‟s decision 
that the events of 26
th
 March 2011 constitute and undesirable trading situation (UTS)” 
<www.ea.govt.nz.> at 4. 
452
 See “Draft Decision”, above n 443, at 20-21 and Electricity Authority “ Proposed Actions of 
the Electricity Authority under Part 5 of the Electricity Industry Participation Code to Correct 
an Undesirable Trading Situation that occurred on 26 March 2011” (“Final Decision”) 
<www.ea.govt.nz> at 20-23 and Bay of Plenty Energy Limited v The Electricity Authority [2012] 
NZHC 238. 
113 
 
late 2009.
453
 Additional maintenance of the Arapuni/Otahuhu line was also 
planned. Maintenance was delayed until 26 March 2011, but between December 
2010 and March 2011 the fact that both lines would be affected had been notified. 
On Friday 25
th
 of March, 2011, Genesis kicked off the affair at 9:51 am when it 
moved 320 MW of offered generation from a low priced band (<$100/MWh) to 
the $19,000/MWh offer band. At around 1:00 pm Contact Energy withdrew 
425MW of offered energy at Stratford, at which point the System Operator‟s 
Security Despatch Schedule (“SDS”) system forecast prices for 26 March at 
$20,000/MWh.  
In response, Mighty River Power (“MRP”) offered an additional 125MW from its 
Southdown plant in Auckland at $.01/MWh, prompting the System Operator to 
reforecast prices to a maximum of $150/MWh. As actual demand the next day 
would be much higher than expected, the effect of MRP‟s offer was to mask the 
anticipated prices. The System Operator underestimated the actual demand by 
100-120MW, and the inevitable result was that the system was constrained on and 
prices spiked.
454
 
That afternoon, still troubled by the direction events were taking the wholesale 
market, MRP sought hedge cover from Genesis. Genesis offered two 50MW 
tranches at $350/MWh and $750/MWh. By this time the forecast prices had 
dropped again to $150/MWh, and MRP rejected the offer.  
Beginning at 10:40 am the next day, the System Operator successively reduced 
the Whakamaru-Otahuhu transmission constraints from 404MW to 390 MW and 
then down to 380MW. In a move initially described by the Electricity Authority 
as being “consistent with an attempt to bring about a market squeeze affecting the 
rest of the North Island”, MRP followed Genesis‟ lead in moving Waikato 
generation to the highest priced bands.
455
 Genesis countered by reducing the low 
priced energy offered at Huntly by 30 MW, while increasing the low priced 
energy offered at Tokaanu south of the constraint by 20MW. It was this action 
                                                 
453
 Bay of Plenty Energy Limited v The Electricity Authority at [35]. 
454
 “Final Decision” at [86]. 
455
 Electricity Authority Final Decision at [147]. 
114 
 
that exacerbated the separation of prices and lead to accusations that Genesis had 
engineered the spring washer effect.
456
 
One can imagine the heated discussions in control rooms up and down the country, 
particularly at Meridian Energy that afternoon, when the decision was made to 
seek hedge cover from Genesis and Genesis refused. At 3:37 pm Meridian again 
sought hedge cover and this time were offered 30MW at $10,000/MWh. Hands 
must have been thrown up in the air in disgust. Meridian declined the offer and 
the decision to complain to the Authority would have been made, if not on the 
spot, then very shortly afterwards.  
Reactions must have been even more horrified amongst the major users who did 
not find out about the high prices until well after the fact. One of the major 
surprises for someone fresh to this field is the fact that, given the well-known 
volatility of the wholesale market, anyone would risk exposure to spot prices 
without closely observing trading. That this is a feature of the NZEM is quite 
astonishing. It lends credence to arguments that industry participants, who failed 
to employ more defensive hedge and demand response arrangements, should not 
complain when the market turned against them. The justice of enjoying overall 
lower spot prices, without paying a premium for hedge cover, and then appealing 
to the Authority to make up for their own complacency, is questionable. 
Thirty five market participants would complain to the Electricity Authority and, 
following the decision that a UTS had occurred, also make submissions about the 
decision.
457
 Most, like MRP and Meridian, would agree that a UTS had occurred 
but that the remedy resetting prices to $3000/MWh was insufficiently punitive 
towards Genesis and would in fact cost innocent participants dearly. A few like 
Contact, King Country Energy and, of course, Genesis, would disagree that a UTS 
had occurred, and argue that prices should be left to fall where they lay. This was 
a competitive market after all, it was well known that it had no cap on prices. The 
price signal was supposed to operate according to the purest application of the 
rules of supply and demand. The familiar marginal cost controversy arguments 
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came into play, the market should take into consideration the long term benefits of 
profits for contestability and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency considerations 
which focus on short term price movements should take second place. 
In light of Authority‟s summary of the events of the day, we can now re-examine 
exactly how the provisions of the UTS were applied, and more importantly, how 
they were disputed and rationalised. 
 
Clause i: Manipulative or Attempted Manipulative Trading Activity 
The heart of the allegation was that Genesis had manipulated its offer prices to 
taken advantage of a transitory monopoly position. It was alleged that Genesis‟ 
strategy of reducing generation at Huntly, while increasing generation at Tokaanu 
south of the constraint, had been deliberately designed to cause the separation of 
prices.
458
 The Authority decided that the allegation was not founded for three 
reasons.  
First, the System Operator‟s SDS forecasts were inaccurate.459 Demand north of 
the constraint was some 100-120 MW higher than expected and the failure to 
forecast this was the System Operator‟s responsibility. More accurate demand 
forecasts would have alerted the market to the possibility of high prices. Industry 
participants could have made different hedging or demand response decisions if 
forecasts had been more accurate. 
Secondly, Contact Energy‟s decision to withdraw 425 MW from the market was a 
significant factor in causing the constraint to bind.
460
 Again, had forecasts been 
more accurate, Contact would most likely have made the decision to stay in the 
market and prices would have been “unexceptional”.461  For many participants 
Contact‟s decision, following so soon after Genesis‟ withdrawal, must have 
seemed more than coincidental and suggestive of collusion. The Authority 
accepted Contact‟s explanation for the withdrawal, however. The Authority could 
see no reason why Contact would have foregone those profits, if they had actually 
anticipated that prices would spike. 
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Finally, after extensive consideration of Genesis‟ offer strategy, including use of 
vectorised Scheduling Pricing and Despatch (“vSPD” software) to simulate events 
under different pricing and demand conditions, the Authority concluded that 
Genesis had simply been rationally managing its own risk position. Even if 
Genesis had not pursued its offer strategy at Tokaanu, it was still the marginal 
generator for Hamilton and the regions north of Hamilton. There were still 
sufficient lower price offers south of the constraint to cause prices to separate, 
regardless of Genesis‟ offer strategy.462  
Gensis‟ position was described as net pivotal.463 A generator is net pivotal when it 
is the sole supplier to a market where demand exceeds its own load 
commitment.
464
 The position of a net pivotal generator can be contrasted with that 
of a pivotal generator. Pivotal situations, where the electricity demanded from a 
generator is greater than it can supply, are reasonably common. A pivotal 
generator has no incentive to set higher prices as its contracted demand 
commitments are greater than its generation capabilities. It would have to 
purchase electricity at the higher price from its rivals to provide for its own 
customers, and the result would be a net loss. 
A net pivotal generator, on the other hand, is free to set high prices because any 
“additional revenue it earns will exceed its additional costs (from purchasing 
electricity from the wholesale market and meeting hedge contract 
commitments).”465 In other words, it sets the market price and then profits because 
it is the sole supplier to its rivals. As a vertically integrated entity there will be an 
internal transfer of funds, but so long as the internal transfer is exceeded by 
revenue obtained from rivals, the event will be profitable.  
The Authority reasoned that Genesis was entitled to offer just enough low priced 
electricity to cover its total position, and no more.
466
 The increase in low price 
offers at Tokaanu compensated for the reduction at Huntly:
467
 
If Genesis reduced the Huntly low-priced energy offer by 150MW (as it did) 
without increasing the low-priced offer by the same amount at Tokaanu, 
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Genesis would have been exposed to the possibility of being short 150MW. 
In other words, if the constraint between Otahuhu and Whakamaru was 
removed or relaxed, and the North Island interim price was high but below 
Genesis‟ next offer price, Genesis would have been short by 150MW. 
It is difficult to decide whether this logic is convincing or not. No explanation is 
given for Genesis‟ decision to reduce generation at Huntly, necessitating the 
increased generation at Tokaanu in the first place. Presumably it was accepted as a 
commercially rational, profit-maximising decision, given that offers in excess of 
$19,000/MWh were possible. The UTS Committee noted that:
468
 
… there is no price cap on offers made in the wholesale market for 
electricity and in its view offering generation at high prices is not per se 
evidence of manipulative or attempted manipulative trading activity. 
Just as in the general competition law since the passing of the Commerce Act, 
monopoly profits are not prohibited, and for the same reasons. According to the 
Schumpeterian logic of dynamic efficiency, it is the potential for profits which 
create incentives investment for long term growth and for contestability to 
discipline the market. Should the onus have been on Genesis to offer as much 
low-priced energy as possible at Huntly? Was there an obligation to protect rivals 
and customers alike by turning down the sure profits available to it as a result of a 
temporary monopoly it had played no part in obtaining?  To enforce such an 
obligation would amount to requiring competitive rivals to protect each other‟s 
interests, which seems to be a short cut to collusion, and certainly would not be 
consistent with a policy aimed at encouraging competitive rivalry.  
 
Clause ii: Misleading or Deceptive Trading 
Genesis‟ offers of $19,000/MWh were posted on the 25th of March, 2011, the day 
before the price hike. These offers were visible in several SDS forecasts for any 
participants who cared to look. Yet, as there had only been five half hourly trading 
periods in the past in which Genesis had been the „net pivotal‟ generator, it was 
found that there was no way the market could have been pre-warned that prices 
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would reach that level.
469
 At the same time, Genesis had made offers at 
$10,000/MWh thousands of times since March 2011. The result was that:
470
 
This limited ability of Genesis to forewarn participants, coupled with the fact 
that Genesis has made offers at $10,000/MWh over an extended period, do 
not support an allegation of misleading or deceptive conduct. 
The logic here is odd. The Authority associates a lack of opportunity to 
monopolise the market with an „ability to forewarn participants‟, as though having 
not engaged in predatory pricing before was sufficient to excuse the intention to 
do so on this occasion. If Genesis was net pivotal, they would obviously seek to 
extract high prices from the market, even if that had not happened before. A more 
literal interpretation of „forewarning‟ might have included the expectation that 
Genesis would have directly contacted major users it knew to be unaware of the 
spiking prices, let them know what exactly was happening in the market, and offer 
them the appropriate hedge cover.
471
 The warning industry participants are 
required to give to the market goes directly to the nature of misleading or 
deceptive conduct. The Authority‟s position seems to be that misleading by 
omission is not blameworthy. There is no requirement to forewarn industry 
participants in the Code, and perhaps this is an area that should be considered for 
amendment. 
The explanation is also inconsistent in that it treats the offer of $19,000/MWh as 
equivalent to an offer of $10,000/MWh, when it is obviously almost twice the 
amount. The quantum of possible damage, particularly in a market where it is well 
known that several major users lack the facilities for detailed up to the minute 
market analysis, implies that on basic principles of causation and remoteness, 
Genesis behaviour was blameworthy. Again the difficulty for participants is that 
there is no price cap on the NZEM, the market clearly operates on the basis of 
caveat emptor. Genesis‟ position would be that, as Huntly was the marginal 
generator with a coal and gas fired plant, offers in the $20,000/MWh range were 
to be expected.
472
 The problem was caused by the transmission constraint, which 
was beyond their control, not by their offer strategy. And, consistent with 
dynamic efficiency arguments, without those high prices there is no incentive for 
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Genesis to maintain and operate the aging Huntly power station, particularly when 
it is only required on those occasions when hydro power is insufficient to cover 
demand. Not only that, the decision amounts to a price cap which runs counter to 
the Authority‟s own commitment to deepening the hedge market.  
This is the problem. The volatility of the market is well known, whether or not it 
is a result of deliberate action. Normal market price movements include 
unpredictable and massive price spikes. Not all industry participants run 
specialised market clearing teams and many complained that they were unable to 
reduce demand or seek hedge cover because they were not made aware of the 
price changes until after the fact. But what about the caveat emptor principle? 
King Country Energy opposed the Authority‟s decision to reset offer prices on the 
grounds that it frequently advises customers of the risks of operating in the spot 
market without taking the appropriate precautions.
473
 Even then, advance 
knowledge would be of little use if hedges were not available and/or demand 
could not be reduced. Without market volatility, however, there is no incentive for 
consumers to purchase hedge insurance, to observe the market more closely, or to 
reduce demand where possible. All of which reduces the profitability and 
efficiency of the NZEM. So on the one hand, we can see that Genesis‟ offer 
behaviour may have been unpalatable, but it arguably was well within the rules of 
the NZEM and was consistent with the Authority‟s own stated objectives and 
policies, and the stance on efficiency and wealth transfers. 
This conclusion also did not sit well with many in the market who considered that 
there had been an informal „gentlemen‟s agreement‟ not to take advantage of such 
situations.
474
 Genesis Energy‟s decision to do so seemed to be motivated by the 
need to maximise profits from the aging Huntly Power Station than by the short 
run scarcity in supply. This merely brings as back to the argument that the prices 
should have been left to lie where they fell for the good of the long run efficiency 
of the electricity industry. 
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Clauses iii and v: Unwarranted Speculation or an Undesirable 
Practice 
The Authority here have lumped clauses iii and v of the definition of a UTS 
together.
475
 The intention was to consider whether Genesis could “determine 
prices in a significant portion of the wholesale market”, whether industry 
participants could have substituted supply or reduced demand, and whether the 
prices threatened the market sufficiently to amount to a UTS.
476
 
The first two points constitute the Authority‟s definition of a price squeeze. The 
term „squeeze‟ originates in commodity futures markets where they were assumed 
to be undesirable.
477
 In the context of the wholesale electricity market, 
 
a market 
squeeze occurs when a generator is in a position where it is able to „name its 
price‟, but parties exposed to that price are unaware of it until it is too late. 
Typically a market squeeze was part of a deliberate market coup, which, 
depending upon the circumstances, could amount to an out and out fraud. The 
Authority used the concept, but did so by applying a no-fault approach which 
avoided the question of whether the behaviour should have been penalised or not. 
The Authority‟s initial premise was that Genesis was not solely responsible for 
creating the conditions which put them in a „net pivotal‟ position. For one thing, 
Contact Energy had played a part by withdrawing 425 MW of capacity. If this 
capacity had been made available prices would have been unexceptional, leading 
some submitters to speculate that there may have been collusion between Contact 
and Genesis. When the Authority put the question to Contact, however, the 
written response was:
478
 
 „The expectation at the time was that prices were likely to be low for 26 
March and that it would not be economic to run the Taranaki Combined 
Cycle power station‟; and  
 „The Stratford peakers were being run for commissioning, under the 
control of the generation development project team. The peaker offer was 
changed as the result of a new commissioning plan provided to Contact 
Energy's trading team (received around 10:58am on 25 March) by the 
generation development team.‟ 
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When asked whether they were aware that the result of this withdrawal of 
425MW had been a factor in creating high prices on March 26, Contact‟s response 
was a laconic “No.”479 
Given that the Authority now has powers and status equivalent to the Commerce 
Commission, it is submitted that more could have been done to investigate this 
allegation. Collusion under s 27 of the Commerce Act is a serious matter and the 
Authority has the option of including material breaches of law under a UTS 
investigation. Any investigation should reflect a determination to treat 
anticompetitive behaviour with the same diligence as any other form of organized 
crime. Simply taking the accused party at their word is an inadequate where so 
much money and power is involved. The Authority‟s position was that, had the 
price forecasts for 26 March been more accurate then Contact might have made its 
TCC plant at Stratford available, demand reduction might have been more 
responsive and hedge arrangements may have been more diligently sought.
480
 
Perhaps if price forecasts had been accurate at the $20,000/MWh mark, and 
Contact had still withdrawn supply, then that explanation might have been given a 
harder look. 
Exceptionally high prices alone are not sufficient to constitute a UTS.
481
 The 
difference between a legitimate price signal and a UTS, is the possible harm 
undesirable practices cause to the integrity of the market. As the prices were not 
caused by any actual scarcity, they could not be said to be “competitively 
determined.” 482  If prices are not competitively determined then industry 
participants will lose faith in the market, with inefficient results. The example the 
Authority provides is that industry participants could go outside the NZEM and 
purchase higher cost distributed generation, which does not make sense if there is 
lower cost generation already in place. Yet if demand continues to grow beyond 
the capacity of our hydro generation, it makes sense to provide incentives to 
develop distributed generation, particularly carbon neutral alternatives such as 
solar and wind. Where is it written that the electricity generation and distribution 
must continue along its historic trajectory of domination by a few large 
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corporations with a monopoly of generation? Encouraging distributed generation 
would reduce the demand for more generation and more transmission lines which 
is driving industry pressure to force retail prices ever higher. 
The Authority also said that increased market volatility would result in the 
increased use of fixed price/variable volume hedge contracts which would 
actually reduce the sensitivity of demand side responses.
483
 This last point 
assumes industry participants would buy expensive hedges without also reducing 
demand. It seems an odd aside when the Authority has also made developing a 
liquid hedge market one of its priorities. Demand side response is not just about 
reducing power use, but is also intended to allow the selling of unused power to 
other consumers, a matter the Authority is required to address.
484
 Intervening in 
the market to reduce price volatility will affect the development of demand side 
mechanisms, as well as hedges. It is not a simple matter of prioritising one over 
the other. 
The overall conclusion was that an intervention was called for, and prices were 
reset to the Long Run Marginal Cost of a new entrant peaking generation, 
$3000/MWh.
485
 This conclusion was based on the assumption that reducing 
demand was to be prioritised over encouraging hedges.  It was also based on the 
assumption that distributed generation was not a realistic solution for New 
Zealand‟s long term electricity needs. The solution was to set a high price for 
marginal generation, not excessive, but high enough to make for a reasonable 
profit. This thesis argues that this sort of reasoning sounds more like prime 
necessity than one might have expected from the dynamic efficiency arguments 
which grew out of the Chicago School writings of Schumpeter and Baumol. 
 Clause iv: Material Breach of Law 
One fundamental question, which the Authority almost entirely ignored, was the 
importance of s 36 of the Commerce Act. Section 36 is the prohibition on taking 
advantage of a substantial degree of market power for a proscribed purpose, and it 
would seem to have been a natural start for any investigation into anticompetitive 
behaviour. The Authority simply said that s 36 was for the Commerce 
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Commission to investigate, but that in its opinion, s 36 had not been breached.
486
 
If it had been breached it would only have been relevant to paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of the UTS clause, in that it could threaten trading on the wholesale market and 
couldn‟t be resolved by any other mechanism. Perhaps it was felt that bringing the 
UTS under s 35 was superfluous, perhaps the Authority was simply showing 
respect to the Commission‟s jurisdiction. That the question arose shows that 
anticompetitive behaviour could prove to be a flashpoint between the two 
agencies. What if the Authority had determined that no UTS had occurred and the 
matter was then referred to the Commission? Industry participants would then 
face a situation of double jeopardy, acquitted by one regulatory authority, but then 
faced with the expense and difficulty of defending the same case before the next. 
Perhaps the High Court judgment would shed some light on the matter. 
 
The High Court Judgment 
Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd and others, including Contact Energy Ltd and Genesis 
Power Ltd, appealed the Authority‟s decision to the High Court. Justice Ronald 
Young‟s judgment was delivered on the 27th February, 2012. Bay of Plenty 
Energy Limited v The Electricity Authority
487
 is a repetitive and scrappy judgment, 
however. It appears to have been hastily compiled from work done by a number 
of different authors. One quote from the Final Decision, about the consequences 
of allowing the high prices to stand, was repeated three times.
488
 The judgment 
repeatedly restates the same points about the UTS clauses. It also lacks internal 
consistency in that it identifies different points of the arguments as being the most 
significant, all of which makes its logic difficult to follow. That confusion is not 
helped by a conclusion which, rather than summarising the arguments presented 
in a succinct ratio, simply states:  
For the reasons detailed in this judgment I am satisfied that the Authority 
made no error of law upon which its conclusions that a UTS existed on 26 
March 2011 could be challenged.
489
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The decision makes confusing references to kV and MW, seemingly using these 
basic units interchangeably. For example, at [47] where it says: “The System 
Operator seriously underestimated demand for 26 March, by as much as 120kV”, 
then at [160] where the underestimated demand is said to be “100MW to 120MW.” 
This is the difference between thousands of volts and millions of volts. It is 
perhaps not of major significance to the outcome, but it does show that the 
decision is technically inexact. More care needed to be taken in the proof-reading, 
perhaps indicating the time pressure the Court was under. The suspicion is that 
there may be other errors of fact. 
No doubt the manner in which the judgment was presented reflected the difficulty 
of compiling and responding to submissions from some thirty-one parties. The 
result is that it is not practical for this thesis to deal at length with all the points 
made in as logical an order as would be preferred. Rather the attempt will be made 
to summarise some of the key arguments and to identify their implications for 
competition law and electricity regulation in general. Perhaps if the matter were to 
be appealed at a later date, future scholarly efforts might prove more fruitful. 
The case amounts to an affirmation that the Electricity Authority is the sole arbiter 
of its own justice. The result could be seen as the Court simply rubber stamping 
the Authority‟s approach, “What is orderly in this context the Authority are 
uniquely qualified to assess.”490 A more useful and objective approach might have 
been to carefully consider all parties submissions on the events and, more 
importantly, the significance of those events. Nevertheless the Court was 
following the precedent of the New Zealand Supreme Court approving Lord 
Donaldson MR‟s comment that:491  
It does not matter whether, with whatever degree of certainty, the appellate 
court considers it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is 
whether the decision under the appeal was a permissible option.
 492
 
The Court‟s role was not to come to a different conclusion on the facts, but to ask 
whether the Authority‟s decision “was not legitimately available on the facts 
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found.”493 The only grounds for overturning the decision of such an expert body 
are if its conclusions are so untenable as to be illegitimate.
494
 
The Court found that, while the market prizes consistency in that like cases should 
be treated alike, “UTS provisions are inherently fact dependent.”495 That means 
that the decision cannot be criticised for being the first to impose a price cap, nor 
can it be used as a precedent for the imposition of a price cap as a remedy in the 
future, “past decisions do not have a precedential effect as understood in law.”496 
This is consistent with Telecom New Zealand v Commerce Commission,
497
 where 
it was held that the Commerce Commission: 
… has made it clear it is not bound by its own decisions and therefore on 
each occasion where the meaning of those phrases is in issue, it must 
consider their appropriate meaning anew. It is trite that this must occur in a 
factual context. In isolation from the relevant facts the interpretative function 
is effectively impossible. This proposition is highlighted in this case because 
this is a factually complex area where a specialist tribunal, the Commerce 
Commission, has been given exclusive statutory powers to find the facts. 
In accepting the Authority‟s unique qualifications, however, the judgment appears 
to have fallen into a circular logic trap:
 498
 
I am satisfied, therefore, that the Authority understood what a squeeze was 
because it defined the term itself. It then applied its definition of a squeeze to 
the facts of this case and its knowledge of the electricity industry and 
concluded this event was undesirable. It then used these facts together with 
other factual findings to test whether a UTS had occurred. No error of law 
has been identified in this approach nor was any conclusion by the Authority 
reached which was not available on the facts. 
In other words, the Authority correctly defined the squeeze because it defined the 
squeeze. Is there then no external test for a squeeze? If the Authority is not to be 
held to its own previous decisions then does that mean that terms such as „market 
squeeze‟ will be defined anew for each fact situation, and further, does it mean 
that each new definition will also be accepted simply because of who defined it?   
The Authority took it upon itself to apply its discretion under the UTS as broadly 
as possible, because this is the best means of dealing with the vast array of 
practices which could threaten orderly trading. Such constraint on market 
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behaviour is “common to many organised markets”499 The Authority has therefore 
taken a best practice approach, on the theoretical basis that the preeminent need is 
for flexibility. The point is, not so much that the decision was so incorrect, but 
that in choosing flexibility over certainty, the Authority may have opened the door 
to capricious and indiscriminate decision-making in future. Cases are always 
„inherently fact dependent‟ but fair play requires clear rules, which may not be 
provided for by general proscriptions in a code. This decision seems to miss the 
importance of setting those clear benchmarks to guide future behaviour. 
Nowhere is discretion more apparent than in the relationship between clauses (a) 
and (b) and clause (c) of the UTS provisions.
500
 The Authority must establish that 
(a), the event threatens trading on the wholesale market, and (b), the matter cannot 
be resolved by other mechanisms.
501
 Clause (c) lists behaviour which might be 
considered a UTS, including manipulative trading, misleading or deceptive 
conduct, undesirable practices, material breach of law and so forth. The Authority 
has determined, however, that behaviour which might fall within one or more of 
these descriptions will not necessarily amount to a UTS, unless trading itself is 
threatened.
502
 The five clauses themselves, are only included as general examples 
of undesirable situations. Treating them as definitive would mean that clause (c) 
would need to be expanded to include a “fully comprehensive and exhaustive list” 
which would be counterproductive.
503
 
To trigger a UTS the Court held that it is crucial to bring the conduct within 
clauses (a) and (b), but clause (c) will only be illustrative of a UTS.
504
 Therefore 
the Authority‟s decision cannot be criticised for failing to fall within any of clause 
(c)‟s categories, including the (c)(iv) material breach of law provision. Material 
breach of law, such as anticompetitive conduct under s 36, will only amount to a 
UTS if it also threatens trading and cannot be resolved by any other mechanism. 
This means that a failure to address a possible breach of s 36 will not necessarily 
be treated as an error of law. 
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Clause (b) stipulates that the other mechanisms of the Code do not have to be used 
if the Authority makes a reasonable decision not to use them. Other mechanisms 
include making amendments to the Code, an option some submitters felt should 
have been explored before setting what could be seen as a de fact price cap. As the 
decision to amend the Code is at the Authority‟s discretion, it is not an error of 
law to reset prices without amending the Code. As each decision is treated as 
entirely fact dependent, and as the court‟s respect for the Authority‟s expertise is 
complete, that discretion is almost unreviewable. The Authority may have to show 
that its choice was reasonable, but that may be such a formality that in fact (b), as 
well as (c), may be redundant. That leaves clause (a) as the true test, that is, did 
the conduct threaten the integrity of the market?  
If the Commerce Commission were approaching a market cornering problem 
under s 36, there would have been extensive analysis of the market structure, 
inquiries into the degree of market power the defendant firm held, and whether or 
not that firm had taken advantage of its power for a proscribed purpose.
505
 In a 
case involving a vertically integrated firm with control of an essential wholesale 
input, the ECPR rule would be used as part of the counterfactual analysis.
506
 The 
prices the firm charged to its competitor could include its opportunity costs, but 
exceeding ECPR over a long period of time causing damage to a competitor, 
could provide evidence of anticompetitive purpose sufficient to breach s 36. The 
object of the exercise would have been to decide whether or not the firm was at 
fault, in that it was using its power to drive competitors from the field to the 
detriment of the competitive process, a necessary step before the Commerce Act‟s 
punitive remedies can be imposed. Instead, the Authority takes a no-fault 
approach:
507
 
The Authority did not find that Genesis created a squeeze. It found that a 
squeeze occurred. It did not matter to the Authority whether any individual 
company created the squeeze or whether the squeeze was created as a result 
of a combination of circumstances. It was the existence of events the 
Authority identified as a squeeze which matter.  
Perhaps this is in line with the division of jurisdictions first indicated in the MOU. 
The Authority‟s role would be to focus on market arrangements and leave 
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questions about market conduct to the Commerce Commission.
508
 Yet given the 
power that the Authority‟s Rulings Panel has, to order penalties of up to $200,000, 
to award compensation of any sum and costs, it is arguable that this was not the 
legislative intent.
509
 Either the Authority or an Industry Participant may refer a 
complaint to the Rulings Panel, the Authority‟s own appeal body.510 The fact that 
the Rulings Panel has these punitive powers indicates that it would have to find 
fault, and that might entail a harder look at the sort of issues a s 36 investigation 
would entail.  
The closest the Court came to considering the s 36 question was when it said that 
“the Authority considered whether Genesis had taken advantage of market power 
to achieve high prices and thereby engaged in manipulative behaviour.”511 The 
Court acknowledged that the UTS arose because the prices were “the product of 
the exercise of transient market power.”512 Exercising market power to charge 
prices far in excess of underlying costs is the very essence of monopolistic 
behaviour, but it will only breach s 36 if done for one of the proscribed purposes. 
Purpose can be inferred from effects, and that anticompetitive purpose could have 
been inferred from the resulting and inevitable damage to Genesis‟ rivals.  
Taking advantage of market power is a phrase so closely associated with s 36 as 
to be considered a term of art. It requires the use of counterfactual analysis. Did 
the Authority actually consider the question of how a market participant in a 
competitive market would have behaved in the same circumstances? The Court 
acknowledged there is no price cap on the NZEM and that Genesis submitted its 
offers at the correct time, which put some of the onus on market participants. The 
market squeeze was then a result of the transmission outages, and the unforecast 
demand, which divorced prices from actual supply and demand. The approach 
was simply to consider the combination of factors in toto and decide whether all 
circumstances amounted to a UTS. 
513
 Genesis was not at fault because its 
“strategy around 25-26 March was consistent with managing its own risk of being 
able to supply all the electricity it had agreed to supply as well as (as it was 
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entitled to) maximising the price it received for the electricity it generated.”514 The 
inference is that any competitor in the same circumstances would have behaved in 
the same way, so in fact the Authority was doing a form of counterfactual analysis.  
The concomitant conclusion was that if there had been a genuine scarcity or that 
the high prices had been signalled sufficiently far in advance that they could be 
foreseen, no UTS would have occurred.
515
 This reinforces the point that prices are 
not capped, and that high prices may in fact be necessary to signal scarcity or to 
encourage contestability and investment. One wonders whether those 
circumstances did arise in the future whether the Authority would, in fact, have 
the courage of its convictions. 
If the incident had threatened orderly trading then one might have expected that 
similar conditions would have had similar results. But when similar market 
conditions did occur on the weekend of the 2
nd
 April, no price squeeze occurred. 
The market had learned its lesson, proper hedging and demand response measures 
were employed and prices were unexceptional.
516
 Genesis argued that this showed 
that March 26 could not have abridged clause (a), threatening orderly trading, 
because orderly trading demonstrably occurred. The Court replied that, as 
forecasts were accurate, no generator was net pivotal, and no squeeze actually 
occurred, the scenario was in fact quite different:
517
 
The fact that on another occasion the potential for the exercise of transient 
market power was avoided does not somehow undermine the Authority„s 
conclusions about the events of 26 March and the fact that they constituted a 
UTS.  
It would never then be possible for Genesis to show that March 26 was actually 
good for the market. The Court has not only treated March 26 as inherently fact 
dependent, but it has refused to accept any beneficial impact events may have had 
on the market over time. It is an argument Genesis cannot win. The resolution to 
ignore Powerco and treat wealth transfers neutrally in the interests of „increasing 
the pie‟, has not been forgotten, but such reasoning will not apply to price 
squeezes. 
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Was the remedy the correct one? The Authority set prices at the Long Run 
Marginal Cost (“LRMC”) because:518 
The $3000/MW offer price cap is intended to remove the effects of the 
market squeeze, while retaining incentives on participant that are aligned 
with those in a workably completive market. In a situation where there is a 
willing buyer and willing seller, a net pivotal generator should be able price 
up to the economic alternative of the buyer, which would approximate the 
LRMC of a new entrant generation option or the opportunity cost of 
electricity for consumers (i.e. the price at which demand response occurs).   
Setting prices for an essential wholesale input at the LRMC is basically the same 
as the Baumol-Willig ECPR from Telecom v Clear.
519
 Recall that ECPR is the 
basis for the counterfactual test in monopoly situations involving vertically 
integrated suppliers of essential wholesale inputs under s 36. Just like the LRMC, 
it accepts that charges can include the opportunity costs for foregone revenue. By 
applying the same calculation the Authority seems to have replicated Telecom v 
Clear and applied it to UTS decisions. This cannot be a coincidence. If the 
Authority had been able to impose a punitive penalty as a deterrent, then the result 
would have been identical to the Datatails case. Nevertheless the decision did 
create winners and losers, and seemed to penalise those who had made the proper 
risk assessments and paid a premium for hedge arrangements to cover just such 
occasions or who had responded to the increases in prices by cutting production. 
Could the Final Decision breach the Memorandum of Understanding the 
Authority has with the Commerce Commission? The whole issue of the 
interrelationship between Commerce Commission and Authority is left 
unexamined by the Court. The requirement to advise the Commission before 
amending the code is something still to be considered, as is the potential for res 
judicata problems created by the potential for parallel s 36 and UTS proceedings. 
The EIA prohibits the Authority from regulating anything that is the Commerce 
Commission‟s domain under  Part‟s 3 and 4 of the Commerce Act.520 Yet as this 
decision has no precedential effect, it cannot be seen as a price cap and cannot be 
a form of price control as we would understand it under Part 4, nor is it an 
amendment which affects the Commission‟s powers and functions. Parallel 
proceedings are also a common occurrence. So long as the Authority‟s reasoning 
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continues to be consistent with the prevailing competition law, then that too 
should not prove too problematic. One can only hope that any such jurisdictional 
questions could be resolved in a common sense matter, and if they are not, 
academics can always use a legal drama. 
 
Conclusion 
Competition law has evolved away from the ideal that statically efficient perfect 
competition was possible, or even preferable. Adam Smith‟s invisible hand 
became constrained by the static efficiency models of Cournot and Edgeworth 
who believed that efficiency meant the greatest output at the cheapest price. The 
Jeffersonian ideal held that democratic self-sufficiency was an inalienable right. 
The Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm predicted that concentrated markets 
would have inefficient results. The role of the state was therefore to identify when 
excessive profits were being obtained by monopoly firms, and then either control 
prices by regulation, or reform the market structure, breaking up cartels and 
monopolies.  
Beginning with the work of Frank Knight and J.B. Clark, economists began to 
realise that the difference between perfect and actual competition may be 
impossible to gap. J.M. Clark coined the term workable competition to make the 
point that perfect competition probably did not exist, and if it did it would be 
ruinous, a point that would be echoed in Robert Bork‟s influential Antitrust 
Paradox in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, some very influential writers suggested that goods should be 
produced at the marginal cost, and that prices should be calculated and maintained  
by regulation. Where prices could not be controlled, Pigovian subsidies or Kaldor-
Hicks payments could be used to compensate for disparities in Pareto Optimality. 
Ronald Coase stridently argued that such a proposal was a recipe for economic 
disaster, not just for the amount of wasteful state intervention it would require, but 
for costs to long term development which would be undermined by the low profits 
of marginal cost pricing. These marginal cost controversy arguments continue to 
be proffered to this day, particularly in New Zealand by economists like Grant 
Read, Bart van Campen and Lewis Evans. 
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The resurgence of Adam Smith‟s liberal ideals was thus based on a rejection of an 
interventionist state. Robert Bork and Richard Posner both argued that the 
populist ideals of the Sherman Antitrust Act as applied by the Supreme Court in 
Standard Oil, had made it a crime for a monopoly firm to profit, even where 
efficiency gains could be made, which was utterly illogical. Schumpeter argued 
that the real power of capitalism was derived from the waves of creative 
destruction, which destroyed the inefficient, making way for new ideas and new 
products. Baumol took the idea one step further, arguing that contestability only 
required potential rivalry to discipline the incumbent monopolist. These ideas 
were transmitted to New Zealand, as evident in the writings of Alan Bollard, and 
were encapsulated in the light handed regulation of the Commerce Act 1986. 
The two key elements of the Commerce Act were s 36, which prohibited 
anticompetitive behaviour, and Part 4, which provided for price control of natural 
monopolies. As the dynamic efficiency versus consumer welfare debate waxed 
and waned, both elements were amended with the intention of lowering the 
threshold for s 36 prosecutions, and enabling price regulation to take a more 
balanced approach. Efficiency benefits could be achieved by applying cheaper and 
more flexible control options and indeed the costs of regulation had to be weighed 
against the benefits. Ahdar pointed out that the acceptance of the overweening 
power of the monopolist to compete had resulted in s 36 being hamstrung, despite 
the lower threshold, as evidenced by the lack of successful s 36 prosecutions until 
very recently. Typical of this was the development of the Baumol Willig ECPR 
rule which indemnified vertically integrated firms from prosecution where their 
charges to rivals for essential wholesale inputs included the opportunity costs, the 
revenues lost through competition. The recent Datatails case demonstrates, 
however, that pricing in excess of ECPR in market cornering situations could well 
result in stiff penalties. 
The Electricity Authority meanwhile has had its own evolutionary history, which 
has had to take into account the problems peculiar to regulation of electricity and 
the development of the industry as a state owned monopoly. Concerns in Wolak‟s 
report about monopoly profit taking on a massive scale, in an investigation by the 
Commerce Commission, still failed to activate s 36. Monopoly profits alone are 
not illegal, a clear result of the Chicago School influence of Posner amongst 
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others. The Authority itself has stated that, unlike the Commerce Commission‟s 
position in Powerco, it would not take wealth transfers into account, but would 
apply a total surplus standard approach. Efficiency benefits would trump 
consumer welfare considerations, because the assumption was that consumers 
would benefit in the long run. 
When the UTS regime was applied to the March 26
th
 price hike, however, the 
Authority intervened because to allow market cornering behaviour on this scale 
would shatter the confidence and integrity of the market. The Authority cast no 
blame, but reset prices to the LRMC of a new entrant. The remedy reaffirmed the 
Authority‟s faith in contestability, balanced with the need to ensure that prices are 
competitively determined. Despite the fact that the outcome was not based on an 
explicit s 36 analysis, the result was extremely similar to the application of the 
ECPR counterfactual in Datatails. The fact that similar circumstances have had 
similar results before two very different regulatory agencies, should be reassuring 
to industry participants and consumers alike. The fact that UTS decisions lack the 
usual precedential value still contains the risk of very different and even arbitrary 
decision making in future. 
One final note, even though the marginal cost controversy resulted in a rejection 
of state centred pricing, and even though light handed regulation sought to 
exclude prime necessity arguments that utility services should be provided at a 
reasonable price, we still see echoes of those sentiments in the ECPR and the 
LRMC calculations of the Commerce Commission and the Electricity Authority. 
There is still the sense that where consumers and rivals are captive, the illimitable 
power of monopolist must be constrained. The marginal cost arguments of last 
century have shifted the calculation of what profit is reasonable, but the same 
logic applies. Dynamic efficiency takes a long run view, but in this new era of re-
regulation, abuse of monopoly power will ultimately be resisted by the Commerce 
Commission and the Electricity Authority. 
 
 
  
134 
 
Spiking Prices: How Economics, History and Law have 
shaped the New Zealand Electricity Authority’s UTS 
Regime 
By Steven Farnworth 
Bibliography 
 
Legislation 
Commerce Act 1975. 
Commerce Act 1986. 
Crown Entities Act 2004. 
Electricity Industry Act 2010. 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
Trade Practices Act 1958. 
 
Regulations 
Electricity Industry Participation Code 2010. 
 
International Legislation 
Sherman Antitrust Act 15 USC § 1-7. 
Clayton Antitrust Act 15 USC §§ 12-27 and 29 
 
New Zealand Caselaw 
Air New Zealand v Commerce Commission (No 6) [2004] 11 TCLR 347. 
Bay of Plenty Energy Limited v The Electricity Authority [2012] NZHC 238. 
Commerce Commission v BP Oil New Zealand Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 377 (HC).  
Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZSC 
111. 
Commerce Commission v Telecom (2011) 13 TCLR 270; [2011] NZCCLR 19 
(HC). 
Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corp NZ Ltd [1993] 5 TCLR 413. 
Commerce Commission Decision 482: Cendant Corporation/Budget Group Inc (6 
November 2002). 
Commerce Commission Decision 491: Contact Energy Ltd/Natural Gas 
Corporation Holdings Ltd (4 February 2003). 
Powerco v Commerce Commission [2008] NZCA 289. 
135 
 
Re New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Co Ltd/Auckland Cooperative Milk 
Producers Ltd (1988) 1 NZBLC (Com) 104,320. 
Re Associated Booksellers [1962] NZLR 1057. 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited 
[1995] 1 NZLR 385. 
Telecom New Zealand v Commerce Commission HC Wellington CIV-2004-485-
2118, 6 October 2005. 
Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 352 (CA) 
at 358. 
Union Shipping v Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662,669. 
Vector Ltd (formerly Mercury-Energy Ltd) v Transpower New Zealand Ltd [1999] 
3 NZLR 646. 
Vector Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd [1999] 8 TCLR 554. 
 
International Caselaw 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Boral (1999) ATPR 41-715. 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd (now Boral Masonry Ltd) v Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (2003) 195 ALR 609; (2003) ATPR 41-915. 
Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Superior Propane Inc., 2001 FCA 104, 
[2001] 3 FC 185. 
Canada (Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc., 2003 FCA 53, 
[2003] 3 FC 529. 
Olympia Equipment Leasing Co v Western Union Telegraph Com 797 F 2d 370. 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-
925; 167 CLR 177.83 ALR 577. 
Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Assn Ltd (QCMA) (1976) 8 ALR 481. 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States 221 US 1, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911). 
Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 540 US 398. 
 
Books and Chapters in Books 
Abernathy, W The Productivity Dilemma (Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1978). 
Amato, Giuliano Antitrust and the Bounds of Power (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
1997). 
Areeda, Phillip, Kaplow, Louis and Edlin, Aaron Antitrust Analysis: Problems, 
Text and Cases (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). 
Bakan, Joel The Corporation: the Pathological Pursuit or Profit and Power (Free 
Press, New York, 2004). 
Basu, Kaushik Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011). 
136 
 
Baumol, William The Free Market Innovation Machine (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2002). 
Bertram, Geoffrey “Keynesianism, Neoclassicism and the State” in Roper, B and 
Rudd, C (eds) State and Economy in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993). 
Bollard, Allan (ed) The Influence of American Economics on New Zealand 
Thinking and Policy (NZEIR, Wellington, 1988). 
Bork, Robert The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself  (Basic Books Inc, 
New York, 1978). 
Bork, Robert The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself  (2
nd
 ed, Free 
Press, New York, 1993). 
Clark, John Bates The Distribution of Wealth: A Theory of Wages, Interest and 
Profits (Kelley, New York, 1965). 
Coase, Ronald The Firm the Market and the Law (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1990). 
Collinge, John The Law relating to Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies, 
Mergers and Takeovers in New Zealand (2
nd
 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1982). 
Cournot, Antoine Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1838) (A. M. 
Kelley, New York, 1971). 
Douglas, Roger Unfinished Business (Random House, Auckland, 1993). 
Easton, Brian “Commercialisation of the New Zealand Economy” in Brian Easton 
(ed) The Making of Rogernomics (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1989). 
Epstein, Richard “Private Property and the Public Domain; the Case of Antitrust” 
in J R Pennock and J W Chapman, (eds) Ethics, Economics and the Law: Nomos 
XXIV (University Press, New York, 1948). 
Evans, Lewis “Public Utility Regulation in New Zealand and the United States” in 
Bollard, Allan (ed), The Influence of American Economics on New Zealand 
Thinking and Policy (NZEIR, Wellington, 1988). 
Evans, Lewis and others A Critique of Wolak’s Evaluation of the NZ Electricity 
Market: Introduction and Overview (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, NZ, 
2011). 
Gale, S (ed) The New Zealand Experience of Liberalisation and Deregulation 
(NZEIR, Wellington, 1990). 
Gault, T.M. and Allan, Barry Gault on Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2010). 
Ginsberg, Douglas “Synthetic Competition” in Leveque, F and Shelanski, H (eds) 
Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and US: Legal and Economic Perspectives 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, UK, 2009). 
Greer, Douglas “Contestability in Competition Policy: Replacement, Supplement 
or Impediment” in Bollard, Allan (ed), The Influence of American Economics on 
New Zealand Thinking and Policy (NZEIR, Wellington, 1988) at 39. 
Hatch, J The Theory of Contestable Markets and Other Recent Developments in 
the Theory of Competition (Economic Society of Australia, Canberra, 1984). 
137 
 
Hayek, Frederick The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1944). 
Heilbroner, Robert The Essential Adam Smith (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1986). 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell The Common Law (1881) (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass), 2009). 
Hovencamp, H The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2005). 
Keynes, JM “A tract on monetary reform,” (1923) in The Collected Works of John 
Maynard Keynes vol IV (McMillan, London, 1971). 
Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(4
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York, 2011). 
Joseph, Phillip (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995). 
Kelsey, Jane The New Zealand Experiment (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
1995). 
Keen, Steve Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Dethroned (St Martins 
Press, NY, 2011). 
Klein, Naomi The Shock Doctrine (Penguin Books, London, 2007). 
Knight, Frank Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) (Sentry Press, New York, 
1964). 
Machiavelli, Niccolo The Prince [1531] (Alfred A. Knopf, Toronto, 1996). 
Miller, Richard “From Macro to Micro: the Re-emergence of Efficiency 
Considerations in Economic Policy” in Bollard, Alan (ed), The Influence of 
American Economics on New Zealand Thinking and Policy (NZEIR, Wellington, 
1988). 
Mas-Colell, Andre, Whinston, Michael and Green, Jerry Microeconomic Theory 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) 
Nowak, Peter Sex, Bombs and Burgers: How War, Porn and Fast Food Created 
Technology as We Know It (Griffin Press, Australia, 2010). 
Peritz, Rudolf Competition Policy in America: History, Rhetoric, Law (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1996). 
Pickett, Kate and Wilkinson, Richard The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies 
Almost Always Do Better (Penguin Books, London, 2009).  
Posner, Richard Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (University of Chicago 
Press, London, 1976). 
Posner, Richard Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (2
nd
 ed, University of 
Chicago Press, London, 2001). 
Rawls, John Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972). 
Roggenkamp, Martha, Barrerra-Hernandez, Lila, Zillman, Donald and del Guayo, 
Inigo (eds) Energy Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in Changing 
Markets (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). 
138 
 
Round, David (ed) The Australian Trade Practices Act 1974: Proscriptions and 
Prescriptions for a More Competitive Economy (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Netherlands, 1994) at 213. 
Stoft, Steven Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity (IEEE 
Press, New Jersey, 2002). 
Samuelson, Paul Economics: an Introductory Analysis (6
th
 ed, McGraw Hill, New 
York, 1964). 
Schumpeter, Joseph Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Unwin University 
Books, London, 1956). 
Scott, John “Firm Versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity” in R&D, Patents 
and Productivity in Griliches, Zvi (ed.) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1984). 
Sen, Amartya On Ethics and Economics (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1988). 
Smith, Adam Lectures on Jurisprudence  (1766) (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1978). 
Smith, Adam  The Wealth of Nations (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1910). 
Sumpter, Matt New Zealand Competition Law and Policy (CCH New Zealand Ltd, 
Auckland, 2010). 
Taggart, Michael “Public Utilities and Public Law” in Joseph, Philip (ed) Essays 
on the Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995). 
van Campen, Bart Poletti, Stephen, Young, David and Zakeri, Golbin “A Guide to 
the New Zealand Electricity Market” (University of Auckland, Auckland; NZ, 
2011). 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Vernon, John and Harrington Jr., Joseph Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust (D.C. Heath and Co., Massachusetts, 1992).  
Viscusi, W. Kip, Vernon, John and Harrington Jr., Joseph Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust (3
rd
 ed, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2000).  
Wells, Wyatt Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World (Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2002). 
Williamson, John “In Search of a Manual for Technopols”, in Williamson, John 
(ed) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (IIE, Washington DC, 1994).  
Yergin, Daniel The Prize: the epic quest for oil, money and power (Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1991). 
 
Journal Articles 
Acemoglu, Daron “Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies” (2008) 6 JEEA 1. 
Ahdar, Rex “Escaping New Zealand‟s monopolisation quagmire” (2006) 34 
SBLR 260. 
Ahdar, Rex “The New Zealand Electricity Industry and the Limits of Competition 
Law” (2010) 18 ULR 51. 
Barton Barry, “Electricity Regulation in New Zealand: the Early Stages of a New 
Regime” (2008) 26 JERL 207. 
139 
 
Barton, Barry “From Public Service to Market Commodity: Electricity and Gas 
Law in New Zealand” (1998) 16 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 351. 
Baumol, W “Contestable Markets, An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial 
Structure” (March, 1982) 72 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1. 
Baumol, W and Willig, R “Contestability: Developments Since the Book” (1986) 
38 (Supp) Oxford Econ. Pap. 9. 
Bertram, Geoffrey “What‟s Wrong with New Zealand‟s Public Benefits Test?” 
(December, 2004) 38 NZEP 265. 
Blaug, Mark “Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus 
Dynamic Efficiency” (2001) 19 Rev. Ind. Organ. 37. 
Bork, Robert “Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act” (Oct., 1966) 
9 J. Law Econ. 7. 
Clark, JM “Towards a Concept of Workable Competition” (June, 1940) 30(2) 
Amer. Econ. Rev. 241. 
Costa, Joan and Ghemawat, Pankaj “The Organizational Tension between Static 
and Dynamic Efficiency” (1993) 14 SMJ 59. 
Every-Palmer, Dr James “The State and Monopolies: New Zealand‟s Experience” 
(2010) 12 Otago LR 227. 
Gabsion, Xavier and Laibson, David “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, 
and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets” (2006) 121 Q. J. Econ. 505. 
Hicks, John “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly” (Jan, 
1935) 3(1) Econometrica 1. 
Hicks, John “The Foundations of Welfare Economics” (1939) 49 The Economic 
Journal 696. 
High, Jack “Bork‟s Paradox: Static Vs. Dynamic Efficiency in Antitrust Analysis” 
in (December, 1984) 3(2) Contemporary Econ. Pol. 21. 
Hildebrand, D “The European School in EC Competition Law” (2002) 25 W. 
Comp. 3. 
Hunter, Alex “Restrictions of Competition in New Zealand” (1963) 39(86) Econ. 
Rec. 131. 
Kaldor, Nicholas “Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility” (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 549. 
Katz, Michael and Shelanski, Howard “„Schumpeterian‟ Competition and 
Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets” (2005) 14 Competition 1. 
Levin et al., “R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New 
Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses” (1985) 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 20. 
Leibenstein, Harvey “Allocative Efficiency vs. „X-Efficiency‟” (June, 1966) 56(3) 
Am. Econ. Rev. 392. 
Orbach, Barak “The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox” (2010) 7 JCLE Vol 7 
133. 
Scherer, FM “Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers” 
(June, 1967) 57(3) Amer. Econ. Rev. 524. 
140 
 
Shepherd, W “Contestability v Competition” (1984) 17 Amer. Econ. Rev. 572. 
Solow, Robert “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” 
(August 1957) 39 Rev. Econ. Stud. 312. 
 
Parliamentary and Government Materials 
Commerce Commission “Memorandum of Understanding between the Electricity 
Authority and the Commerce Commission” (December 2010) < www.ea.govt.nz>. 
Electricity Authority, “Interpretation of the Authority‟s statutory objective” 
(Wellington, 14 February 2011) <www.ea.govt.nz>. 
Electricity Commission, “About the Electricity Commission” <www.ea.govt.nz>. 
 
Congressional Record and Hansard 
Sherman, Senator John 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890). 
(27 February, 2001) 590 NZPD 7972. 
 
Reports 
Bollard, Alan “The Applicability of Contestability Theory to New Zealand 
Competition Law and Policy” (NZEIR, Wellington, 1987). 
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee “Ministerial Review of 
the Electricity Market” <www.med.govt.nz>. 
Commerce Commission “Investigation Report: Commerce Act 1986 s 27, s 30 
and s 36 Electricity Investigation” (21 May 2009) < www.comcom.govt.nz>. 
Commerce Commission, “Milk Markets: Consideration of Whether to Initiate a 
Commerce Act Inquiry into Milk Prices” (Wellington, August, 2011) 
<www.comcom.govt.nz >. 
Culy, J, Read, E, and Wright, B “The Evolution of New Zealand‟s Electricity 
Supply Structure” (NZEIR, Wellington, 1995). 
Electricity Authority, “Draft Decision regarding alleged UTS on 26 March 2011” 
<www.ea.govt.nz >. 
Electricity Authority “Questions and Answers relating to the Electricity 
Authority‟s decision that the events of 26th March 2011 constitute an undesirable 
trading situation (UTS)” <www.ea.govt.nz >. 
Electricity Authority “Summary of UTS decision and related matters” 
<www.ea.govt.nz >. 
Electricity Technical Advisory Group and Ministry of Economic Development 
“Improving Electricity Market Performance” (August, 2009) <www.med.govt.nz>. 
International Energy Agency “International Energy Agency Energy Policies of 
IEA Countries – New Zealand 2006 Review” < www.iea.org >. 
Read, Grant “Scarcity Pricing for New Zealand: A Personal Perspective” (12 
October, 2010) <www.ea.govt.nz>. 
141 
 
Treasury Government Management: Brief to the incoming Government 1987 Vol 
one (Treasury, Wellington, 1987). 
 
 
Internet Resources 
Evans, Lewis and others “An Essay on the Concept of Dynamic Efficiency and its 
implications for Assessments of the Benefits from Regulation and Price Control”  
< www.iscr.org.nz>. 
Feiyu, Lu “Spring Washer Effect: A Market Clearing Engine Study of the NEMS” 
(October, 2004) <www.emcsg.com>. 
Katz, Michael “The Appropriate Objective of Competition Policy”, (25 January, 
2011) <www.iscr.org.nz/>. 
Korah, Valentine “Compulsory Access to Essential Facilities Under section 36 of 
the New Zealand Commerce Act” (November, 1999) <www.iscr.org.nz>. 
LexisNexis Commercial Law in New Zealand (LexisNexis, NZ, 2012) 
<www.lexisnexis.com>. 
Markham, Jerry “A Financial History of the United States” (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002) <www.credoreference.com. >. 
Reagan, Ronald  “Inaugural Address” (Jan 20, 1981) <www.issues2000.org>. 
Russell, Nick “Regulatory Reform in the Electricity Industry: Bold Steps for a 
New Century or Rearranging the Deck Chairs?” (26 March, 1010) 
<www.chenpalmer.com>. 
van Campen, Bart, Kirkpatrick, Rob,  Poletti, Steve and Young, David “A 
Response to the Wolak Report” (25th May 2009). <www.epoc.org.nz>. 
 
UTS Submissions 
Genesis Energy “Draft Decision on UTS Claims” < www.ea.govt.nz>. 
King Country Energy “Re: 26 March 2011 Event” <www.ea.govt.nz>. 
Mighty River Power “Consultation Paper – Draft decision regarding alleged UTS 
on 26 March 2011” (13 May 2011) <www.ea.govt.nz>. 
New Zealand Steel “Draft Decision on UTS of 26 March 2011” 
<www.ea.govt.nz>. 
 
Newspaper Articles 
Hickey Bernard, “Auckland academics question Wolak report on power price 
gouging” (May 25, 2009) <www.interest.co.nz>. 
New Zealand Herald “NZ power industry‟s „gentlemen‟s agreement‟ on market 
power at risk.” (March 30, 2011) <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
The Press “Policy Changed Needed to End Growing Inequality of Wealth” 
<www.stuff.co.nz >. 
142 
 
 
Television Documentary 
Barry, Alistair In a Land of Plenty – the Story of Unemployment in New Zealand 
(Vanguard Films, Wellington, NZ, 2002). 
 
 
